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This thesis explains the development of three distinctive forms of engagement between the 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian states and foreign investment since the 1970s until 2014 in their oil 
sectors. State treatment of foreign investment ranged from stringent in the 1970s, to open in the 
decades of the 1980s and 1990s, to a hybrid model in the 2000s. The broad changes that occurred 
in the three periods responded to factors conceptualized herein as the conditions of state-
company bargaining, and the role of dominant and contested ideas. This study is accomplished 
through a detailed historical analysis and in-depth case studies. The dissertation incorporates and 
modifies insights from longstanding traditions in political science that deal with the politics of 
bargaining between states and transnational corporations: the Obsolescing Bargaining Models 
(OBM). It highlights the strategic view of states in their treatment of foreign investment through 
time, emphasizing states’ agency, by combining insights from the politics of bargaining, while 
also integrating ideational motivations, based on constructivist scholarship, in the shifts of state 
treatment of foreign investment historically. This perspective allows a shift in gaze from the 
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The political economy of state-foreign companies’ relations from an historical perspective: 
The oil industry of Venezuela and Ecuador 
 
1.1. Problem and research questions  
 
Since the advent of the last phase of globalization, the liberalization of trade, finance, and the 
opening of borders to investments and capital have become central focuses of attention. The 
ideas, policy regimes and mechanisms that attract investments have sparked a wealth of 
scholarly work. In this globalized context, policies geared toward strengthening state control 
over the resource sector are often seen as deviant behavior. In particular, resource nationalism 
associated with revolutionary regimes has been understood as a result of institutional failures, 
and their advocates are portrayed as outliers in an otherwise cooperative international system. In 
a widely cited article, Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston define revolutionary resource 
nationalism as associated with ‘broader political and social upheaval, not merely directed at the 
natural-resource sector’.1 This type of resource nationalism is characterized as having ‘dangerous 
effects’ on international resource companies with nationalizing actions that are ‘top-down, 
arbitrary and accompanied by little if any compensation or recourse’.2 But even more so, the re-
emergence of resource nationalism has been associated with wider rogue state actions that can be 
summed up as part of the greatest evils in international relations: ‘exporters such as Russia, Iran, 
Venezuela, and until recently, Iraq and Libya, actively defy global norms, invade neighboring 
countries, expropriate foreign investors, flout human rights, and finance terrorism and armed 
rebellions in foreign countries’.3  
 
Venezuela and Ecuador have been cited prominently as examples of revolutionary resource 
nationalist states. They are, moreover, part of the wave of left wing governments that rose to 
power in South America in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela was first elected in 1998 and remained in power until his death in 2013, when his 
vice-president Nicolás Maduro was elected to complete his term. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa was 
                                                            
1 Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston, “The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism,” Survival 51, no. 2 (May 1, 
2009): 150, doi:10.1080/00396330902860884. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Michael L. Ross and Erik Voeten, “Oil and International Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 1 
(March 1, 2016): 85, doi:10.1093/isq/sqv003. 
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first elected in 2007 and remains in power today. The ‘revolutionary resource nationalist’ label 
attributed to them responds to the fact that both of their governments produced changes in the 
legal framework that govern their states’ relations with foreign companies in their oil sectors. 
These legal changes have been proclaimed as re-nationalizations, after years of liberalization and 
opening to foreign investment.  
 
Several years after these governments had taken office, these nationalizing policies came into 
effect. In 2007, the Venezuelan government completed its ‘full oil sovereignty campaign’ by 
establishing new associations with foreign companies in the form of joint-ventures with the state 
holding shares of at least 60% of assets. Three years later, in 2010, the Ecuadorian government 
pursued a policy that forced a change to all oil production-sharing agreements to service 
contracts wherein the state pays foreign companies a flat service fee per barrel of oil extracted. 
These shifts in policy have been seen both in the academic and political spheres as representing a 
tougher stance against foreign companies and a reassertion of state control over the oil industry.  
 
The political discourse in these countries referred to these changes as bringing an increased sense 
of sovereignty and ownership over oil. Carlos Pareja Yanuzzelli, former president of 
Petroecuador and former Minister of Hydrocarbons in Ecuador, said in an interview that after the 
change in contracts, ‘the oil in Ecuador is 100% property of the state’.4 Moreover, the discourse 
that accompanied these ‘re-nationalizations’ also embodied notions of development and power. 
On the occasion of the takeover of ExxonMobil assets in the Orinoco river belt in May 2007, 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez said that ‘Venezuelans now have full operational control 
over their oil, upon which the whole development and power of the nation will depend for years 
to come’.5 Hugo Chávez stated during the same speech that Venezuela acquired operational 
control over its oil in the Orinoco river belt ‘for the first time’, contrasting the time of apertura 
or ‘oil opening’ (1990s) with his full oil sovereignty campaign. Similarly, in Ecuador, the era of 
                                                            
4 Interview with author, Quito May 2015. 
5 Hugo Chávez, Pensamiento Petrolero Del Comandante Chávez (Caracas: Ministerio del Poder Popular para 
Petróleo y Minería/ PDVSA, 2013), 164. 
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the 1990s is referred to ‘as entreguismo – or the selling out of the country’s interests’, in contrast 
to a more nationalist period in the 2000s heralded by Correa.6  
 
The main academic focus on the rise of the ‘new left’ has been concerned with explaining their 
emergence and characterizing their political models. For quite some time, the debate surrounding 
the left-wing governments in South America focused on a reductionist typology that 
distinguished countries between a generally market-friendly left and an authoritarian and non-
cooperative ‘radical’ left.7 Among the main political economy characteristics of the ‘radical left’ 
is its pursuit of apparently audacious and deviant policies of natural resource governance. The 
most prolific works on the political economy of the new left have been narrowly focused on their 
increased reliance on resource extraction and primary commodity export, a phenomenon recently 
labeled as ‘neo-extractivism’.8 While some critical scholars have paid attention to their reliance 
on foreign capital to expand resource extraction, studies on the terms of their association with 
foreign investment have been scant.  
 
Even more so, overall assessments of these countries’ historical treatment of International Oil 
Companies (IOCs) and other foreign investors are notably absent.9 Ignoring the historical 
trajectories of these countries tends to overstate the innovative and even radical nature of the 
current left-leaning governments, particularly when compared to the neoliberal period in the 
                                                            
6 Emily Billo, “Sovereignty and Subterranean Resources: An Institutional Ethnography of Repsol’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility Programs in Ecuador,” Geoforum 59 (2015): 268. 
7 Jorge Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 28. 
8 Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and Kristina Dietz, “(Neo-) Extractivism–a New Challenge for Development Theory from 
Latin America,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2014): 468–86; Eduardo Gudynas, “Diez Tesis Urgentes Sobre El 
Nuevo Extractivismo,” in Extractivismo, Política Y Sociedad, ed. CLAES (Quito: CAAP/CLAES, 2009); Eduardo 
Gudynas, “Natural Resource Nationalisms and the Compensatory State in Progressive South America,” in The 
Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism, ed. Paul 
Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016); Henry Veltmeyer, “The Political Economy of 
Natural Resource Extraction: A New Model or Extractive Imperialism?,” Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies/Revue Canadienne D’études Du Développement 34, no. 1 (2013): 79–95. 
9 Well-known texts on Venezuela’s oil and state date back to the 1990s, see: Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: 
Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (University of Chicago Press, 1997); Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of 
Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, vol. 26 (Univ of California Press, 1997). Previous works on Latin American 
countries include: George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982). For a history of Ecuador's oil industry see: John D. Martz, Politics and 
Petroleum in Ecuador (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1987). 
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region during the 1980s and 1990s, as the political discourse of these governments likes to 
emphasize.10  
 
This dissertation attempts to fill this glaring gap by underscoring the historical evolution of state 
treatment of foreign investment. This thesis seeks to answer the following research questions: (1) 
“How have the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean governments’ treatment of foreign investment in 
their oil sectors changed since the 1970s?” and (2) “What explains the approaches they have 
taken?” The main objective is to show the historical evolution of state treatment of foreign 
investment in Venezuela and Ecuador, paying particular attention to resource nationalist policies, 
which in both cases fulfilled important political objectives in the 1970s, faced important 
challenges in the 1980s and 1990s, and re-emerged during the 2000s.  
 
1.2. Main arguments and contributions	  
1.2.1. Empirical contributions: three forms of engagement with foreign investment 
 
This dissertation provides important empirical and analytical contributions. In empirical terms, 
as an answer to the first research question, this thesis will explain the development of three 
distinctive forms of engagements between the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian state and foreign 
investment from the 1970s until 2014. This is accomplished through a detailed historical analysis 
and in-depth case study. Table 1.1 below synthesizes the evolution of the states’ treatment of 
foreign investment in Venezuela and Ecuador in three time periods. State treatment of foreign 
investment ranged from stringent in the 1970s, to open in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, to 
hybrid treatment in the 2000s. This study concludes with the collapse of oil prices in 2014, but 
nevertheless makes some references to the evolution of the oil industry in both cases until today.   
  
                                                            
10 Chávez, Pensamiento Petrolero Del Comandante Chávez. 
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Table 1.1: The evolution of the treatment of foreign investment in the oil sector in 
Venezuela and Ecuador: from stringent to hybrid 
 
Country case/ 
Period of study 
State relations with 
IOCs 1970s 
State relations with  
IOCs 1990s 






Full nationalization with 
state monopoly. 
Association with IOCs 
only permitted through 
contracts for technical 
assistance.  
Open 
Open to FDI with joint-
ventures and association 
contracts with low taxes and 
lax regulations.  
Ownership structure of 
ventures was flexible, 
allowing for IOCs to hold 
majority ownership.  
International courts were set 
as venues to settle disputes. 
Hybrid 
Forced migration to joint-
ventures with majority state 
ownership. 
State restored the power of 
domestic courts to rule in 
cases of dispute. 







with IOCs.  
High state appropriation 
of profits and majority 
ownership of main 
extracting consortium.  
Open 
Open to FDI through 
production sharing 
agreements with low taxes 
and lax regulation. 
Hybrid 
Forced migration from 
production sharing-
agreements to service 
contacts with flat service fee. 
Joint-ventures allowed for 
SOEs, with majority state 
ownership. 
 
Government treatment of foreign investment in the oil sector in the 1970s is characterized as 
stringent with the culmination of nationalist strides both in Venezuela and Ecuador (see chapters 
3 and 6). Stringency in this context is understood as the desire of state officials to take over 
investment assets and achieve full nationalization of oil installations together with a high intake 
of the industry’s profits. These nationalist strides meant the full nationalization of the oil industry 
in Venezuela with state appropriation of industry profits well above 80%. In Ecuador, the 1970s 
witnessed important thresholds of control over the oil industry with 51% state ownership in the 
country’s main operating consortium, CEPE-Texaco, and 80% of appropriation of profits over 
the industry. None of these countries completely sealed off relations with foreign companies, as 
they remained linked through technical contracts in Venezuela and association contracts in 





In the 1980s and 1990s, a new era of open treatment emerged (discussed in detail in chapters 4 
and 7). In Venezuela, the state voluntarily decreased its appropriation of rents from its National 
Oil Company (NOC), Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and the company initiated a process of 
internationalization and opening geared toward increasing its administrative and political 
autonomy. The oil opening in Venezuela culminated in the 1990s with the signing of association 
contracts, risk contracts and the creation of joint-ventures. All of these forms of association 
welcomed investors under flexible conditions, meager tax burdens, and a legal framework that 
ensured investors’ confidence by establishing international courts as venues to settle disputes. In 
Ecuador, the 1980s was characterized by high foreign debt burdens and the need to increase 
production to service this debt. Risk service contracts were signed to welcome new investors in 
the Amazon region wherein investments were reimbursed once commercially viable discoveries 
were made. Later, in the 1990s, service contracts were replaced with production sharing 
agreements that allowed companies to appropriate about 80% of production and obtain 
significant windfall profits.  
 
With the rise of the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela and the Citizen’s Revolution in Ecuador 
led by Chávez and Correa respectively, a new treatment model was established (see chapters 5 
and 8). Unlike the 1970s, when full nationalization was achieved in Venezuela and state majority 
ownership was gained in Ecuador, the terms of state treatment of foreign investors are considered 
hybrid under these new left regimes. The hybridity of this model is characterized by state 
officials’ desire to increase control over investments, especially in terms of higher rent 
appropriation, without necessarily hoping to nationalize all or most of the industry’s assets. 
Foreign investors remained in both countries despite changes in the extraction terms and new 
investments were pursued, especially coming from China and other emerging powers.  
 
The new arrangements approved under chavismo in Venezuela gave foreign companies the right 
to own assets as minority partners in joint-ventures, something that was not possible under the 
nationalization law of 1975. At the same time, the government substantially increased corporate 
tax and royalty levels from the previous liberal framework. The state also restored the power of 
domestic courts to rule in cases of legal disputes with IOCs, something that the oil opening had 
eroded. Most importantly, it brought PDVSA back to state control. To a large degree, this state 
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control is currently exercised through alliance with foreign investors. PDVSA is now in charge 
of channeling funds for government spending, leaving foreign partners as key sources of capital 
and as partners that can help the government control PDVSA.  
 
In the case of Ecuador, the government forced a change in contracts with foreign companies as a 
means of redressing the liberal policies of ‘give away’ embodied in production-sharing 
agreements signed in the 1990s. With new service contracts, the state promotes the idea that it 
has restored sovereignty over the resource. Only joint-ventures were allowed for foreign SOEs 
with majority shares for the Ecuadorian government. During times of high prices between 2010 
and 2014, the state also procured increasing revenues that helped it to leverage innovative 
development policies. As a dollarized economy with limited access to foreign capital due to its 
2009 default, Ecuador’s state-led developmentalism has become reliant on foreign investment in 
extractive sectors. 
 
1.2.2. Analytical contributions: bridging bargaining conditions with dominant and contested 
ideas  
 
In relation to the 1990s, which has been the main political and academic focus of comparison so 
far, contemporary resource nationalists have exerted tighter control over foreign companies. By 
shifting the lens to a longer historical perspective, this dissertation argues that contemporary left-
wing governments in Venezuela and Ecuador have been more open to foreign investment than 
has been conventionally understood, and more than their counterparts were during the 1970s. 
Their relative openness to foreign investment with state control is testament to their desire to use 
foreign capital to benefit their political agendas and developmental models, as well as to changes 
in the bargaining conditions of the oil industry. Beyond the importance of describing and 
characterizing these general trends, this thesis proposes a framework to explain the changes 
across the three periods, while addressing the second research question.  
 
One reason for the nationalization trends in the 1970s can be found in factors included in 
obsolescing bargaining models (OBM). The obsolescence of the concessionary agreements from 
the earlier part of the century occurred as states gained more confidence and increased their 
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ability to regulate the industry, especially in Venezuela. Changes in the oil price were also 
important. A second set of factors explaining nationalization had to do with ideas, as emerging 
norms regarding national sovereignty over natural resources became dominant throughout the 
Third World. In this period, internal ideational contestations in Venezuela and Ecuador 
demonstrated the emergence of diverse coalitions around different kinds of resource nationalist 
policies. Both Venezuela and Ecuador maintained some linkages with foreign investments in this 
period but exercised more stringent control over the industry through rents appropriation and, in 
the case of Venezuela, by attaining full state ownership of the industry.  
 
The terms of the bargain changed considerably in the 1980s as a result of the decline in the oil 
price. In ideational terms, the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology together with 
the burden of foreign debt played an important role, especially in Ecuador. In this period, 
Ecuador pursued an open door policy that was geared toward servicing foreign debt through 
increased oil production. Though dominant, neoliberalism was not completely hegemonic in 
Venezuela and different actors within Congress and other institutional spaces contested and 
resisted liberal reforms. Moreover, the government tried, unsuccessfully, to keep PDVSA under 
control. The main ideational divide during this period in Venezuela emerged from contested 
views between PDVSA’s managerial elite, who emphasized the company’s interests as an oil 
producer, and state officials, who saw as their role defending prices and maximizing rents. The 
company’s managerial elite managed to pursue policies of internationalization and opening 
largely based on, and as a way to expand, PDVSA’s autonomy from the state.  
 
In the 2000s, the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments then shifted to pursue a treatment of 
foreign investors that I have labeled as ‘hybrid’ (chapters 5 and 8). The hybrid model responded 
partly to an increase in oil prices and the motivation to appropriate investors’ sunk costs. But in 
contemporary revolutionary resource nationalist Venezuela and Ecuador, foreign investment has 
also been used to serve the broader political and economic goals of the state. In the Venezuelan 
case, the government’s goals focused on asserting control over PDVSA and the advancement of 
a socialist political economic model after growing ideational divergence between PDVSA and 
the state led to a direct confrontation between the two. In Ecuador, these goals have been focused 




In summary, the broad changes that occurred in the three periods responded to factors that I 
conceptualize as the conditions of the bargain and the role of dominant ideas, underpinned by 
internal ideological contestations. Table 1.2 summarizes the main factors contained in this 
explanatory framework, which is based on a diversity of theoretical approaches. From OBM 
literature, this framework draws on the following factors as explanatory variables: industry 
maturity, state technical capacity, oil price conditions, industry concentration, and type and 
quantity of states’ underground endowments (Table 1.2). These objective variables help to 
explain specific moments when states faced greater incentives to increase control over foreign 
investment or, on the contrary, had incentives to loosen those controls.  
 
While drawing on OBM literature, I also modify it in some ways. OBM literature assumes that 
states and IOCs are unitary actors seeking to maximize their benefits (i.e., subsoil rents, see 
Table 1.2). I show, however, that companies are increasingly varied in their nature, and some, 
especially foreign state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may act in ways that the traditional private 
corporations would not. While industry concentration is recognized in OBM scholarship, this 
condition is usually considered at the national level and changes in the outlook of global energy 
market actors tend to be ignored. Because the rise of SOEs at the global level brings into 
question some of the common attitudes of IOCs toward host states, I include this variable as part 
of the bargaining conditions, especially in the current era.  
 
Building on political science literature, I analyze how the two countries’ internal ideational 
contestations affect the ways in which bargaining conditions play out in different junctures, and 
can lead to different outcomes even from the same objective conditions. Indeed, state treatment 
of foreign companies can be shaped by ideational motivations that transcend the incentives of 
rational actors as described in OBM literature (Table 1.2).11 Dominant ideas can originate at the 
                                                            
11 The role of ideas in the OBM has not been completely absent, especially in the earlier iterations of this theory. 
Notions of development and state capacity have been embedded into some of the motivations of state action for the 
bargaining literature. See: Barbara Jenkins, “Reexamining the ‘Obsolescing Bargain’: A Study of Canada’s National 
Energy Program,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 139–65; Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment 
in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-Host Country Relations (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971); Gary Gereffi and Peter Evans, “Transnational Corporations, Dependent 
Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico,” Latin American 
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national or global levels and may be embraced or challenged by the aforementioned contending 
actors. This ideational component of the framework draws on constructivist and political ecology 
perspectives to include ideas as crucial factors helping us to understand the specific meanings 
and purposes of bargaining shifts.    
 
Table 1.2 Explanatory framework in state treatment of foreign companies: bargaining 
conditions, and dominant and contested ideas 
 
 1970s 
State stringent treatment 
of foreign investment  
1980s-1990s 
Open treatment of foreign 
investment 
2000s 
Hybrid state treatment  of 















• Sunk investments 
• Increased state technical 
capacity 
• High oil prices 
• Concentrated industry 
 
 
• Need for new investments 
• Low oil prices 
• Exploitation of unconventional 
crudes, technology mostly available 
from IOCs 
 
• Sunk investments 
• High oil prices 
• Less concentrated industry 
• Exploitation of unconventional 
crudes 
• Attractiveness of host state’s 
reserves 




















• Division among 
nationalists 
 
• State-led development, 
ISI policies 
 
• International norms favor 
state control over natural 
resources 
 
• State-PDVSA struggles for 
control (Venezuela) 
 
• Parties’ disagreements about 
neoliberal reforms (Venezuela) 
 
• Social movements’ resistance to 
neoliberalism (Ecuador) 
 
• The rise of neoliberalism  
 
• International norms and 
institutions favor open investments 
 
 
• Government-PDVSA battle for 
control (Venezuela) 
 
• Environmentalists’ activism 
against oil extraction  
(Ecuador) 
 
• Neo-developmentalist agenda 
in Ecuador 
 
• Rentier socialism in Venezuela 
 
• Rise of China and SOEs favor 
state-market nexus 
 
Despite the similarities in the general trends of state treatment of foreign investment, this 
research also shows important differences in these changes across the two country cases. While 
some ideological characteristics of governments in the third phase are similar (i.e., expressing a 
critical view of neoliberalism and anti-imperialist rhetoric), they differ greatly in other respects, 
including their resource endowments, history of the oil industry and institutional capacity, and 
the nature of social activism. As will be discussed, these differences explain important aspects of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Research Review 16, no. 3 (1981): 31–64; Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of 
Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton, N.J, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
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the outcomes of the current study. Venezuela ranks first in world-proven oil reserves—ahead of 
Saudi Arabia and Canada—with 297,735 million barrels of oil. Most of these are heavy and extra 
heavy crude deposits. Ecuador’s reserves rank 19th in the world with over 8,000 million barrels 
(see Figure 1.1 below). The quantity of Venezuela’s reserves makes its attractiveness for foreign 
investment different than that of Ecuador, and suggests a stark contrast in these states’ 
bargaining capacity vis-á-vis companies. Furthermore, Venezuela’s long history of having a 
concessionary system allowed the development of institutional and regulatory capacities of a 
rentier state that was reliant on oil rents for over 50 years before it nationalized the industry (see 
chapter 3). In Ecuador, knowledge and technical capacity to control the industry has been partial 
and dependent on foreign investors (see chapters 6 and 7).  
 
Figure 1.1 World’s top reserve holders* (Million of barrels produced) 
 
Source: data from OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016). Canadian data from Canada’s Association of 
Petroleum Producers 
*Also includes China, United States and Ecuador 
 
Another significant difference between the two country cases is the role of resource extraction in 
the compound of domestic social forces and activism. In Venezuela, oil extraction is taken for 
granted and has been associated with national identity and the country’s political system since 
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the early twentieth century.12 Much social activism in Venezuela centers on disputes around 
‘socialism’ and alternatives to it as understood by the government elite, in opposition to 
liberal/representative democracy. As has been previously mentioned and will be explained in 
more detail, a major internal dispute in Venezuela occurred at the center of oil policy, between 
the government and the managerial elite of PDVSA (see chapters 4 and 5). These contestations 
related to notions of autonomy and control that reflect different subjective cultures: the culture of 
a globally-oriented oil producing company (PDVSA) and that of a landlord state.  
 
The purpose of resource extraction and use of rents in both cases differs greatly as Venezuela 
pursues a model of rentier socialism and Ecuador enhances a neo-developmentalist agenda. In 
Ecuador, beyond the socialism/democracy debate, resistance to resource extraction is also at the 
front and center of social activism. Environmental and social impacts of extraction have 
generated an alliance between Indigenous activists and urban environmentalists for at least two 
decades. These sectors, despite being relatively minor players in Ecuadorian society, championed 
the ideals of ‘buen vivir’ (roughly translated as ‘living well’) and sought to drastically decrease 
extraction and pursue a more balanced relationship between state, society, and nature. The 
inclusion of important environmental provisions in Ecuador’s new constitution, including the 
rights of nature, has been an important achievement of these environmentalist and Indigenous 
leaders. Even though ‘buen vivir’ ideals have been largely undermined by a developmentalist 
project heralded by the state 13 , these environmentalist principles add complexity to the 
relationship between state and extractive companies in ways that are not present in Venezuela 
(see chapter 8).  
1.2.3. Inserting arguments and contributions within international politics and global governance 
literatures 
 
This work provides important analytical contributions to a variety of literatures in international 
politics and global governance (see chapter 2). Broadly speaking, this work is circumscribed 
                                                            
12 Coronil, The Magical State; Miguel Tinker Salas, “The Enduring Legacy: Oil,” Culture, and Society in Venezuela 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 2009, 1900–1938. 
13 Lorenzo Pellegrini et al., “The Demise of a New Conservation and Development Policy? Exploring the Tensions 
of the Yasuní ITT Initiative,” The Extractive Industries and Society 1, no. 2 (November 2014): 284–91, 
doi:10.1016/j.exis.2014.05.001; Gonzalo Escribano, “Ecuador’s Energy Policy Mix: Development versus 




within the realm of International Political Economy (IPE) and specifically IPE studies, which 
embrace interpretative frameworks and theoretical eclecticism, while also committing to rigorous 
empirical analysis. 14  This thesis engages with two main bodies of literature that provide 
important inroads to the current analysis: OBM literature and constructivist approaches to 
political economy.  
 
A wealth of scholarship has been devoted to analyzing the effects of resource extraction on the 
social, economic, environmental, and political realms of developing countries. In these works, 
however, little attention is paid to the processes through which extraction takes place in relation 
with foreign companies. This research takes on the task to uncover the mediation process that 
occurs between states and companies prior to rent distribution. In this context, this dissertation 
highlights the strategic view of states in their treatment of foreign investment, emphasizing 
states’ agency, by combining insights from the politics of bargaining with the role of ideas 
deployed through internal ideological contestations. Moreover, it engages with state treatment of 
foreign investment from an historical perspective. This perspective allows a shift in gaze from 
the apparent novelty of new left governments to comprehending longer-term linkages, ruptures 
and continuities.  
 
I build on the OBM literature that emerged with the 1970s’ wave of resource nationalism. This 
literature explains the behavior of two sets of actors—host states and foreign companies—whose 
interests are not always completely incompatible.15 The bargain is thus described as positive sum, 
wherein actors can arrive at certain points of equilibrium and both may procure benefits.16 
                                                            
14 For a succinct discussion of methodological divides in IPE debates, and the role of empiricism and theory, see:  
Eric Helleiner, “Division and Dialogue in Anglo-American IPE: A Reluctant Canadian View,” New Political 
Economy 14, no. 3 (2009): 377–83, doi:10.1080/13563460903087524. 
15 Raymond Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues (Harvard University Press, 1977); Mikesell, 
Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries; Stephen J. Kobrin, “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis 
in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 609–38, 
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027624. 
16 Vlado Vivoda, “Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: Challenges and Change in 
the New Millennium,” New Political Economy 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 517–34, 
doi:10.1080/13563460903287322; Vlado Vivoda, The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big 
Oil: A Study of Bargaining in the Contemporary Oil Industry (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008), 
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:330900; Vlado Vivoda, “Rise of State-Firm Bargaining in the 2000s,” in 
The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 53–69; Janis Nikolaus Kluge, “Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and the 
Limited Access Order,” New Political Economy, July 2016, 1–19, doi:10.1080/13563467.2016.1201802. 
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Initially, the conditions of the bargain benefit the transnational corporation, which tends to be 
endowed with capital and resources that the host state lacks. Changes in the underlying 
conditions of the bargain produce incentives for actors to change the terms of the arrangement. 
The basic argument that stems from the model is that once initial investments have been 
committed, states gain confidence over time and seek changes in the terms of association to 
increase states’ appropriation of rents. As investments have been previously committed, 
companies can find themselves ‘trapped’ by host states, and the initial advantage becomes 
obsolete. Recent scholarship has assessed the validity of Raymond Vernon’s traditional OBM in 
the current wave of resource nationalism.17 New arguments have been added to analyze the 
progressive decay of the initial advantage held by IOCs. For example, a more concentrated 
industry tends to increase the relative power of companies while a less concentrated industry 
benefits host states. An exogenous factor is also decisive: the international price of oil. Higher 
prices benefit host states while lower prices benefit companies. Similarly, the quality and 
accessibility of the resource can increase burdens for host states which may lack technical 
capacity to extract heavy crude or access deep water off-shore deposits. 18   
 
In this line of thought, while the bargaining literature considers industry concentration as an 
important bargaining variable, it does so mainly by focusing on the domestic industry conditions. 
In general, OBM literature focuses on IOCs interaction with states. I argue that foreign investors 
should not be considered as homogenous actors. In the present day, the emergence of new 
powers that hope to appropriate foreign resource markets are prompting novel corporate 
behaviours, problematizing OBM assumptions about the simple two-actor model. SOEs—which 
act at home as NOCs but behave as IOC investors abroad with the backing of their home state—
can offer advantages to producing countries that traditional private IOCs cannot.19 In both the 
cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, Chinese SOEs have figured prominently as a new source of 
investments in the 2000s. Moreover, China’s lending institutions have generally been 
significantly active in providing other development and financial cooperation to both of these 
                                                            
17 For Vernon’s original model, see Raymond Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues (Harvard 
University Press, 1977). 
18 Vlado Vivoda, The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big Oil: A Study of Bargaining in the 
Contemporary Oil Industry (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008), http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:330900. 
19 Vivoda, The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big Oil. 
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countries. China’s emergence in the world economy and its thirst for oil can help to explain its 
firms’ more benevolent behavior toward host states, which may use this foreign alliance to 
improve their bargaining position with respect to other companies. Furthermore, the type of 
expansion experienced with China reveals, in light of recent IPE works concerned with state-
market nexus, a statist form of intervention that is simultaneously market and state oriented.20 In 
the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, China has not only become a critical source of investment in 
their oil sectors, but also turned into a lender of last resort and a fundamental stabilizer. Foreign 
investors’ diversity, demonstrated in the rise of SOEs, encouraged states to conceive of a form of 
engagement with investors that is portrayed as a ‘strategic alliance’. 
 
Despite attempts to update the model and include new actors outside of the state-IOC dyad 
locally and transnationally, the bargaining literature, especially in its most recent iterations 
assumes that states are unitary actors pursuing material interests.21 In this research, I argue that 
state behavior can also be explained by changes and encounters between domestic factions who 
advance ideas that become dominant at different times. These ideas can emerge from the national 
or global level and oftentimes are influenced by other state and non-state actors across borders. 
In the process of reconstructing the history of state treatment of foreign investment, it is crucial 
to examine the emergence and pursuit of local and global norms by different social groups in 
order to make sense of various moments of conflict and cooperation. My current work draws 
from constructivist scholarship that has stressed the importance of ideas in explaining the 
outcomes of economic policy.22 The theoretical approach in this thesis focuses on two main 
pathways through which ideas affect outcomes: ideas as ‘meaning’ and ideas as ‘subjectivity’. 
The meaning of national identity tied to subsoil sovereignty and the meaning of development are 
                                                            
20 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Naná de Graaff, and Henk Overbeek, “The Reconfiguration of the Global State–Capital 
Nexus,” Globalizations 9, no. 4 (August 2012): 471–86, doi:10.1080/14747731.2012.699915. 
21 David Levy and Aseem Prakash, “Bargains Old and New: Multinational Corporations in Global Governance,” 
Business and Politics 5, no. 2 (2003). 
22 Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of 
Revolution in Venezuela (Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Diego Bautista Urbaneja, La Renta Y El Reclamo: 
Ensayo Sobre Petróleo Y Economía Política En Venezuela (Caracas: Alfa, 2013); Carlos De la Torre, “Technocratic 
Populism in Ecuador,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 3 (2013): 33–46; Tom Perreault and Gabriela Valdivia, 
“Hydrocarbons, Popular Protest and National Imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in Comparative Context,” Geoforum 
41, no. 5 (2010): 689–99; Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, “Material Constraints to Popular Imaginaries: The 
Extractive Economy and Resource Nationalism in Bolivia,” Political Geography 31, no. 4 (2012): 225–35; Anthony 
Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury, Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America 
(University of Texas Press, 2013). 
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particularly crucial. At the same time, subjective beliefs associated with different social actors 
are relevant in this account. For instance, struggles over control and autonomy between the state 
and PDVSA in Venezuela were largely rooted in different interpretations of what an autonomous 
oil producer ought to do and what the role of the landlord state is in the context of national 
development. In Ecuador, internal ideological disputes took the form of social and 
environmentalist activism. Social movements and indigenous leadership led strong campaigns 
that encouraged a temporary moratorium on oil extraction in the national park Yasuní and led 
actions against IOCs through national and international activism.  While dominant ideas are 
important in affecting state behavior, ideas are also contested by different social actors and may 
carry different weight at specific times.  
 
In addition to contributing to OBM literature as well as scholarship on the role of ideas, the 
analytical framework proposed in this thesis also speaks to ongoing broader debates in 
international politics and global governance about the role of the state. Significant analytical 
innovations have brought to light the diffusion of state power to other actors,23 networks,24 
institutions25 and mechanisms.26 Nevertheless, many agree that the state remains an important site 
of contestation.27 The early discussions that placed a focus on the battle of states versus markets 
have clearly evolved to a point where states and markets are not antithetical. If anything, these 
sites of authority face important frictions but can also complement, incorporate, and overlap one 
another. While diffusion of power has been eloquently seen as a ‘form of governing’28, a state-
                                                            
23 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988); Stefano Guzzini and Iver B. Neumann, The Diffusion 
of Power in Global Governance: International Political Economy Meets Foucault, Palgrave Studies in International 
Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire  ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Margaret E. Keck, 
Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998). 
24 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order / Anne-Marie Slaughter. (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), http://books.scholarsportal.info/viewdoc.html?id=/ebooks/ebooks2/pda/2011-12-
01/1/13826.9781400825998. 
25 Michael N. Barnett, Rules for the World International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–732. 
26 Guzzini and Neumann, The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance. 
27 Robert W. Cox, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge Studies in International Relations  ; 40 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Philip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics a Theory of Transnational 
Neopluralism, Oxford Scholarship Online (New York  ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733699.001.0001. 
28 Guzzini and Neumann, The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance. 
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market nexus has been recently illuminated in studies of the global economy, as the state has 
become increasingly active in global markets and market forces require domestic state action to 
operate.29 In broad terms, my analytical perspective contributes to these debates by pointing out 
that the state remains an important locus of power, without negating market and global forces. 
This is particularly true today with the rise of new powers in global markets, which are strongly 
influenced by and connected to their home states.  
 
Importantly, the present work also contributes to broader debates about Latin America and the 
region’s connection to the global economy through its position of primary commodity producer. 
As previously mentioned, this work draws on recent discussions of extractivism. It is important 
to recognize, however, that these debates about Latin America’s position in the global economy 
have a long tradition in the region’s social thought. Many theoretical contributions sought to de-
center our understanding of the global economy, from the metropolis to the ‘periphery’ of the 
system, highlighting the political economy interdependence between center and periphery. This 
work explores such peripheral states, and particularly some which claim national ownership over 
subsoil resources. These states simultaneously engage with global forces and international 
markets for their resources. This research contributes to a long lineage of social thought from the 
essayists of the early twentieth century30 to the structuralist school,31 dependency scholars,32 and 
post-colonial intellectuals33 that have contributed to the critical placement of Latin America in 
the wider context of the modern capitalist system. In recent years, attempts to bring to light Latin 
American and other non-western contributions to our understanding of norm creation in global 
                                                            
29 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Naná de Graaff, and Henk Overbeek, “The Reconfiguration of the Global State–Capital 
Nexus,” Globalizations 9, no. 4 (August 2012): 471–86, doi:10.1080/14747731.2012.699915. 
30 Victor Raúl Haya De La Torre, “El Antimperialismo Y El APRA,” Santiago: Ercilla, 1936; José Carlos 
Mariátegui, 7 Ensayos de Interpretación de La Realidad Peruana, vol. 4 (Fundacion Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1979). 
31 Raúl Prebisch, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” Comisión Económica 
Para América Latina Y El Caribe, 1950, http://archivo.cepal.org/pdfs/cdPrebisch/002.pdf. 
32 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia Y Desarrollo En América Latina: Ensayo de 
Interpretación Sociológica (Siglo xxi, 1996); Ruy Mauro Marini, “Dialéctica de La Dependencia” (Era, 1977), 
http://lahaine.org/amauta/b2-img/mauro_dia.pdf. 
33 Edgardo Lander, La Colonialidad Del Saber: Eurocentrismo Y Ciencias Sociales: Perspectivas Latinoamericanas 
(Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, 1993); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making 
and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.31025; Arturo Escobar, “Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative 
Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or Post-Development?,” Cultural Studies 24, no. 1 (2010): 1–65. 
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governance34 and the configuration of IPE35 have also been a matter of debate. In essence, Latin 
American states are also globalized states; they are part and parcel of global economic processes 
and have been so for a long time.  
 
The following section of this chapter briefly conceptualizes resource nationalism in the current 
era of globalization and places Venezuela and Ecuador’s policies in a wider regional and 
historical context. The objective of this section is to provide a conceptual understanding of 
resource nationalism within this work. 
1.3. Conceptualizing resource nationalism in the era of globalization 
 
Resource nationalism can take many forms, different policies, ideas and discourses. In a narrow 
sense, Stevens argues that resource nationalism ‘is assumed to have two components—limiting 
the operations of private IOCs and asserting a greater national control over natural resource 
development’.36 In a broader sense, Click and Weiner include the purposes of such actions and 
define resource nationalism as: ‘state control or dominance of natural resources, and the resulting 
potential to use this power for political and economic purposes, including relationships with 
foreign investors’. They go on to argue that ‘at the heart of resource nationalism is a 
government’s intervention in its country’s natural resource industries to protect or enhance its 
national patrimony and sovereignty’.37 Drawing on the recent work of Haslam and Heidrich, 
three basic ‘categories of action’ surrounding resource nationalism emerge as recurrent themes 
despite broader ideological commitments of different states. These actions focus on: 1) 
                                                            
34 Amitav Acharya, “Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Evolution of 
Norms,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 
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Global Order,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 7 (July 2, 2016): 1156–70, doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1154433; 
Kathryn Sikkink, “Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea of International Human Rights,” 
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 389–
404, doi:10.5555/1075-2846-20.3.389. 
35 Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the 
Postwar Order (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014); Eric Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical 
Foundations of IPE Thought,” Contexto Internacional 37, no. 3 (2015): 975–1010; Diana Tussie and Pia Riggirozzi, 
“A Global Conversation: Rethinking IPE in Post-Hegemonic Scenarios *,” Contexto Internacional 37, no. 3 (2015): 
1041–68. 
36 Paul Stevens, “National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies in the Middle East: Under the Shadow of 
Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle,” The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 1, no. 1 (2008): 5. 
37 Reid W. Click and Robert J. Weiner, “Resource Nationalism Meets the Market: Political Risk and the Value of 




maximization of public revenue; 2) assertion of strategic state control; and 3) enhancement of 
developmental spillovers from extractive activities.38  
 
The maximization of revenues is generally done through royalty, corporate or windfall taxes, 
although royalties are the simplest and most common way for landowner states to take a piece of 
the rent pie. While state ownership over the resource is a given in many producing states, control 
over the industry is a more abstract term that is open for interpretation depending on the 
historical and social context.39 The degree of control that a state can exercise in the resource 
industry varies according to the different policy mechanisms it can deploy. Policies can target the 
ownership of one specific firm, or the entire resource industry at any level, but it commonly 
occurs upstream in the industry and less so at the downstream level.40 Ownership over a firm’s 
assets or the entire industry can be mandated through expropriations or confiscation.41  
 
Policies targeting ownership have been usually referred to as nationalization, at least in the Latin 
American context. Bolivia nationalized its oil in 1937 after the end of the devastating Chaco war. 
Mexico nationalized the industry under the government of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938. Mexico’s 
nationalization had an important symbolic impact for producing countries in the region as well as 
for IOCs. This move made the US government more cautious in challenging host countries’ 
demands on companies, especially in the context of the Second World War (see chapter 3). As 
will be discussed, a process of nationalization led by Carlos Andrés Pérez was finalized in 
Venezuela in 1976 (see chapter 3). Part of the military in Ecuador attempted a full 
nationalization in the 1970s but managed to achieve it only partially (see chapter 5). In current 
times, policies targeting the ownership structure of the whole industry have been less salient, due 
to the increasing mix of private and public enterprises and innovative forms of state regulation. 
Arsel et al. stress that nationalization today ‘cannot be understood simply as a state takeover of 
                                                            
38 Haslam and Heidrich, “From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism: States, Firms and Development.” P. 1 
39 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional 
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40 Jeffrey D. Wilson, “Understanding Resource Nationalism: Economic Dynamics and Political Institutions,” 
Contemporary Politics, no. ahead-of-print (2015): 1–18. 
41 Ruben Berrios, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern, “Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin 
America: Economics and Political Ideology,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 5 (2011): 673–97. 
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private enterprises’ but rather as ‘the increased presence of the state in the extractive process’.42 
As we shall see, these more nuanced or ‘hybrid’ shifts are at the heart of the contemporary 
processes of resource nationalism in countries like Venezuela and Ecuador. 
 
Today, management policies that increase state control are usually implemented through legal 
constraints in contracts. In this line of policies, there are mechanisms that deploy industrial 
policy requirements or local content quotas for certain operations. 43  Industrial policy can 
therefore be advanced through mechanisms of private-public alliances that allow investments to 
come into countries’ specific sectors. Brazil is an illustrative case as the state has used foreign 
investment in its resource sectors to advance internationally competitive firms and link these 
investments with wider redistributive and industrial policies.44  
 
Policies of control through legal contracts have been recently used in Venezuela and Ecuador. 
Under such managerial policies, NOCs can control majority assets in a joint-venture that still has 
foreign or private partners.45 Indeed, this was the route of Venezuela’s partial nationalization 
(shown in chapter 5). A radical shift in contracts to assert control was the strategy pursued by 
Rafael Correa in 2010 after forcing a complete change from production-sharing agreements to 
service contracts in Ecuador (see chapter 8).46 These management policies targeting firms’ 
ownership or regulatory frameworks, along with tools to increase state revenues, are the type of 
resource nationalist policies enacted today in radical left-leaning South American countries.47 In 
the remainder of this work, I argue that these policies are still compatible with forces of 
globalization through controlled investments and associations. These differ from the more 
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45 Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern, “Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America.” 
46 Emily Billo, “Sovereignty and Subterranean Resources: An Institutional Ethnography of Repsol’s Corporate 
Social Responsibility Programs in Ecuador,” Geoforum 59 (2015): 268–77; Gonzalo Escribano, “Ecuador’s Energy 
Policy Mix: Development versus Conservation and Nationalism with Chinese Loans,” Energy Policy 57 (2013): 
152–59, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.01.022. 




antagonistic incarnations of nationalization in the 1960s and 1970s that aimed at full takeover of 
foreign companies’ assets.  
 
Moreover, resource nationalist policies tend to respond to different ideas of national sovereignty 
and are executed to satisfy a greater societal goal, or as a means to satisfy the interests of rent-
seeking actors. In a nutshell, there is also a nationalist component that refers to broader 
ideational factors, which assume that ‘the natural resources of a country belong to the nation and 
exist as a national patrimony and consequently should be used for the benefit of the nation as a 
whole and not be exploited for private gain’.48 As Perreault and Valdivia point out, ‘struggles 
over resources such as oil and gas become focal points for broader struggles involving the terms 
of citizenship, the nation, rights and identity’. 49  These ideational processes are indeed 
fundamental in drawing the lines of struggles and spelling out the discursive elements of state-
companies’ disputes. 
 
1.4. Methodology, case selection, and positionality 
 
This section describes the methodological approach used in this work. As previously stated, the 
research questions grounding the present work seek to historicize the changes in state treatment 
of foreign investment in Venezuela and Ecuador. This approach is strongly influenced by a 
tradition in IPE studies that is historical and interpretative in nature.50 In the words of Robert W. 
Cox, a historicist approach can be seen as ‘holist’. It is an approach that ‘considers individual 
events as intelligible only within the larger totality of contemporaneous thought and action’.51 
This research is inscribed in that larger tradition of historicist understandings of contemporary 
social reality. Two important notions of history are relevant in this case. Drawing on Braudel, 
this work recognizes that specific social structures and events are the result of long-lived 
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processes established by social and even natural forces, and are part of a longue durée. However, 
specific junctures—the histoire événementielle—structured as the result of consecutive decisions 
and actions, are also important in explaining certain social and economic outcomes, ruptures and 
continuities.  
 
As will become apparent, in order to fully comprehend the motivations and the outcomes of 
policies such as the contractual change with foreign companies in contemporary Venezuela and 
Ecuador, it is important to first contextualize them, and consider the historical linkages of these 
states with foreign investment. Through this history, it is also possible to conceptualize the often 
uneasy relationship between these states and their NOCs which, in the case of Venezuela, 
internalized IOCs’ logics and practices. Beyond long-lasting links with foreign investment in the 
oil sector, specific junctures —such as a coup attempt in 2002 in Venezuela (chapter 5), or social 
mobilization against specific IOCs, i.e., Texaco and Occidental Petroleum, in Ecuador (chapter 
7)—also substantially impacted the outcomes of state-company relations during Chávez and 
Correa’s governments.  
 
This thesis presents detailed and focused historical analyses of two distinct country case studies. 
It draws upon primary sources such as laws, policy documents, regulations of foreign companies, 
and interviews with key stakeholders as well as secondary sources in Spanish and English, for 
these historical narratives. It follows dissimilar historical periods traced through the history of 
each country’s exposure to the global economy as oil exporters. Venezuela started to export oil 
in 1917; it was the world’s largest oil exporter by the end of the 1920s, and has remained among 
the top 10 exporters since then. Ecuador became a net exporter only in 1972 and has since 
remained a relatively minor player in the oil market. Nevertheless, in both cases, the objective 
has been to analyze mainly three specific time periods, the 1970s, the 1980-90s and the 2000s.  
 
Rather than hoping to extrapolate generalizable conclusions and causal mechanisms, this work 
aims to draw conclusions about a particular phenomenon stemming from two country cases. In 
other words, it seeks to historizice the experience of resource nationalism in two countries 
currently governed by the left. This work sits in the camp of qualitative political science, which 
gives, in Bennet and Elman’s words, ‘priority to identifying causal effects rather than causal 
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mechanisms’.52 Despite the use of two cases, which may suggest the choice of comparative 
research, this dissertation develops what Hancké explains as case studies ‘conducted 
independently of one another, with a conclusion which engages the two cases side by side’.53 
Unlike comparative studies that attempt to hold certain variables constant and arrive at wider 
generalizations through methods of agreement or difference, the expectations of inference are 
circumscribed to the cases, but the research advances broader theoretical analysis that can be 
used in future studies.54 The intention is to comprehend the evolution of two countries in South 
America governed today by seemingly radical governments that pursue resource nationalist 
policies and still welcome foreign investment.  
1.4.1. Case selection and methods  
 
Case study selection followed from the universe of contemporary left-wing nationalist South 
American countries. This thesis focuses solely on Ecuador and Venezuela, as opposed to Bolivia 
as well, in order to concentrate on investments in oil. Natural gas and other minerals are referred 
to when they appear to be relevant to the larger discussion of resource extraction, but the central 
focus of this work is crude oil. The political systems of these two countries have undergone deep 
and radical changes in the past few years, due to the rise of left-wing movements to leading 
positions in state structures. Rather than pursuing changes within existing legal and institutional 
arrangements—as ‘less radical’ left-wing governments did in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay—the 
executive power in both Venezuela and Ecuador favored a complete re-writing of the national 
constitution and the exercise of hegemonic power by controlling all branches of government. It is 
usually assumed that this group of radical left-leaning countries is more investment-adverse than 
the more moderate version of the left turn.55 Venezuela and Ecuador are part of a broader anti-
imperialist alliance named ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America), together 
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with Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Dominica. Under Venezuela’s leadership, ALBA attempts to 
reconfigure social relations based on socialist principles.56  
 
The current research was developed over almost 3 years, starting in early 2014. Fieldwork was 
conducted in 2014 and 2015 in Caracas and Quito, respectively, for a total of 14 weeks in both 
countries. During this time, 52 in-depth interviews were conducted; the University of Waterloo’s 
Research Ethics Committee granted approval for the qualitative methods. In Venezuela, 20 
participants were interviewed between June and August 2014. Nine additional participants were 
interviewed via Skype, telephone, or written electronic exchanges from Waterloo, Ontario. In 
Ecuador, 23 participants were interviewed between May and June 2015. In both cases, official 
sources from government agencies were given precedence. As will be described below, many 
other informal conversations were also held with relevant stakeholders. Before commencing the 
fieldwork, key sources were identified and meetings were requested. Once access to a key 
stakeholder was gained, a snowball approach was employed to recruit other interviewees in and 
outside government agencies. All interviews were open-ended; although a tentative agenda for 
discussion topics was provided, interviewees were encouraged to speak openly about the various 
themes they felt were relevant.  
 
While Venezuela’s state is highly centralized, particularly in its oil policy, Ecuador’s is more 
decentralized and various institutions play a role in its relationship with foreign companies. This 
institutional difference has to do with the history of each country’s oil sector (see chapters 3 and 
6). Table 1.3 shows a comprehensive list of the official entities and civil society organizations in 
which interviewees were accessed in each country. Senior policy officials were formally 
interviewed at the level of Director General and above, including deputy ministers, under-
secretaries, and ambassadors. Informal exchanges also occurred with employees at various 
ministries and oil companies. The information provided through informal exchanges helped to 
inform views of the different locales presented, and to enrich questions asked of senior officials 
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and scholars; however, individuals involved in the informal discussions were not quoted directly. 
Names are provided only when interviewees provided consent, according to the guidelines of the 
University of Waterloo’s Research Ethics Committee. Upon their request, other subjects 




Table 1.3 Interviewees’ institutional affiliation  




! Petróleos de Venezuela 
! Ministry of oil and 
mines 
! Central Bank of 
Venezuela 
! Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 







! Rice University (Baker 
Institute) 
! Center for Strategic 
and International 
Studies, Washington  
! Centro de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos 
“Rómulo Gallegos” 














! Secretariat of Planning 




! Coordinator ministry 
for development and 
human talent 
! Ministry of Finance 
! Acción Ecológica 





! Asociación de Bancos 
Privados del Ecuador 
! Colegio de 
Economistas de 
Pichincha 
! Instituto de Altos 
Estudios Nacionales  
 
Beyond official sources, key former officials who now work in the private sector or in academia 
were also interviewed. In the case of Venezuela, access was available to former policy makers 
who currently work at IOCs or teach in universities in Venezuela and the United States. In both 
countries, several participants were recruited from university settings and were experts in oil and 
state-IOC relations. In Ecuador, interviewees included civil society representatives and 
journalists who have taken part in various struggles against oil exploitation with previous and 
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current governments. Engaging with interviewees from a wide range of political affinities and 
world-views enriched the perspective of the case studies and allowed for triangulation of 
officials’ views and official documents. It also allowed for a deeper understanding of these 
societies and the political processes that have been underway in each of them. All interviews 
were conducted in Spanish, transcribed and coded before commencement of the writing process. 
All quotes have been translated into English by the author. 
 
The veracity of interviewees’ statements may be a point of debate. Most interviews with officials 
reveal an interest in conveying a message about states’ interests and motivations. These ideas 
may appear as ‘the official story’ that is also disseminated through media and official 
propaganda. For instance, Ecuadorian officials emphasized that the new service contracts meant 
the regaining of sovereignty, in comparison to a previous era of ‘give away’ to foreign interests. 
In Venezuela, the official story magnifies the efforts of the ruling elite to safeguard the 
revolution and national sovereignty from foreign and domestic threats that seek to pillage the 
nation’s main source of wealth. Some respondents in Venezuela also insist that through his 
efforts to unify OPEC, Hugo Chávez single-handedly helped increase the oil price at the 
beginning of the 2000s, rather than viewing this increase as a result of an increasing demand in 
global markets. The statements made by officials were deconstructed via inquiries into how 
sovereignty safeguard mechanisms actually worked. Exchanges with the same official 
informants exposed, for example, that the new contracts in Ecuador did not indicate a radical 
reversal to the conditions of previous production-sharing agreements, and that joint ventures in 
Venezuela are also geared toward controlling PDVSA, rather than largely containing a potential 
foreign intervention. In terms of the history of state-foreign companies’ relations, the interviews 
were crucial in disentangling conflicting nationalist views at play during the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s—many of which have implications for current policy.   
 
While in the field, I attended workshops and symposia on political economy issues and oil in 
each country. Key spaces for debates of this nature were the Center for Latin American Studies 
“Rómulo Gallegos” (CELARG) in Caracas, and the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito. 
The case studies also drew significantly from content analysis of a wide collection of primary 
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sources from Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, and international specialized media, think-tanks, and most 
importantly, from government briefs, laws, regulations, and contracts from 2001 to 2016. 
 
1.4.2. Positionality: the ambivalence of autonomy and commitment  
 
Carrying out field research also involved important challenges. The most significant one related 
to the positionality of the researcher. In contexts of deep political polarization and social 
upheaval, interviews cannot be equated with simple sources of data. They are processes of social 
debate on their own, and must be analyzed in light of these contentions. While negotiating 
access, there was often an implicit request from interviewees to know the position of the 
researcher with respect to the subject matter. On fewer occasions, the expectation was overt. One 
interviewee asked me once, ‘before I proceed to this interview, I need to know whether this work 
will be used in any way to support a government that violates basic human rights and has 
destroyed my country’.57 At times like this, the researcher is posed with the ethical debate of 
positioning himself as honestly as possible with the subject of research—without entering into 
long debates about human rights or democracy—and, at the same time, whatever his actual 
position may be, hoping to safeguard the desired interview.  
 
Access to Venezuelan sources may have been initially limited by this issue. Despite having 
personal connections on both sides of the political spectrum and having moved through a range 
of affinities, the possibility of being ascribed to a political camp a priori may have had an impact 
in my access to some sources. The way this challenge was countered was by tracing as many 
other primary sources as possible, and trying to access officials through a series of different 
contacts. For example, I gained access to key documents through establishing excellent relations 
with the staff at the library Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo at the Ministry of Oil and Mines in 
Caracas, who lent a helping hand whenever I needed in the summer of 2014. Through the staff, I 
gained access to top officials in the ministry and PDVSA. In turn, these top officials in Caracas 
were remarkably generous. 
 
                                                            
57 Telephone interview 2016. 
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Finally, because of the challenge I mentioned about positionality and due to a larger recognition 
that any theoretical claim departs from and serves a particular perspective,58 it is important to 
locate myself from the outset of this work. I grew up in a Venezuelan working-class household, 
generally influenced by progressive ideas. My parents are unskilled workers who joined urban 
radical left-wing movements in their youth. I was distanced from most centers of economic and 
political power; for example, I did not attend a famous private or public school in Caracas. My 
formal education was the result of earning scholarships abroad. In short, I have always been 
disconnected from the oil elites in Venezuela (and also in Ecuador). Often, my interviewees 
inquired where I came from, both wondering about my place of birth but also trying to locate me, 
largely unsuccessfully, in their wider social universe.  
 
After finishing my undergraduate degree in Canada in 2005, I returned to Venezuela and joined 
the ranks of non-partisan, yet pro-government state officials and worked in an ambiance of 
policy research, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was part of a larger group of middle class, 
educated pro-revolutionary officials that grew slowly disenchanted and disenfranchised from the 
Bolivarian political process. I eventually realized that the polarized national context and 
authoritarian nature of the Bolivarian regime did not allow for ‘non-partisan’ or ‘critical’ support 
of wider progressive social transformations. Thus, I sought to return to Canada to pursue my 
doctorate in 2012. I intended to pursue my academic goals and regain the distance and autonomy 
of a researcher with no institutional and political affiliations in my country of origin. However, 
my work is deeply committed in an intellectual but also personal way to understanding my and 
other Latin American countries. I therefore embrace the ambivalence of autonomy and 
commitment, recognizing the potential effects of this ambivalence on the outcome of my work.   
 
1.5. Thesis structure  
 
Through a detailed analysis of their historical trajectories, I uncover the ruptures and continuities 
of Venezuela and Ecuador’s oil industries with global capital. My main focus has been these 
states’ treatment of foreign investment, including the various forms of control over the oil 
industry attempted over time. The present work argues that changes in the conditions of the 
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bargain and contested and dominant ideas affected state treatment of foreign investment in their 
oil sectors in distinct time periods.  
  
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines my theoretical approach. The 
chapter surveys the long-standing literature in international politics that engages with state-
company relations: the obsolescing bargaining models. The chapter outlines the value of the 
material considerations included in OBM, especially in its most recent adaptations. I argue, 
however, that the bargaining literatures, despite increasing recognition of the limitations in the 
two-actor dyad, overlook the importance of diversity within actors, and the role of ideas 
impacting the changes of the bargain. Concerning the latter, my theoretical discussion recognizes 
the value of ideational approaches, as cast by constructivist literature in international political 
economy. The role of national identity and the idea of development as important meanings for 
state actors help shape state treatment of foreign investment. Similarly, the power relations and 
subjectivities in which actors are immersed allow or constrain their behavior in important ways. 
The advantage of this approach which draws on both OBM and constructivist literature is that it 
is inclusive of both rationalist and ideational theories that attempt to explain the foreign 
economic policies of states.  
 
Chapter 3 details the history of Venezuela’s rentier state in relation to foreign investment. It 
argues that the state progressively gained knowledge, strength and capacity to control the 
industry and appropriate rents from foreign companies. This process culminated in full 
nationalization that took place in 1976. Insights from obsolescing bargain models illuminate a 
process of shifting bargains from 1943 to 1975, a period wherein the state had the upper hand in 
the business via appropriation of rents and legal regulation of company operations. The ideas of 
national control over natural resources also impacted national and international norms of 
landlord state association with foreign capital. Many of these norms became the basis for the 
creation of OPEC. Further, the chapter explains how two strands of nationalism contested 
policies of control over foreign companies. In 1976, policymakers associated with one of these 
strands –Acción Democrática (AD) nationalists— approved a nationalization law that brought all 
oil industry assets to the state, while allowing the possibility for engagement in technical 




Chapter 4 demonstrates that struggles for rent and control did not end with nationalization. The 
logics of bargaining were instead internalized, or ‘nationalized’, between the state and its own 
NOC, PDVSA. In this context, PDVSA created mechanisms to internationalize in the 1980s and 
1990s, as a way to develop its autonomy and break free of state political and financial control. 
While neoliberal adjustment became an important goal of state officials at the end of the 1980s, 
it was also resisted by some political parties. Leading members of traditional political parties 
hoped to keep control over PDVSA, and attempted to curtail its goals. This state-PDVSA tension 
was largely a consequence of conflicting subjective views of the role of a landlord state vis-á-vis 
a global energy firm. It was only in the 1990s that the government pushed for neoliberal reforms 
and, at the same time, allowed PDVSA’s plans for encouraging foreign investment in the 
country. At this time, foreign investment became crucial to expand oil output and strengthen 
PDVSA’s position internationally, while also distancing itself from OPEC quotas and mandates. 
In this period, bargaining power shifted away from the state toward the NOC and IOCs due to 
the fact that a new investment cycle began in the context of low oil prices. 
 
For PDVSA, internationalization in the post-1976 context meant securing autonomy vis-á-vis the 
state and fulfilling its perceived role as a global energy company. During the government of 
Hugo Chávez, however, keeping fields of the Orinoco basin open to foreign investors meant, in 
contrast, a way for the state to exert control over PDVSA. This rather paradoxical process is 
explained in chapter 5. This chapter presents an analysis of how an explicit battle between 
PDVSA’s managerial elite and the government ended with government control and set the stage 
for later reforms in the relationship with foreign companies. Following OBM insights, these 
hybrid reforms were made at the time when investments had been sunk in heavy crude projects 
and international oil prices were at record high levels. The new relationship established through 
joint-ventures sought to secure government control over PDVSA and over oil rents to carry out a 
model of rentier socialism centralized by the President. The ideas of state control in this period 
were more compatible with foreign investment than the nationalist period of the 1970s, mainly 
due to PDVSA’s legacy of autonomy. Moreover, new industry features such as the rise of 




Chapter 6 delves into the history of Ecuador’s oil nationalism and the tensions between the 
1970s military regimes and foreign companies. It explains how the military partially nationalized 
the oil industry in the context of a struggle with the Texaco-Gulf consortium—the largest 
producing enterprise in the country—drawing on wider notions of third-worldism and 
development. The military managed to appropriate 80% of the industry’s profit and was able to 
takeover the Gulf Corporation’s assets. This takeover, however, was not the product of an 
internal consensus; it provoked divisions within the military and was also influenced by Gulf’s 
intra-firm maneuvers. Finally, it argues that the military benefited from a formidable 
international context of high oil prices and shifting ideas surrounding development and national 
ownership of natural resources.  
 
Subsequently, chapter 7 explores the emergence of party democracy in Ecuador and the 
imposition of neoliberal reforms that forced a radical opening of the oil sector to foreign 
investment through mechanisms that have been known as a ‘give away’ of national resources. 
These mechanisms of ‘give away’ were embodied in production-sharing agreements. Low oil 
prices and the need to pay off foreign loans decreased the state’s bargaining power vis-á-vis 
IOCs. Nevertheless, commitment to neoliberal restructuring prevailed in forging open relations 
with IOCs and increased oil output, while resistance to neoliberalism emerged among social 
movements. The chapter explains that during the neoliberal period, the pursuit of foreign 
investment was central to satisfy demands from international lending institutions and servicing 
debt.  
 
Chapter 8 analyzes the emergence of Ecuador’s Citizen’s Revolution under Rafael Correa’s 
leadership in relation to oil policy. It shows the initial ambivalence of this political project 
toward resource extraction, largely due to important internal contestations between 
environmentalists and neo-developmentalists. Neo-developmentalist imperatives soon became 
dominant, and state-led development policies required the pursuit of oil extraction in association 
with foreign investment. The context of higher oil prices and sunk investments from the 1990s 
motivated the state to migrate all contracts with foreign investors to service contracts. The 
chapter explains how the state negotiated this change in contracts, arguing that this shift was also 
prompted by a narrow understanding of resource ownership by the political elite in Ecuador. 
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Hence, the roles of ideas related to national sovereignty impacted the type of contracts that were 
pushed forward by the state. Due to Ecuador’s limited bargaining power, which was essentially 
rooted in its relative unattractiveness to foreign investors, the outcomes of these negotiations 
were less favorable than was hoped. But like Venezuela, Ecuador has become increasingly 
reliant on Chinese investments and loans as China’s ‘go-out’ strategy has benefitted the 
Ecuadorian state’s resource and development policy. 
 
The dissertation concludes with chapter 9, which summarizes the main contributions of this 
work—weaving together its empirical and theoretical arguments. The final chapter also provides 
an opportunity for a comparative analysis between the two cases, and showcases how this work 
enriches recent international politics and global governance literatures. Lastly, it speaks to new 





Explaining states’ treatment of foreign investment in an historical perspective: 




The study of state-foreign company relations has long been dominated by bargaining theories. 
Obsolescing bargaining models, first popularized by the work of American economist Raymond 
Vernon, focused narrowly on material incentives in a two-actor setting. The basic OBM thesis 
proclaimed that at an early stage in the business cycle of resource industries, the advantage lies 
with the foreign corporation, as the host state usually lacks the capital and technology to extract 
the resource on its own. At a later point, once investment costs have been incurred, the host state 
develops confidence and regulatory capacity, increasing its motives to reap better deals from the 
foreign company. In short, the original arrangement becomes obsolete. 
 
OBM was used to explain the resource nationalization wave of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as 
the liberalizing trends of the 1980s and 1990s.59 It has been assumed as the ‘accepted paradigm’ 
of state-IOC bargaining in international economic relations.60 The model’s explanatory capacity 
has been expanded by up-to-date studies on host state-foreign company relations.61 These new 
studies have incorporated other variables and actors. During the 1970s and the 1980s, scholars 
working within OBM paradigms considered notions of nationalism, development policies, and 
sectoral disputes as important considerations within state-multinational corporations’ bargain.62  
Yet, more recent studies advancing bargaining models for the resource sector remain centered on 
material variables. 
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The main theoretical criticism of OBM that emerges from my study relates to the 
characterization of unitary rational actors that seek to maximize material benefits, i.e. 
underground rents. States are not homogeneous and are subject to different motivations that do 
not always respond to utility-maximizing rationalities. While actors are endowed with material 
capabilities, they also interpret these material conditions in accordance with broader 
considerations related to their identity, their role in society or their ideological commitments. 
The bargaining relationship between states and foreign companies are thus inscribed within 
broader ideological disputes.  
 
Even when affected by similar material variables such as an increased oil price, diverse 
ideological considerations can generate different outcomes in state treatment of foreign investors. 
As discussed in chapter 1, distinct material endowments, such as the quantity and quality of a 
country’s crude reservoir, can offer specific advantages to some state officials in comparison 
with others. Equally important, state-owned companies from emerging powers, acting with the 
backing of their home state, have been recently open to invest under a more nationalist 
regulatory framework, hoping to secure an increased supply of energy resources, something that 
traditional IOCs have not been equally willing to do. In this case, the context of state-IOC 
bargaining is significantly affected by geopolitical and economic considerations of global nature.   
 
In this chapter, I will briefly review how the global energy market is subject to the politics of 
bargaining and the main insights stemming from the OBM. As part of this discussion, I will 
engage with the most salient weaknesses of this approach. The third section of the chapter will 
explain the ways in which ideational approaches can help comprehend changes in state treatment 
of foreign investment, mainly employing strands of constructivist literature from international 
political economy and political geography. 
2.2. The politics of bargaining 
 
This thesis aims to address the changes in the relationships between the state and foreign 
companies required for extraction to occur. The state acts as a regulator for companies during the 
extractive process. The state, however, is also a mediator for economic actors, including those 
same companies, conflicting constituencies, and various agencies in the distribution of rents. It is 
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important to emphasize that my understanding of ‘mediation’ in this context is not one of a 
neutral third party that calculates costs and benefits and derives optimal solutions to a defined 
problem. Instead, this particular mediator is an actor itself; an entity with its own set of interests 
in the extractive process. The state is part of the bargaining process as much as it is the one 
setting the ‘rules of the game’ under constraining and enabling factors. This role is probably 
better understood as one of friction and constant negotiation. As will become clear from the 
examples analyzed below, the state is not a neutral entity or a pre-conceived, ahistorical one. The 
state also undergoes changes and variations in composition throughout history, determining long-
term linkages despite ruptures in specific junctures.  
 
The current discussion will draw from political science literature of the 1970s that has been used 
in recent years as a way to assess the validity of bargaining models in the relationship between 
transnational corporations and host governments.63 This body of work has been considered useful 
to explain the increase in resource nationalist attitudes by developing countries in recent years. 
Further, it illuminates various avenues with which to consider some of the deficiencies in the 
surveyed literature regarding post-neoliberal regimes and neo-extractivism. This literature 
stresses the shifting bargaining process between host states and foreign corporations. It 
demonstrates that, despite the intentions of any given government coalition with regards to the 
use of rent income, there is a bargaining process that occurs between states and companies that is 
generally influenced by factors associated with industry conditions. Understanding this process 
of bargaining is crucial in order to explain the mediation that occurs between states and 
companies before the use of rent income.  
 
The relationship between oil-producing states and IOCs is largely determined by contention 
surrounding the control of oil rents. Costs of extraction vary depending on the stage of 
development of an oil field, but are generally lower than the international market price of crude. 
By virtue of being a crucial commodity for the world economy as the most preferred source of 
energy, the international market price for oil allows companies to earn potentially large rents. 
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This phenomenon characterizes the nature of the politics behind the oil industry as well as the 
bargaining that takes place in order to determine the division of those rents.64 Susan Strange puts 
this eloquently: ‘the international oil business… is a particularly complex cat’s-cradle of 
interlocking bargains’.65  
 
These interlocking bargains reflect the tensions between different actors in a highly politicized 
market. The global energy market in general, and oil market in particular, are considered of great 
importance for most states, making their energy provision a matter of national security.66 The 
politicization of the energy market has given states with a relatively minor role in world politics 
heightened importance due to their ‘particular-intrinsic power’.67 This kind of power is largely 
determined by their capacity to affect the energy provision of larger states, through interrupting 
sales or affecting transport routes. 68  Hydrocarbon producers are thus on one side of the 
bargaining equation. In a similar fashion, states traditionally considered to be more powerful (i.e. 
endowed with strong military power and advanced industrial economy) developed strong 
transnational corporations that controlled oil production throughout the world until the 1960s.69 
These IOCs, the ‘seven sisters’, have traditionally been on the other side of the bargaining 
equation. Yet, with the emergence of resource nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, producer 
states have also developed strong oil SOEs, and likewise, emerging powers today compete with 
traditional IOCs for hydrocarbon markets and reserves throughout the world.70 
 
The embeddedness of geopolitical considerations in the state-IOC bargaining cannot be 
underestimated. Oil is a resource of such a geopolitical significance that the US—normally a 
strong advocate of free trade—imposed import quotas on crude between 1959 and 1973 to 
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protect local producers and administer oil inflow from allies across the world.71 In the aftermath 
of the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, the quota system was dismantled and US would later 
impose an export ban on American oil in 1975, which was only lifted during the second Barack 
Obama administration. Interestingly, these policies of market control exercised in the US have 
not been labeled as resource nationalist, but rather understood as part of larger national security 
strategies.72 Even though states and companies bargain on the basis of different endowments and 
ideational motivations, there are also undeniable geopolitical considerations that underpin the 
politics of bargaining.  
 
2.2.1 Obsolescing bargaining model 
 
According to the OBM literature, the state-IOC bargain is crucially dependent upon the market 
cycle of investments and maturity of the industry. It is assumed that in early stages, most oil-
producing states in resource-endowed countries lack the technology and labor capacity to invest 
in exploration and future extraction of the resource. As such, foreign capital becomes necessary 
to establish the groundwork for oil exploitation. Producing states welcome foreign investments 
in their oil industry to the extent that these investments provide them with the possibility of 
further resource extraction, and to make the extraction sustainable in the long term.73 It is 
ultimately understood that these states seek to appropriate as much rent as possible—while at the 
same time making arrangements for foreign companies that are considered attractive enough to 
be worthy of investment. 
 
The relationship of interdependence and power balance between these actors tends to change 
over time, as described by Vernon in the OBM.74 The core of his argument is that once the initial 
phase of investments is complete and extraction is in motion, states gain confidence, develop 
                                                            
71 Yergin, The Prize. 
72 Strange, States and Markets; Jeffrey D. Wilson, “Understanding Resource Nationalism: Economic Dynamics and 
Political Institutions,” Contemporary Politics, no. ahead-of-print (2015): 1–18. 
73 ‘Sustainable’ is an unfeasible term here because oil is a non-renewable natural resource. However, what this 
means, generally, is that investments can be made to secure higher recuperation rates of the resource and 
maintenance of mature yields for longer exploitation. 
74 Vernon, Storm over the Multinationals. 
39 
 
necessary knowledge, and eventually seek further control over the industry.75 An initial statement 
about this process appears in Vernon’s seminal work Sovereignty at Bay. In this book, Vernon 
states ‘the foreign enterprise whose successful establishment had rested on some superior 
capability or knowledge lost its security of position as time eroded the initial advantage’.76 In 
Storm over the Multinationals, Vernon goes on to argue that ‘when the initial risks are overcome, 
however, and the capital is put in place, the attitudes of both parties—business and 
government—undergo a basic change. The capital has been sunk; the initial risks have been 
overcome’.77 Indeed, the position of each actor changes as ‘the terms now seem much less 
reasonable to the government. The struggle is on to shift the terms toward a new point of 
equilibrium’.78 Hence, the bargaining terms reach a point of obsolescence, and a new bargain is 
sought. In sum, the OBM is conceptualized as a ‘positive sum game in which the goals of the 
MNC and host state are assumed to be in conflict, the initial bargain favors the MNC, but as 
MNC assets are transformed into hostages, relative bargaining power shifts over the host state 
over time’.79  
The early discussions of OBM included important considerations regarding states’ strategic view 
of development, such as import-substitution industrialization goals, and relatedly, state 
regulatory and technical capacity. For example, Theodore Moran’s seminal book on the copper 
industry in Chile explores a wide set of interests stemming within various sectors of Chilean 
society and also with borader international disputes.80 Gereffi and Evans’ take on dependent 
development in countries such as Brazil and Mexico shows how changing state-MNC relations 
largely impacted state capacity and industrial policy, challenging traditional notions of 
dependency. 81 Similarly, Barbara Jenkins sophisticated study of Canada’s National Energy 
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Program demonstrated the importance of considering corporate power in a wider net of 
international and domestic interplay of interests and contraints.82 
As mentioned, central in the original thesis of OBM is the maturity of the industry (large 
investors’ sunk costs). But state actors’ use of the obsolescing original state-MNC agreement is 
linked with important political considerations related to development policy. As will be shown, 
the image of a ‘hostage’ can be observed at different points in the history of Venezuela and 
Ecuador’s oil industry. As is explained in detail in chapter 3, during the 1970s, the 
nationalization of IOCs assets in Venezuela responded to a long-lasting process of confidence 
and state regulation over the industry. Companies’ installations were doomed to confiscation at 
the end of the concessionary contracts. In 1971, a reversion law anticipated that confiscation 
would take place in 1983 and 1996 when contracts expired. Companies faced incentives to stop 
investing and the government sped up the takeover. Similarly, at the time of partial re-
nationalization in 2006-2007, the Chávez government waited five years to force the application 
of an existing legal framework on sunk investments in the Orinoco belt (chapter 5). Finally, 
Ecuador’s purchase of Gulf assets in 1975 was in part the result of a process of increased state 
assertiveness over the industry (chapter 6).  
In recent iterations of the OBM literature, there have been important contributions that help 
expand and adapt the core arguments of the theory. Other determining factors affecting the 
bargaining relationship between foreign companies and host states are mostly related to the 
nature of the industry and the context in which it operates. A highly concentrated industry 
typically increases bargaining power of the foreign company whereas an industry with more 
intense competition contributes to the host state’s bargaining power.83 The cases of Ecuador and 
Venezuela exemplify each side of the spectrum. While Ecuador has a more concentrated 
industry, the Venezuelan market is somewhat more competitive. Among other reasons, this is 
due to the nature of their reservoir and the extent of their investments. In fact, the Venezuelan 
reservoir is the single determining factor that explains its more advantageous position compared 
to Ecuador in the process of bargaining with investors. The degree of concentration of the 
domestic market within each country, however, has not always reflected its current state. As in 
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much of the world, a handful of Anglo-Dutch and American companies dominated Venezuela’s 
market from the early twentieth century onwards. Increased competition emerged in the 1990s 
when Venezuela’s oil opening campaign diversified investments. Furthermore, as will be 
demonstrated, in the period of chavismo, the government considered diversification of 
investments to be a core pillar of its strategy for self-protection (see chapter 5).  
The price of oil is another crucial market factor that affects the distribution of power in this 
relationship. Higher prices tend to benefit host states while lower prices shift the balance toward 
companies.84 The historical experience demonstrates that ‘when prices rise, host governments 
rethink their contracts and seek higher taxes and royalties. Thus, it is natural that during a period 
of high prices the phenomenon of resource nationalism comes to the surface, as it is a by-product 
of high prices’.85 The bargaining models literature has therefore characterized different periods of 
‘conflict’ or ‘cooperation’ that depend on average oil prices, assuming that resource nationalism 
is less likely to emerge at times of low prices. Both the 2007 partial re-nationalization in 
Venezuela and the 2010 re-negotiation of contracts occurred in the context of high oil prices and 
were indeed a crucial factor in these decisions. In sum, resource nationalism is generally more 
likely to emerge at times of higher prices, when there are larger sunk costs, increased state 
capacity, and at times of more intense competition between extracting companies.  
The issue of more intense competition among companies requires further discussion. In OBM 
literature, the issue of ‘industry concentration’ is considered largely within the domestic industry 
and this point is of course important. Yet, the position and outlook of companies in general have 
changed considerably in recent years world-wide. While IOCs have historically been the main 
form of foreign investor, new types of foreign companies have recently appeared in the global 
energy market. Specifically important have been Chinese SOEs, which have been instrumental in 
China’s ‘go-out’ strategy used to satisfy the country’s energy demands. These SOEs receive state 
financial and political support and can offer extra investment advantages to home states. Often, 
Chinese investments are accompanied by other financial cooperation agreements as well as 
investments in infrastructure and other sectors.  
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In general, the global energy market has witnessed an increased presence of state firms and these 
firms have been present in the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean cases as well. According to de 
Graaff’s recent study, the world’s main five NOCs from various regions of the developing world 
have increased their corporate relationships in the last few years, doubling joint ventures abroad 
and tripling them at home.86 This state-capital nexus supports the view that resource nationalism 
has been ‘more pragmatic and opportunistic’ in recent years than it was in the 1960s and 1970s.87 
This increased presence of SOEs in international markets, recently dubbed as a ‘return of the 
state’, has not necessarily meant a broad redressing of globalization and market governance. IPE 
scholars exploring this state-capital nexus emphasize that the state is not necessarily antagonistic 
to the market and, more importantly, that the market needs the state to perform certain basic 
functions for it to operate well.88 For van Apeldoorn et al., the roles of market creation, 
correction, direction, and external representation are crucial for the wellbeing of the market and 
these functions are manifest today both in the global north and global south. The context of the 
global financial crisis demonstrated that active state action was necessary to ‘save’ the system 
and provide safeguards to important market players. 
 
The incursion in the market by China’s SOEs as well as Russia’s, India’s and Brazil’s public-
private ventures changed conditions of extraction in many developing countries. In the 2000s, 
both higher prices and a less concentrated industry (in this case, globally) gave producing 
countries greater bargaining capacity to shift the balance in their favor vis-á-vis IOCs. Changes 
in the global energy market produced processes that transcend the traditionally linear power-
shifts between states (NOCs) and markets (IOCs) to more transnational and ‘hybrid alliances and 
coalitions of interests’.89 The growth of emerging powers impacted the market not only in terms 
of oil prices, but also in the way the oil industry was organized, as new major ‘consumers’ are 
also represented through state companies that operate beyond their borders. The specific case of 
China’s apparently non-interventionist attitude toward developing countries created the 
opportunity for increased investment in extractive industries. Further, it led to a new dynamic of 
cooperation for infrastructure that has involved Chinese SOEs and financial institutions. Chinese 
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SOEs and financial lending mechanisms have become predominant both in Venezuela and 
Ecuador, bringing about important state-to-state alliances that include new foreign investors in 
the Orinoco belt and the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
 
Bargaining models, especially in the most recent iterations of the literature, tend to be based on 
rational actors involved in a two-actor situation that assumes a positive sum game ‘as the 
objectives of the two sets of actors are never exclusively conflictive’.90 In an attempt to update 
these models to different sectors in the current context, Levy and Prakash include other actors 
such as non-governmental organizations in the bargaining setting of increasingly 
internationalized investment regimes. 91  Ramamurti eloquently explains how host country-
multinational corporation relations have recently become a ‘multi-party’ bargaining process that 
involves international organizations. 92  Others such as Eden and Appel Molot explore the 
importance of second wave of multinational corporations (latecomers) with regards to existing 
investors (first movers).93 
 
These studies have shown that the typology becomes more complicated once other parties are 
introduced. A crucial theoretical contribution in this regard comes from Vlado Vivoda’s 
bargaining model for the international oil industry, which utilizes a ‘nesting’ approach and is 
especially pertinent for this dissertation. This approach includes firm-, industry-, and country-
specific conditions that may affect the relative bargaining capacity of each of the two actors.94 
This model attributes unique resources to each, the oil company and the host government. These 
resources are specific to the industry and form the basic entry conditions. The unique oil 
company resources tend to be its ‘capital possession, and technological and managerial expertise 
relative to the host government’. The unique resources of the host government ‘include the level 
of attractiveness of its oil, measured in terms of reserve size, reserve longevity, and potential 
profitability’.95 Next, a series of bargaining processes occur within an international context and a 
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host-country context. Changes in the conditions within the nest—such as (but not limited to) 
rapid changes in the oil price that transform the entry conditions in the industry—can trigger a 
re-bargain. 
 
Material considerations are certainly important determinants for changing state treatment of 
foreign investment. These considerations, however, do not fully explain how and in what ways 
states change their treatment of foreign investors.96 Much like some of the original discussions 
based on host state-multinational corporation relations, this work is concerned with highlighting 
internal ideological contestations and changes in the outlook of the actors that interact in the 
global energy market. This study is able to capture some of the complexities in state-foreign 
company relations in ways that more contemporary bargaining models do not. But the analytical 
upshot of this work is not simply based on casting the interplay of domestic actors’ interests. In 
order to develop this explanation further, it is important to move beyond the squarely material 
motivations and ‘incentives’ that are paramount in shaping the behavior of actors according to 
OBM models. The manner in which host states engage with global factors may also differ 
according to dominant and contested ideas that various social alliances employ to impact policy. 
Even when the motivations of host states align with each other during periods of higher oil 
prices, or when the conditions of investments make companies ‘hostages’, the outcomes of 
policy change may differ due to other factors that are unrelated to the material incentives or the 
endowments of actors. Ideas are powerful determinants of policy outcomes, and broadly set the 
context in which national and international debates take place. Indeed, ideas can shape the 
contours of shifting bargaining conditions. In the next subsection, I discuss various arguments 
that provide useful conceptualizations of the role of ideas in the enactment of national identity in 
resource governance. 
2.3. Ideational contestations: the paths of meaning and subjectivity 
 
The interests of actors should not be understood as a given or exclusively affected by material 
exogenous factors such as fluctuating oil prices or the quantity and quality of a country’s 
underground endowments. They can also be shaped and transformed by ideas and beliefs ‘about 
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what is desirable and how the world works’.97 Already established as a dominant approach in 
international relations, constructivist literature has made important contributions towards 
uncovering linkages between widely held inter-subjective meanings that can influence policy.98  
 
Critical scholars in the vein of neo-Gramscian thought considered ideas as inseparable from 
other categories that formed a ‘historic structure’. Cox’s famous article published in Millennium 
in 1981 argued that ideas, material capabilities and institutions interact in a given historical 
structure in reciprocal ways—ideas were inseparable from material capabilities and institutions. 
Ideas, material capabilities and institutions, in turn, constrained and enabled actors. Cox 
considered ideas as ‘inter-subjective meanings’, or those ‘shared notions of the nature of social 
relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour’. Similarly, ideas were 
‘collective images of social order held by different groups of people’.99  At the core of the Coxian 
perspective was the notion that any given world order was determined by the interaction of these 
categories.100 My project is less concerned with the broad functioning of a global order, and 
instead with the interactions of specific states with global actors. In this context, the central 
concern herein is with the role ideas play in the shifting preferences of states’ interactions with 
foreign investment.  
 
A more mainstream current of thought grew out of international relations, questioning the core 
assumptions of the materialist currents of the discipline. 101 While realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism based their theoretical apparatus on the assumption that states were self-
interested and the central unit of analysis in an international system defined by anarchy, 
constructivists argued that anarchy was itself largely the result of state agents’ interpretation of 
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the world order. National and cultural identities, in turn, affected state behavior internationally. 
Similarly, powerful ideas transformed into international norms also affect state actors beyond 
material interests.  
 
After more than two decades of contributions to international relations, international political 
economy scholars have recently begun taking stock of the contribution of constructivist insights 
to current understandings of the global economy. In a recent study, Rawi Abdelal argues that 
‘constructivism as an approach to IPE emphasizes that policy practices may result from 
international institutions, international norms (which specify the practices associated with a 
particular state identity), domestic cultural norms, and national identities’.102 In a recognized 
edited volume, Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons identify four main pathways through which 
constructivism approaches its explanations of empirical puzzles. These refer to meaning, 
cognition, uncertainty and subjectivity.103 My framework identifies the pathways of meaning and 
subjectivity as the bases for ideas complementing bargaining insights to explain the approaches 
states have taken toward foreign investment in an historical perspective. 
 
A common ideational approach to IPE focuses on the ‘meanings with which material facts of the 
world are endowed’. In contrast with purely materialist approaches, such as bargaining models, 
which assume that agents act according to material incentives, this line of ideational scholarship 
considers that ‘agents endow the economies in which they are embedded with social purposes’.104 
Ultimately, what social agents struggle to achieve is largely dependent on how they interpret 
their own identities. Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons recognize that social purposes can be a result of 
broad contestation or be rather latent and taken for granted by large groups in society. Much of 
the detailed discussions that will follow in this dissertation take the form of broad contestations 
around the meaning of national identities, as nations that own specific kinds of natural wealth (in 
these cases, crude oil), and that of development, as the ‘social purpose’ of said national wealth. 
Different social groups, often organized in political parties in parliaments or social movements 
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and indigenous confederations, contest the meanings and purposes of oil ownership through 
time. As we shall see, the capacity of these groups to exert influence is dependent on their ability 
to employ ideas and discourses that can shift policy decisions and even transform power 
structures of the state.  
 
Beyond domestic social groups, Barnett and Finnemore have discussed how international 
organizations are endowed with agency and are capable of fixing meanings and constrain states 
through different avenues of authority.105 International norms can enhance certain state actors 
when norms align with the ways officials interpret national identities.106 Finnemore and Sikkink 
demonstrate also that norms can originate at a national level and then can be internationalized 
through ‘norm entrepreneurs’ of various kinds. For some time, scholars centered on the diffusion 
of ideas and norms flowing from the global north to the south but, in recent times, various 
studies committed in broad terms with a constructivist agenda have illuminated how actors from 
the global south contributed to norm creation internationally.107  
 
Norm diffusion therefore can start from a local setting and flow from south to north or within the 
periphery. The influence of domestic contestations around norms as well as that of transnational 
norms in domestic settings is worth casting within the area of resource governance. As will be 
shown, the notions of production benchmarks and the eventual creation of OPEC emerge as 
cases in point. Venezuelan nationalists, who ushered the country’s identity as a landlord state for 
much of the twentieth century, created benchmarks of state treatment of foreign investors, which 
spread to other oil producers.108 Later on, together with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, Venezuelan 
officials agreed on acceptable behaviors of producers in order to protect oil prices. This initial 
agreement then evolved to the creation of OPEC as an international organization to serve their 
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states’ interests. In this case, as will be shown in chapter 3, Venezuelan nationalists—most 
notably Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo—served as ‘norm entrepreneurs’. Simultaneously, Ecuadorian 
military officials sought to join OPEC in their efforts to assert further control over oil companies 
and join a larger group of producer nations. For Ecuador, factions of the military embraced 
international norms guiding oil producers to advance their resource nationalist domestic agendas.  
 
As mentioned, widely held ideas can be used by actors and inform their interests but subjective 
notions can also shape the contexts in which actors interact and effectively limit or enhance their 
behavior. Hence, another major pathway through which ideas affect the direction of the policy 
and economic policy in particular, is through subjectivity. In this case, a different strand of 
scholarship, committed to post-positivist epistemologies, focus on the value of discourse and 
identity as a basis for subjects’ ability to effect change or to reproduce the status quo.109 Post-
structuralist constructivism stresses the ‘constraining and structural role of discourses as opposed 
to the agential quality of constructivist scholarship that stresses ideas’.110 For these scholars, 
norms and identities represent power structures that determine what is possible, through 
acceptable action, policy and speech. Therefore, the context within which these discursive 
structures arise becomes crucial for post-structuralist scholars.  
 
The political economy of ‘rentier states’ has been understood as a result of a complex web of 
rent-seeking actors in contexts of under-developed political institutions.111 Beneath the view of 
utility-maximizing and materially driven ‘rent seeking’ actors, post-structuralist views of ‘petro-
capitalist complexes’ conceive the state and non-state actors as enacting, and also performing, 
particular roles and discourses defined by the material dependence on oil.112  Contributions from 
political geographers, political anthropologists and ecologists refer to these subjective meanings 
and the way national constructs are associated with resource ownership, and governance.113An 
early reference within this literature is Fernando Coronil’s take on Venezuela as having two 
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bodies: its body politic, and its natural body, which is demonstrated in its subsoil resources. State 
authority is edified as capable of governing society through controlling the natural body of the 
nation. In Coronil’s work, the state and nation are conceptualized as two separate entities that 
interact in an actor-spectator fashion, where the latter is expected to magically ‘deliver’ goods to 
the former. The bond that makes this theater act possible is oil. In Perreault’s words, in Coronil’s 
work, ‘oil acts as both a material and ideological force’.114 
 
Conceptualized as a subjective construct, the state does not operate as a mere agent maximizing 
a set of objectively derived interests. Seen as subjects, state officials are endowed with, and 
constrained by, socially accepted norms and roles, embodying pre-conceived practices and 
discourses. The social constructs of a landlord state or, following Coronil’s terminology, a 
‘magical state’, can help explain the tensions and contradictions of Venezuela’s political elite 
with the growing neoliberal consensus around the world in the late 1980s and 1990s. For quite 
some time, the Venezuelan political elite held on to ideas developed throughout the twentieth 
century about the role of the state as a landlord that ought to extract rents from IOCs, and later, 
its NOC. This notion remained strong even in the midst of a neoliberal turnaround in other 
sectors of the economy and clashed with the managerial culture of PDVSA, inherited from the 
old IOCs. The state-NOC tensions, an internalized version of state-IOC disputes, also reflected 
subjective ideas of ‘the (landlord) state’ and ‘the firm’ (see more in chapter 4).  
  
Post-structuralist scholarship shows how ‘geographical imaginaries’ can effectively impact 
resource governance both stemming from civil society activism and government action.115 The 
struggles over resource extraction, environmental protection and resistance to neoliberalism have 
become central components of this research agenda. This body of literature has integrated 
political economy analysis with cultural politics and symbolic elements that constitute collective 
ideas in relation to material and ecological resources. The work of these scholars similarly 
contributes to understanding mediation processes between the state, resources, and society via 
laws, wealth-distribution mechanisms, technological devices, and most notably through struggles 
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over national identity, space, and local territory.116 Moreover, authors in this tradition consider 
the use of oil governance as part of a larger governmental rationality that is closely associated 
with the conception of both nation and citizenship.117 In a recent study, for example, Pellegrini 
shows that resource nationalism represents a tool of government both for the Bolivian state to 
enact resource extraction and for social movements to resist it.118 In this case, the discourse of 
ownership over natural resources plays a central role in mobilizing competing actors in different 
directions.  
 
In contemporary times, local struggles have emerged as a result of state action that seeks to 
govern natural resource extraction for the purpose of rent distribution and pursuit of industrial 
policies. In fact, the idea of development has been a powerful driver of state action locally, but 
also transnationally for Third World nations. In Latin America, the developmental imperative 
emerged as a reflection of what economists and social scientists in the region argued was the 
subordination of Latin American economies to the interests of the center of capitalism.119 The 
widely shared meaning of development at the time was concerned with an international division 
of labor that distinguished primary commodity producers from industrialized countries was the 
determinant of this subordination. Transforming the logic of how the global economy 
presumably functioned became a decisive turning impulse in the 1960s and 1970s. On one hand, 
industrialization became a central goal, and state policies were designed to achieve it through 
import-substitution. On the other hand, transforming the subordinate position of the Third World 
in the global economy forced a shift in the role of the state’s control of natural resources.120  
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In both Venezuela and Ecuador, the meaning of development has taken different forms and these 
meanings integrate the use of oil as a driver of progress. Undoubtedly, industrialization and 
social equity have in one way or another been part of these policy actions. This is the case of the 
notion of ‘sowing the oil’, which became dominant since the mid-twentieth century in Venezuela 
or the idea of transforming the ‘productive matrix’ which is today an important discourse and 
policy driver in Ecuador. In general, the meanings associated with national development stress 
the role of the state as fundamental in promoting progress, social justice and growth, while the 
use and transformation of primary commodities remains at the basis of the development model. 
In many of these instances, development is linked to oil governance and foreign investment is 
associated with the broader needs of a modern economy. 
 
Indeed, development ideals guide contemporary state actions that seek to use resource extraction 
as a way to advance social justice and industrialization. Current left-wing governments are 
generally understood as governments that have sought to reclaim space for the state to: pursue 
active economic and social policy; assert sovereignty over natural resources and the wealth 
derived from them; and promote grassroots activism and participation in a broader commitment 
to democracy and collective rights.121 These ‘post-neoliberal’ regimes seem to be ‘committed to 
maximizing revenue from the rising global demand for energy as a way of subsidizing 
welfare’.122 In the 2000s, as the left rose to power in many South American countries together 
with a commodity price boom, the long-debated possibility of procuring development by 
leveraging the region’s condition of primary commodity producer and exporter surfaced once 
more. 123  
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Various scholars have argued that these dynamics demonstrate the rising phenomenon of a new 
kind of extractivism.124 By ‘neo-extractivism’, they refer mainly to the conjunction of the 
following two processes: the extraction of raw materials as the main activity—or at least one of 
the most important activities—for the external sector economy and the use of rents derived from 
extraction for active social policy.125 Similarly, other authors such as Arsel, Hogenboom and 
Pellegrini conceptualize this as an ‘extractive imperative’, wherein resource extraction is needed 
and its expansion is required to help satisfy social demands, regardless of the prevailing 
circumstances.126 In the words of Maristella Svampa, the region has arrived at a ‘commodities 
consensus’, which relies on the use of rents to legitimize extraction.127 Meanwhile, the societal 
and environmental problems caused by extraction are heightened, provoking social conflicts and 
the disenfranchising of some social movements and indigenous populations from the post-
neoliberal governments that originally sought to empower them.128  
 
While Venezuela and Ecuador have promoted ideas of socialism and development associated 
with resource extraction, scholars and activists have criticized the deepening of the extractivist 
imperative, which according to them has led to practices of enclosure, control and privatization 
in alliance with foreign investors. Gudynas states that ‘beyond the nationalist rhetoric there has 
been a return of private investors, even in the oil sector’. In countries of the ‘radical left’, state 
companies ‘have signed agreements with transnational corporations, under the so-called 
“migrations” to service contracts and joint ventures’.129 According to this perspective, the result 
of this alliance is the emergence of a ‘new form of class struggle’ between landless and 
marginalized populations and the forces of extractive capital. In this context, it is suggested that 
organized capital has in fact used these peripheral states to assert their power through 
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dispossession and violence.130 While assessing the validity of the claims raised by authors 
critiquing neo-extractivism goes beyond the scope of this research, their criticisms remain 
important points of contention on the ground, especially in Ecuador. Moreover, the use of rent 
distribution as a legitimizing mechanism by the state represents a significant tool for policy 
action and provides content to developmental discourse and practices advanced by left-leaning 
governments. 
 
By integrating the pathways of meaning (focusing on the idea of development and national 
identity in relation to natural resources) and subjectivity (narrowing in on the emergence of 
dominant ideas), this framework contemplates important ideational motivations and 
contestations. As will be explained in greater detail, the historical evolution of ideas around state 
treatment of foreign capital in the oil sector develops through tensions and disputes among local 
and transnational actors. In this case, various actors employ different tactics based on ideas that 
challenge and intervene in the state-IOC bargaining beyond what the material variables of a 
formal model would predict.  
 
The linkage of natural resources and national interests in a globalized energy industry lends 
relevance to literature in the wider constructivist realm that highlighted the pertinence of 
economic nationalism as an interpretative framework in the era of globalization.131 These works 
examined nationalism’s compatibility with market forces, arguing that economic nationalism can 
actually encompass a myriad of policy programs, and that it does not exclusively represent the 
apparently outdated paradigm of (trade) protectionism. In a similar vein, scholars have viewed 
resource nationalism as potentially encompassing numerous policy options, including liberal and 
market-friendly policies. 132  In this context, not only is resource nationalism potentially 
compatible with foreign investment, but foreign investment can also be conceived as 
instrumental to an agenda of state control (Venezuela) and state-led development (Ecuador). 
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Shifting one’s gaze to the conceptions of national sovereignty in a larger context of a globalized 
economy provides an understanding of why and how nationalist policy makers partially 
nationalize oil resources, while at the same time encouraging foreign investment in the oil sector.  
2.4. Conclusions 
 
State treatment of foreign investment has for long been understood through the lens of 
obsolescing bargaining models. While early bargaining model studies considered important 
strategic state notions of development, OBM literature has remained largely centered on material 
variables in its more recent iterations. This theoretical perspective is important in that it 
incorporates: (a) crucial material variables that are focused on the evolution of the industry in 
each specific market; and (b) exogenous factors—especially in recent literature—such as 
fluctuations in the oil price. While the bargaining literature considers industry concentration as 
an important variable, it has been slow in incorporating the new actors that have emerged in 
recent years in the global energy market, namely SOEs from non-western countries.  
 
The main theoretical criticism of OBM is that states should not be considered unitary utility-
maximizing actors; instead, they are diverse. The theoretical approach employed herein bridges 
the material and rationalist approach embedded in contemporary bargaining literature with 
ideational approaches in order to better explain the historical changes in state treatment of 
foreign investment. As will be shown, states also respond to important ideational drivers that are 
contingent upon national identities and the subjectivity of diverse actors. Indeed, different groups 
within states can affect economic policy through ideological contestations that do not necessarily 
respond to material rationalities. In this case, I propose to incorporate constructivist insights with 
the broader material variables that affect state-company relations. The changing meanings of 
development will be a recurrent theme in these ideational variables as well as the subjective 
identities that different state actors hold with regard to natural resources.  
 
The advantage of this complementary perspective is that it gives weight to agency, both in terms 
of the rational position of actors, and in the subjective and historical conditions in which ideas 
and identities are built. At the same time, it recognizes the structural constraints on these actors’ 
agencies. My claim is that rationalist and ideational approaches can complement each other and 
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lead us into broader reflections on our understanding of international politics where the role of 
ideas and material capabilities interact in important ways.  
 
In the following chapters, I will delve into an historical narrative of the two case studies. The 
objective is to weave into the argument a detailed exploration of state treatment of foreign 
investment, the interactions of the changing bargain conditions, the internal ideological 
contestations and ideas that inform these shifts. Resource nationalism and foreign investment are 
therefore conceived in relation to each other and from an historical perspective. In doing so, this 
work will demonstrate how particular trends emerge through time and are affected by the 





The slow process of shifting bargains: 





For much of the twentieth century, Venezuela’s political economy was marked by contention 
between the state and transnational corporations over the conditions upon which oil extraction 
occurred. Starting with an open-door dictatorial regime, this contention evolved to a point 
wherein the state gained knowledge and confidence over time, increasing its capacity to extract 
ground rents from companies. After the stabilization of party democracy in 1958, no more 
concessions were granted. Once companies were certain that concessions would not be renewed, 
they decreased investments in exploration and enhancement, increasing the state’s incentives to 
take over companies’ sunk assets. Indeed, the contractual agreements signed in 1943 and 1956 
became obsolete by the late 1960s. Nationalization was an inevitable outcome of these long-term 
legal and political struggles.  
 
Nevertheless, different interpretations of how the state takeover should happen emerged within 
the Venezuelan political system. In 1971, a law promoted by left parties was approved stating 
that all installations would revert to state control once the 40-year contracts expired in 1983 and 
1996. The state was under no obligation to compensate companies. In 1975, a nationalization law 
was approved under the auspices of the ruling social-democratic party, AD. The law anticipated 
state takeover; it included compensation to companies and also left a window for state 
association with companies under technical assistance contracts (Article 5). The 1975 law 
demonstrated that the history of control over the oil industry was far from settled, and the linkage 
with foreign capital was not completely sealed off either. Article 5 allowed for concrete alliances 
with foreign companies, and the creation of a national holding company with considerable 
autonomy meant the internalization of IOCs’ logics and interests into parts of the state.  
 
In this chapter, I explain how Venezuela came to a complete nationalization of its oil industry in 
1976, illustrating the pinnacle of resource nationalism in the country and the point of most 
stringent relations between the state and foreign companies in contemporary history. I argue that 
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the complete nationalization can be explained in part by the politics of obsolescing bargains and 
the entrenchment of specific ideas that became important to most political actors in Venezuela’s 
political system. These ideas were often understood and mobilized differently by distinct actors 
and coalitions of actors. After fifty years of concessionary system, Venezuela’s political system 
was infused with powerful notions surrounding the need to use the nation’s natural resources for 
the improvement of society as a whole. Notions of state-led development, and socialization of 
wealth, were intrinsically linked with the use of oil rents and popularized as ‘sowing the oil’. The 
use of natural resource wealth for development and the upholding of landlord states’ sovereignty 
over the oil industry also promoted multilateral efforts to enhance Third World nations’ power. 
Venezuela was a protagonist in these efforts and its experience was crucial in the diffusion of 
norms internationally, leading to the creation of OPEC.  
 
This chapter demonstrates that the state-IOCs bargain of 1943 became obsolete in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s. The set up of the new arrangement was largely determined, however, by 
conflicting ideas around the use of oil wealth held by different actors, mostly political parties and 
foreign companies. The state held a monopoly over the industry from 1976 onward. But it also 
‘nationalized’ the interests of foreign companies through the creation of a national holding, 
which had considerable autonomy. 
  
The chapter will unfold in the following way. First, it will review the liberal concessionary 
system set up by Juan Vicente Gómez’s regime. Second, it will explore the emergence of 
nationalist movements in the country and the attempts of the post-Gómez regimes to better 
regulate the industry and the hiatus of military rule between 1952 and 1958, which interrupted 
the democratization process initiated in 1935. Third, the chapter will examine the nascent bi-
partisan democracy and the reemergence of nationalism until the oil industry nationalization was 







3.2. The concessionary system 
 
‘You know about oil. You can make the laws. We are novices on the matter’.133 
Juan Vicente Gómez to foreign companies’ lawyers during discussions around the 1922 
hydrocarbons law. 
 
The era of liberal concessions in Venezuela started with the regime of Juan Vicente Gómez 
(1907-1935), characterized as a ‘liberal tyranny’. Gómez assumed the presidency with the 
project of pacifying the country through a strong dictatorial rule. The regime was organized 
under the so-called Venezuelan positivist thought, which assumed that the ‘organic constitution’ 
of Venezuelan society was inept for democracy.134 According to ideologues such as Laureano 
Vallenilla Lanz, this failure was the result of features such as climate, racial make-up, history 
and geography. Vallenilla Lanz argued that the ‘organic’ constitution of Venezuelan society 
tended to follow strong men.135 Upon seizing power, the economy was in chaos and Gómez 
‘sought to restore order by inviting foreign capital to invest with the guarantee of labor peace and 
flexible business conditions’.136 Indeed, Venezuela established itself as the Latin American 
country with the most liberal policy toward foreign investment at the time. Gumersindo Torres, 
twice industry minister under Gómez,137 said that the country’s laws were ‘the best in the world 
for oil companies’.138 The government granted large concessions to individuals who later leased 
or transferred them cheaply to foreign companies. One of the largest examples was a lease of 27 
million hectares, covering ten out of the country’s 20 states and one of its federal territories.139  
 
The regulatory capacity of the government was linked to the characteristics of the dictatorial 
rule; members of the Gómez family became officials in charge of granting concessions, which 
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provoked a wave of corruption in Venezuela related to selling lands to allies and later to 
investors.140 The financial features of these contracts focused on an annual tax of 1 bolivar (Bs.) 
per hectare and 2 Bs. per ton produced. The duration of contracts oscillated between 30 to 50 
years.141 The state imposed taxes but it did not levy royalties for ‘the right to extract’.142 The 
companies were also exonerated from import fees for any items required for production. These 
conditions also allowed companies to invest in roads, pipelines, refineries, housing and required 
infrastructure that the government was unwilling to fund.143  
 
The Royal-Dutch Shell Corporation acquired most Venezuelan concessions between 1913 and 
1915. The regime welcomed Shell’s entry into the country and it expected to increase production 
capacity.144 In turn, the British-Dutch early entry provided them an advantage over US companies 
that started to compete later on. Companies’ interests in Venezuela grew for geopolitical reasons, 
as its geographical location meant cheaper transport costs compared to other producing 
countries, and also because it offered extraordinary conditions for business, particularly 
compared to revolutionary Mexico.145 The first major commercially viable well began production 
in 1914; in 1918 oil exports from Venezuela began to flow out of the country’s ports and grew 
steadily in the 1920s.146 At this point in history, it is clear that the state-foreign companies’ 
bargain was beneficial to companies. While the state sought to provide incentives for companies 
to invest in the early stages of the industry, the government also had an ideological commitment 
to unfettered regulations, as long as it remained in absolute political control of the country.  
3.2.1. Gumersindo Torres: initial regulation attempts  
 
Dissatisfied with the personal benefits gained from the incursion of foreign companies in the oil 
business, Gómez appointed Gumersindo Torres industry minister in 1918, who was then in 
charge of dealing with matters relating to petroleum. Torres initiated a process of legal 
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transformations to increase state regulation over the industry. He stated that up until that point 
concessions had been granted ‘thoughtlessly’ and the country had therefore ‘obtained little or no 
benefit at all from them’.147 Torres commissioned research in the most important producing 
countries at the time; the United States and Mexico, wishing to make Venezuela’s regulatory 
framework on par with its counterparts. In 1920 the first hydrocarbons law was passed. It 
brought all concessions to a 30-year period; the exploration area was delineated to 60,000 
hectares while exploitation plots were delineated to 200 hectares. Surface taxes were levied 
between 2 to 5 Bs. per hectare and an 8 to 15% royalty for the right to exploit the land was 
imposed (see table 3.1 for a summary below).148 Even though companies were exempt from 
import and export taxes, the state as a proprietor of the subsoil began for the first time to directly 
extract benefits as a rentier through royalties.149  
 
Important innovations came about with Torres’ provisions. Half of the exploration areas given in 
concessions had to be returned to the state to create a ‘national reserve’ for future exploitation by 
the state or to be auctioned for private exploitation. Mendoza Potellá, an oil expert and university 
professor in Venezuela, claimed in an interview that ‘the area in concession was to be delineated 
as a chessboard, dividing black and white lots between the areas for the concessionary and 
reserved areas’. In a three-year period of exploration, ‘the concessionary could not foresee the 
most productive areas’,150 so the state assured a portion of national interest in each concession. 
Lastly, in 1918 Torres created the Direction General of Mines at the ministry of industry, which 
aimed to train both engineers and decision makers with the required technical and political 
capacities to regulate the industry.151 Torres’ regulatory attempts were geared toward increasing 
the state’s technical capacity and knowledge to be better equipped to regulate companies in the 
future.  
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Companies from the US were interested in the Venezuelan market but no concession had yet 
been granted to them. Based on their interest in Venezuela’s market, these companies fiercely 
opposed the 1920 law and directly pressured Gómez to overrule it and to dismiss Torres from the 
ministry.152 Gómez replaced Torres and eased the terms of the law in 1922. The companies 
managed to make the government reduce royalties to 9% and to continue the exemptions on 
imports. The new law softened leasing conditions allowing for large concentrations of land given 
to concessionaires for forty years (see table 2 below).153 The interests of American corporations 
grew steadily in the 1920s, surpassing British-Dutch investments. In 1929, Venezuela had 
received US$ 100 million in investments.154 In the same year, the oil industry employed over 
27,000 workers in the country, contributed over 10% of the GDP, and its rents accounted for 
roughly 20% the government’s revenue.155 The Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ) gradually 
increased its power over Venezuela’s oil industry under its affiliate Creole (with 50% of the 
national industry), Royal Dutch-Shell with 35% and, finally Gulf Co. with 14%. In 1936 Gulf 
sold half of its assets to Creole and Shell, effectively making the industry a concentrated duopoly 
until its nationalization in 1976.  
 
Venezuela became the world’s main oil exporter and second producer behind the US at the end 
of the 1920s. In this context, Torres was appointed minister of industry once again in 1929. 
Torres established a technical secretariat within the ministry to draw up a set of regulations that 
would implement the law of hydrocarbons. The ministry developed regulations to collect taxes 
from the companies, measure production, and prevent spills and accidents. The logic behind this 
was that the nation as owner of subsoil minerals had an interest in regulating extraction. Torres 
was explicit about this: 
… once the legislature grants mining rights to extract, it is not by any means 
leaving it up to the arbitrariness or caprice of the concessionary to do so. [On this 
matter], the nation is intimately interested, as it partakes in the benefits of the 
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extracted product, but mostly as the owner of the mineral before it is extracted 
and the owner of that which remains underground.156 
Mommer and Bautista Urbaneja argue that Torres’ actions demonstrate the beginning of the 
state’s self-awareness as a landowner that would try to impose conditions on the leasing 
concessionary in order to improve the recuperation of the mineral even at the expense of 
increasing costs.157 This self-identity will become an important component of Venezuela’s 
modern conceptions of nationhood 158  and, as we shall see, it will also impact the state 
relationship with extracting companies, including its own. 
 
Under the auspices of the technical secretariat, six engineers were awarded scholarships and sent 
to the US to be trained in different areas of the geological process. These individuals became the 
seeds for modern oil and geological engineering faculties in Venezuela. Both the secretariat and 
the director general of mines were the precursors of what later became the ministry of mines and 
hydrocarbons.159 Regulating the oil industry and learning about oil was a simultaneous process 
that gradually increased confidence vis-á-vis foreign companies but also provoked important 
transformations within the modern state. Such transformations were especially significant as oil 
revenues became more important and Torres was a prominent figure in the process of increasing 
state control over companies. 
 
Venezuela had been largely dependent on agricultural production, and despite with some 
downturns, coffee and cacao production remained important through the 1920s. The Great 
Depression changed this. When the US dollar depreciated after 1933, many Latin American 
economies devalued their currencies to keep pace with the dollar, yet the Venezuelan 
government decided otherwise. As a result, the bolivar appreciated rapidly.160 Pedro Tinoco, then 
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minister of finance, negotiated a gentlemen’s pact between oil companies, banks and the 
government in 1934 to fix the value of the bolivar; an agreement that maintained the currency 
overvalued.161 In the words of Coronil: ‘a strong bolivar, whose value was unrelated to the 
productivity of domestic labor, raised the price of agricultural exports and made them 
uncompetitive on the world market and reduced the costs of imported goods, thus inhibiting local 
production and promoting imports’.162 Tinoco’s policy was seen as an extra-fiscal measure to 
extract benefits from oil companies as they had to exchange more dollars for their activities in 
Venezuela, while it also made imports cheaper and helped satisfy increasing social demands.  
 
The phenomenon known as the ‘Dutch disease’ became endemic in Venezuela after 1934 when 
the government agreed to keep the currency overvalued, and annihilated the prospects of 
agricultural exports. The Tinoco Agreement created an economy that has been characterized—
with only short interruptions—by an overvalued currency until today. The governmental elite 
chose to apply different forms of subsidies to agricultural producers aiming to strengthen their 
position domestically. In this way, the government established itself as the central mediator of 
rent distribution in the country. The channeling of these rents to private hands translated into 
processes whereby economic and social actors claimed portions of this rent to the state.  
 
In sum, during the Gómez dictatorship, there were only incipient attempts to bring the oil 
industry under state regulation. These attempts were largely influenced by the individual figure 
of Minister Torres and noticeably undermined by the power of foreign companies and 
governments. In this period, however, the seed of knowledge and technical capacity was planted 
in a growing state bureaucracy that would later help improve the state’s bargaining position. 
Moreover, in ideational terms, the notion of a landlord state that sought to extract rents from the 
industry was established in Venezuela’s elite and incipient state apparatus. 
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Table 3.1 Evolution of the concessionary system’s regulatory features in Venezuela 
 




• Large land concessions (up to 27 
million hectares). 
• Concessions lasted up to 50 years. 
 
• 1 Bs. per hectare. 
• 1 Bs per ton produced. 
• Companies were exonerated from 
import and export taxes. 
• No royalty was levied.  
Gómez, first hydrocarbon 
law 1920 by Gumersindo 
Torres 
• Concessions were delineated to 
60,000 hectares. 
• Exploitation areas delineated to 
200 hectares. 
• Creation of national reserves. 
• 30 year concessions. 
 
• Surface tax between 2 and 5 Bs. per 
hectare. 
• 8 to 15% royalties. 
• Companies were exonerated from 
import and export taxes. 
 
Gómez, 1922 law by US 
pressure 
• Concessions extended to 40 years 
• Concessions delineated to 10,000 
hectare per concession and 500 
hectare for exploitation parcels.  
 
• Surface tax between 2 and 5 Bs.  
• 9% royalties. 
• Companies were exonerated from 
import and export taxes. 
  
Medina Angarita, 1943 Ley 
convenio 
• Concessions lasted 40 years. 
• Same area extensions and national 
reserve was preserved.  
 
• Royalties 16.6% (one sixth). 
• Income tax 12%. 
• Import and export taxes were levied 
for the first time. 
 
AD triennium 1945-1948 
Ley convenio 
• All regulatory principles remained. 
• No more concessions policy 
• Additional tax was imposed to ensure 
a 50% split in profits between state and 
companies. 
Pérez Jiménez, 1950-1958 
Ley convenio 
• In 1956 and 1957 new concessions 
were granted in national reserves 
areas. 
• Fifty-fifty principle was preserved. 
 
Edgar Sanabria, Junta de 
Gobierno, 1958 
Ley convenio 
• All regulatory principles remained. 
• No more concessions. 
• Additional tax was increased to ensure 
at least 60% profits for the state. 
Rafael Caldera, 1971 
Reversion law (proposed by 
left-wing party MEP) 
• No concession will be renewed.  
• No compensation would be given. 
• Companies were liable to keep 
infrastructure and investments. 
• A fund valued at 10% of companies’ 
assets was to be created and reimbursed 
in 1983 and 1996 if infrastructure was 
well-maintained.  
Carlos Andrés Pérez, 1975 
Nationalization law 
• Nationalization of all foreign assets 
under a national holding, PDVSA. 
• Strategic associations with foreign 
companies allowed for special 
projects with the approval of both 
chambers of Congress. 
• All financial features from the 1943 
law remained in place, now with 




3.3. Post-Gómez era: from ley convenio to the fifty-fifty 
 
Until now, the state treatment of foreign investment has been briefly summarized in the context 
of a fierce dictatorship. It would be easy to state that there were two sets of interests clearly 
defined in the bargain between companies and the government during Gómez’s rule because 
societal participation in public life was strongly curtailed. Gómez’s death on December 17, 1935 
started to change this. His death led to nationalist and popular movements throughout the 
country. In fact, much popular anger targeted oil companies, as they were associated with the 
regime.163 Active political movements hoped for rapid democratic change, particularly those 
involving student leaders who had led rebellions in the past (known as the Generation of 28, a 
year of massive student protests) and who were either exiled or imprisoned.164 In this context, 
Gómez allies appointed General Eleazar López Contreras, then Minister of War and Marine, as 
President. López Conteras met the regime’s traditional qualifications (being a military man and 
born in the Andes) but he also showed signs of opening to a gradual process of democratization. 
Manuel Egaña, who was industry minister under López Contreras, pushed for change in the tax 
structure of the oil industry but faced a series of legal battles in court and direct diplomatic 
pressure from the US.165 The government hence announced in 1938 that it would no longer grant 
oil concessions.  
 
In 1936, López Contreras launched the February Program as a modernizing project that sought to 
keep up with social demands in an organized manner. It also upheld the notion of ‘amplified 
positivism’, which stated the need for these pressing policies to be carried out by a selected 
group of educated individuals and highly technical state bureaucracies.166 The February Program 
and López Contreras’ initial opening gave rise to an urban intelligentsia that defended this sort of 
‘technical democracy’ to solve social problems.167  
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The figure of Arturo Uslar Pietri, an upcoming intellectual and state bureaucrat, emerged in this 
context. In 1936 Uslar Pietri wrote a famous op-ed urging to ‘sow the oil’. This idea turned out 
to be a central component of the evolving regime and a principle that gave meaning to the 
notions of development in Venezuela.168 According to Uslar Pietri, Venezuela urgently needed to 
productively transform the massive wealth stemming from the subsoil into modern industrialized 
agriculture. Otherwise, he argued, the country would face the damning consequences of wasting 
energy and resources, and would find itself unprotected in the future.169 While Uslar Pietri was a 
conservative figure closely associated with the government, his idea of ‘sowing the oil’ soon 
became an important driving force for Venezuela’s emerging political actors and this idea was 
later associated with moves for national development. 
 
López Contreras’ plans for gradual transformation encountered resistance both from conservative 
military sectors and from emerging nationalist forces, most of which were closely associated 
with radical anti-imperialist movements. Conservatives were skeptical of the growing political 
opening. The more revolutionary critics sought faster changes focused on universal and secret 
suffrage and a sort of oil democratization. Oil workers organized the first general strike in 
December 1936, provoking a sharp decline in output, and the regime reacted by backtracking on 
its initial opening and by banning opposition parties and repressing union actions.170 The strike 
has been considered as a milestone in the popular struggle for workers’ rights and democracy in 
the country, while López’s response to end the strike by force was a demonstration of his 
commitment to the Gómez legacy.171  
 
The Generation of 28 defended an emerging discourse about democracy.172 While most members 
agreed on the anti-imperialist nature of their endeavor, the main source of dispute amongst them 
was the role of class struggle. A multi-class nationalist strand, led by Rómulo Betancourt, 
centered on a peasant-worker alliance and the need to push for democratic change toward social 
harmony. The Marxist strand, led by Gustavo Machado, was more focused on the overthrow of 
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landed and bourgeois class domination.173 Machado and others founded the Communist party 
while Betancourt founded the National Democratic Party (Partido democrático nacional or 
PDN). In 1941, the PDN would give way to the modern party organized under Betancourt’s 
leadership known as Acción Democrática (AD). As I will explain, this division within the 
Generation of 28 and its different political agendas would heavily impact our understanding of 
Venezuela’s oil policy and the state’s relationship with foreign companies from the 1930s until 
today, not least because its members remained in power until the 1990s.  
 
The PDN promoted large economic reforms centered on industrialization and strengthening the 
role of the state in oil management.174 One of the PDN’s programmatic documents stated, 
‘economic nationalism is for us the creation and defense of national industry and the exploitation 
of our large natural resources on behalf of the totality of the Venezuelan people’.175 Thus early in 
the 1940s, the PDN articulated the purpose of state control over the oil industry for the purpose 
of development. In parallel, the notion of sowing the oil was emerging in the official elites. In 
contrast with the evolving professional military in government and the Communist party, the 
PDN’s oil nationalism was defended together with the promotion of liberal democracy. During 
the years of 1936-1941 demands for democratic rights emerged. These included the rapid 
incorporation of women in politics, who took part in the emerging political parties, and their 
suffrage movement, which rose to the highest levels in national debates.176 
 
In the context of a centralized and largely military regime, the governing party, following the 
tradition of military Andean men, chose Isaías Medina Angarita as the new candidate for 
President in 1941. Medina was chosen President in second-degree elections by the government-
controlled parliament. Medina Angarita, in turn, pushed for the most audacious legal reform 
since Torres’ time due not only to domestic pressure but also to exogenous factors. Medina was 
influenced by Mexico’s revolutionary elite, which forced a full nationalization in 1938. 
Similarly, the unraveling of World War II made the US more wary of stick diplomacy as the war 
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effort required unrestricted oil supplies.177 Medina wrote to president Roosevelt pledging to 
intercede on behalf of Venezuela’s interests vis-à-vis foreign companies. As Venezuelan 
historian Rafael Arráiz Lucca pointed out in an interview, ‘companies were wary of the extreme 
positions producing states could eventually take. Following the Mexican example, they were 
very cautious’.178 Interestingly, concerns over Mexico’s example and the rise of the Good 
Neighbor policy in the US had already impacted the State Department’s position toward oil 
companies in Venezuela. Hence, Roosevelt asked companies to give in to the government’s 
demands.179 This policy turn had been in the works since Nelson Rockefeller’s activism in 
Venezuela, which had included a pledge to Creole in 1937 to develop policies similar to what we 
now know as ‘corporate social responsibility’.180  
 
A new agreement between the state and IOCs was underway. This new agreement would be 
marked by the international factors described above, which constrained foreign companies vis-á-
vis the Venezuelan government. Increased knowledge within state structures born out of Torres’ 
policies also gave the host government increasing maneuvering capacity. Different domestic 
factions became active in pushing for further transformations in the state’s treatment of foreign 
investment endorsing ideas of national development. This intensified activism was clearly 
marked by a more democratic context, one that differed greatly from the initial years of the 
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3.3.1. Ley convenio and Pérez Alfonzo’s abstention vote 
	  
Under improved external conditions, Medina followed more democratic reforms by de-
criminalizing political parties and trade union activities.181 Medina also started negotiations to 
change the legal framework governing oil extraction. In 1943, the President put forward in 
Congress a new hydrocarbons law that had been negotiated with foreign companies and the State 
Department.182 AD, now with representation in Congress, opted to abstain when voting the law, 
denouncing it as a ley convenio or agreement law.183 The most important provision of the law was 
a complete renegotiation of concessions, which ought to solve all legal breaches in the previous 
contracts. This renegotiation included drafting new concessions to the same companies in 
exchange for their commitment to follow the new regulations. The new royalty would be one 
sixth (16.33%) of output, the income tax imposed on companies would be 12%, and customs fees 
were to be applied for company exports and imports (see table 2 above).184 The law also obliged 
companies to build refineries in Venezuelan territory.185 This provision finally reversed the logic 
implanted by Gómez to willingly give away possible downstream linkages of the industry to 
nearby Caribbean islands.186  
 
According to the proponents of the 1943 law, the new royalty together with all the other taxes 
and fees imposed on the companies, elevated the state’s participation on the oil industry’s profits 
to 50% and set the possibility to increase it to 60%.187 AD vote abstention in Congress was based 
on the fact that the new law ‘meant an absolute forgiveness of all prior vice [in concessions] and 
relinquished any claim that could emerge from illegal concessions’.188 Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, 
AD congressman, argued that even if the law meant an improvement of the conditions ex ante, it 
did not secure a 50% appropriation of the industry’s profits by the state. Pérez Alfonzo’s speech 
in Congress set a new bar in terms of nationalist objectives for the Venezuelan state. It aimed at a 
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compensation for historical illegal appropriations and put forward ‘an economic redemptory 
plan’, based on education, social welfare and modernization.189  
 
Two important domestic processes were manifest in 1943. First, tied to its democratic ideals, AD 
appropriated the idea of ‘sowing the oil’ as its own and made it part of its political program. At 
this point, ‘sowing the oil’ and the use of oil revenues for national development became clearly a 
point of national consensus among most active political factions. Second, the Ley convenio 
became the last agreement between the state and IOCs under the concessionary system. After 
that time, there would only be changes to taxation levels that increased state intake from 
companies’ profits. The Ley convenio was also the result of an agreement between the 
government forces and the Communist Party, which had become allied as a result of the 
Comintern’s decision to support class alliance movements and the allies’ efforts in the war.190 
The support of Venezuela’s Communist Party to the Medina regime would remain a crucial point 
of contention against AD in the future and an important division among Venezuelan resource 
nationalist forces.  
 
3.3.2. Trienio adeco: the fifty-fifty  
 
The transition to democracy and further control over the oil industry were important goals of an 
emerging political force that found support in an increasingly politicized population. AD was 
undoubtedly the most representative of these political forces, but other political organizations 
appealed to unions, professional and student movements, the private sector and religious 
organizations. The Communist Party on the revolutionary side had a formidable political 
organization in trade unions, while the emerging social-democratic Unión Repúblicana 
Democrática (URD) integrated progressive figures from the previous government elite as well as 
emerging student leaders. Lastly, the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente 
(COPEI), Christian-democrat, found support in the more conservative sectors of society. 
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Close to the end of his tenure in 1944, Medina was pressured to give the final step to allow free 
and universal elections. Yet, he did not ‘betray his tradition’ and instead chose to maintain 
second-degree elections, where party lists were elected to Congress and the parliament would in 
turn elect the President. Medina promoted the candidacy of an Andean diplomat, ambassador in 
Washington, Diógenes Escalante.191 Betancourt offered to support Escalante’s candidacy in 
exchange for his commitment to call for free and universal suffrage before the end of his 
tenure.192 Escalante agreed with AD’s proposal but upon his return, his health deteriorated and he 
was unable to run for President. The frail agreement that kept the regime together fell apart. AD 
joined an emerging group of military officials (Unión Patriótica Militar, UPM) that resented their 
loss of influence in government.193 On October 16, 1945 the rebellious military factions assaulted 
different fronts. In three days, Medina surrendered to the rebels and was forced into exile. A 
civilian-military junta was sworn in with Betancourt at the presidency.194 In 1946, a new 
Congress was elected under universal suffrage and it was in charge of writing a new constitution 
and electoral law. Women and illiterate persons were allowed to vote for the first time. 
Presidential elections were held in 1947 and AD’s candidate, novelist Rómulo Gallegos, won by 
a landslide (75% of the vote).195   
 
During the three-year period of AD administration or the trienio adeco (AD’s triennium), a 
simultaneous process of political opening with hegemonic consolidation took place. The party 
enhanced the creation of unions, professional colleges (gremios) and, despite a tense relationship 
with elites, the consolidation of new entrepreneurs.196 Betancourt appointed Pérez Alfonzo as 
industry minister who would strengthen the regulatory and technical structures dedicated to 
hydrocarbons. The government used the 1943 law to increase oil taxes. It introduced a new tax 
on additional profits in 1948; this tax was automatically levied on companies any time a sudden 
increase in profits broke the even distribution of gains between companies and the state. This 
arrangement was known as the fifty-fifty.197 The AD administration also established a ‘no more 
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concessions’ policy, initiating Pérez Alfonzo’s conservationist agenda.198 Despite fears from 
companies, the AD administration decided not to nationalize the oil industry and opted to protect 
the stability of government revenues. The long-term aim of the regime was to replace the 
concessionary system altogether and set up a national oil company.199  
 
The decisive push for the even split of gains or the fifty-fifty agreement (which would be used 
internationally as a reference point for other oil producing states in following years) would be 
remembered as a ground-breaking nationalist victory. A more critical reading of this history 
argues that in fact the 1943 law alone allowed for even further state participation and the 
windfall tax assured gains remained within the 50% margin.200 Those critical analyses would be 
associated with the left. The communist party had supported the Medina regime in the context of 
the war and was a strong defender of the terms of the 1943 law.201 Thus, two strands of 
nationalism emerged in Venezuela by the mid-twentieth century. Forces on the left of the 
political spectrum largely supported the 1943 law and the 1948 fifty-fifty was defended by the 
social-democratic party AD. The former strand would reach its end goal with the approval of the 
reversion law of 1971. The latter, would find its most significant threshold in the nationalization 
process of 1975.202 
 
3.3.3. Back to military rule: the New National Ideal  
 
A growing sectarian attitude by AD alienated many of its potential civilian allies, and it soon 
also found resistance within the military. The military rose up again in November 1948 in a coup 
d’état that overthrew Gallegos. AD and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) went 
clandestine ipso facto, while the two other main parties, URD and COPEI, justified the affair as 
being due to the AD’s sectarianism. General Marcos Perez Jiménez organized an ad hoc 
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triumvirate together with Laureano Vallenilla Lanz,203 son of Gómez’s ideologue, and with the 
head of the political security Pedro Estrada by 1950. Systematically eradicating public activism, 
civil and political rights, the military tried to relinquish the partisan legacy of AD. Pérez 
Jiménez’s ‘New National Ideal’ focused on transforming the nation through improving its 
‘physical environment’, as a way to evolve from its ‘natural backwardness’.204 Against this 
background, the Junta held elections in 1952 to elect a constituent assembly and legitimize the 
regime. Despite the authoritarian context, opposition parties decided to participate and AD’s 
activists, after promoting a boycott of the election, decided to vote for the URD candidates.205 
The result was an overwhelming victory for URD that was reported by the media in Venezuela 
and abroad. Pérez Jiménez and Vallenilla Lanz did not recognize the results and made Pérez 
Jiménez de facto President on December 2 1952.206  
 
The dictatorship kept the fifty-fifty agreement, although in average terms the central government 
reduced its share of rents appropriation. In absolute terms, the rents contribution to government 
revenue increased eleven times, mostly due to the reversal in the ‘no more concessions’ policy. 
Venezuelan production increased once more thanks to companies’ pressures, using the argument 
that Venezuelan oil ‘was losing out in the world market to oil from the Middle East’ due to their 
more favorable conditions.207 While this tactic worked for the companies, the Junta sent a group 
of Venezuelan representatives to the Middle East in 1949 to begin dialogue around price 
protection.208 This was a first if unsuccessful attempt by Venezuela to create an oil cartel. 
Notwithstanding, Pérez Jiménez offered national reserves up for exploitation under a competitive 
mechanism that allowed the entrance of new companies in 1956.209  
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Despite a relatively strong economic performance, the dictatorship failed at building a social 
base for its policies. Corruption in the highest levels of the military was seen as a pillage of the 
nation’s wealth and the elite that largely benefitted from its project eventually withdrew its 
support in the midst of soaring discontent over government debt obligations to local contractors. 
The elite’s discontent was framed as a critique of the dictatorship’s disrespect for civil and 
political rights, but also of the government’s unwillingness to channel natural resources’ wealth 
for the improvement of society as a whole. This change shifted the military’s commitment. An 
up-and-coming professional and modern military sided with a well-organized and unified 
clandestine opposition. In December 1957, the regime organized a plebiscite under complete 
control over institutions and a silenced opposition. This time around, rigging the election was 
costly for the regime and its power crumbled within weeks.  
 
On January 23, 1958 a civil-military rebellion forced Pérez Jiménez and his closest family 
members to flee the country en route to the Dominican Republic, where Rafael Trujillo governed 
with an iron fist. He would later end up exiled in Franco’s Spain. As Coronil points out ‘the 1958 
revolution was neither a traditional military coup nor a mass uprising from below. Rather, it was, 
in a peculiar and real way, the crystallization of collective discontent’.210  
 
In terms of the oil policy, the period from 1936 to 1958 saw important changes in the 
configuration of state-company relations. A wave of nationalist policies was advanced thanks to 
changing international conditions, such as the specter of Mexico’s nationalization, the US Good 
Neighbor policy and the market pressures stemming from World War II. These external factors 
slowly tilted the balance of the bargain in favor of the state. But new democratic parties, mainly 
AD, also challenged these policies, demanding a tougher stance on companies. A nationalist 
discourse and also platform for action was developed in this period, particularly with Pérez 
Alfonzo as a leading figure and the prominence of ideas such as the pursuit of state-led 
development under the banner of ‘sowing the oil’. The changes in the bargaining conditions were 
reinforced and delineated by internal disputes and ideational contentions. Overall, the state 
increased its capacity to extract ground rents reaching at least 50% of profits. Simultaneously, 
with the 1943 law the concessionary system was kept in place but an end date was also stamped 
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on the system. In forty years, all concessions would revert to the state. This end date initiated a 
process of bargain between the state and companies that eventually, in the obsolescing bargain 
parlance, sunk investments and increased incentives to nationalize. Despite the hiatus that the 
Pérez Jiménez military regime represented for the stabilization of a democracy, there were no 
major changes in terms of oil governance, except for the opening of new concessions in 1956. 
 
3.4. Puntofijismo and the Great Venezuela: national and global processes of shifting state-
foreign companies’ bargaining power 
 
AD was wary of its own sectarian politics of the past and decided to foster a commitment of 
governability with the other two main moderate parties, URD and COPEI. The pact was sealed 
in Rafael Caldera’s house named Puntofijo—thus the regime that emerged from it was regarded 
as puntofijismo. They agreed to broad institutional alliances to maintain democracy and even 
governing pacts if necessary, with the understanding that each party would accept to alternate in 
government given electoral defeat.211 The exclusion of the communists was justified as they were 
ultimately committed to ‘another sort of dictatorship’—that of the proletariat.212 This exclusion 
led the PCV to resort to guerrilla warfare for over a decade.213 Even before the formal transit to 
democracy, the January 23 rebellion had an effect on oil policy. Edgar Sanabria, then President 
of the civil-military Junta that transitioned the government to democracy, decided in December 
1958, just a few days before the elected government of Betancourt took office, to break the fifty-
fifty agreement. Sanabria increased state participation of the oil industry’s profit to an average of 
65%.214 This change in the tax codes was forced by an urgent need for higher government 
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revenues to satisfy growing public demands and it was agreed upon with the incoming 
administration to fulfill future commitments.215  
 
During Betancourt’s government, an already experienced Pérez Alfonzo was in charge of the 
ministry of mines and hydrocarbons. Pérez Alfonzo promoted five clear policy lines that became 
reference points for Venezuela’s oil policy for the next two decades and had an impact in much 
of the third world. The ‘petroleum pentagon’ could be summarized in the following way. First, 
the government committed to cease granting any more concessions to foreign companies. 
Second, it focused its efforts on creating a NOC to give Venezuelans managerial capacity in 
petroleum, aiming at gradually replacing the concessionary system with a national monopoly. 
Third, it maintained and improved the levels of profit for the state. Fourth, the government 
developed a conservation policy for the resource by protecting reserves, reducing production and 
defending prices. Lastly, and tied to the former goals, the government fostered a basis of 
coordination with other oil producing countries to exert their power in defense of the resource, its 
market price and business conditions vis-á-vis concessionaires. 216  Clearly influenced by 
structuralist thought developed by Raúl Prebisch, Pérez Alfonzo and the Venezuelan government 
had the double goal of improving the structural position of primary commodity producers, 
particularly those of crude petroleum, and encouraging industrialization.  
 
3.4.1. OPEC: norm entrepreneurship made in Venezuela 
 
The IOCs’ strategy to influence production levels in Venezuela and the Middle East to improve 
their market conditions was challenged in the late 1950s. A cooperative proposal was seen with 
better eyes this time as a reformer in Saudi Arabia, Abdulla al-Tariqi, Director of Mines in the 
Saudi government, advocated nationalist ideas that resembled those the Venezuelans had pursued 
between 1936-1948.217 Venezuela and Iran were invited as observers in 1959 to the first Arab 
Petroleum Congress in Nasser’s Cairo. Pérez Alfonzo engineered a stealth meeting with Tariqi 
and both agreed with an Iranian representative on an unwritten pact—known as the Maadi 
                                                            
215 Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela; Bautista Urbaneja, La Renta Y El Reclamo: Ensayo Sobre Petróleo Y 
Economía Política En Venezuela. 
216 Garavini, “Completing Decolonization”; Darwich Osorio, “Petróleo En Venezuela En El Siglo XX. De La 
Inexperiencia Institucional a La Pericia”; Prashad, The Darker Nations. 
217 Garavini, “Completing Decolonization.” 
77 
 
Pact—to keep prices stable. The rest of the agreement resembled Pérez Alfonzo’s Petroleum 
Pentagon. It centered on the creation of NOCs, the advancement of refining in producers’ 
territories, the protection of state profits following the Venezuelan threshold of 60-40, the 
agreement among all parties before making any change in prices, and enhancing cooperation on 
conservation, production and exploitation.218 As the norm diffusion literature points out, there are 
different mechanisms through which norms ‘travel’ as well as different origins that can include 
the periphery of the international system.219 The case of the Petroleum Pentagon, although had 
national origins, became a ‘transnational norm’ that flowed from Venezuela to other oil 
producing nations.  
 
The following year, in 1960, OPEC was created in Baghdad after the Seven Sisters unilaterally 
decided to drop prices to 1950 levels in reaction to increasing competition from Italy’s ENI and 
from the USSR. At the time, the five founding members of OPEC represented 83% of total world 
output.220 This was among the boldest moves made by third world nations in the global economy. 
While the obsolescing bargain explanations account for nationalist stances to enhance control 
because of price hikes or as a result of investments’ maturity, the creation of OPEC responded 
largely to ideational motives. OPEC was indeed an action by producers to impact prices, but it 
was also a crystallization of emerging notions about the role of natural resources in the pursuit of 
development. This initiative served as a precursor—more than a decade before the launching of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—of third world stances on the governance of the 
global economy as ‘oil producers anticipated the creation of UNCTAD by giving birth to their 
own co-operative structure in 1960, to deal with the declining price of commodities’.221 It was 
also a stance from third world countries to take part in multilateral cooperation from their 
position of sovereign states. Betancourt defended this move as a nationalist position in 
consonance with multilateral behavior. Recalling the creation of OPEC, he argued in a speech 
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years later: ‘we are in an interrelated world; nobody can aspire to make exclusively national 
decisions, nationalism is not incompatible with internationalism’.222 
 
OPEC initiated a gradual shift in the balance of power away from IOCs to producer states. This 
shift was not in any way a process of absolute power change; it was rather a negotiated process 
that enhanced states’ control over operations while the Seven Sisters remained important 
cooperation entities and exerted pressure in local as well as global markets. The footprints of 
these changes can be found in Venezuela’s historical process of acquiring knowledge and 
exerting its power as a landlord state through state regulation. Other partners in the Middle East 
and North Africa effectively adopted Venezuelan benchmarks of rents appropriation as 
acceptable norms, beginning with the fifty-fifty agreement.223 As Pérez Alfonzo puts it, ‘the 
example-demonstration of Venezuela’s measures and government policies… transcended to 
other exporter countries with whom we had initiated contact’.224 The ideational underpinnings of 
these policies were twofold. First, they appealed to a notion of subjectivity as Venezuelan 
officials identified their country as an oil producer with the ‘right’ to extract royalties and 
benefits from the fruits of the soil. Pérez Alfonzo describes it this way: ‘for the first time in the 
international history of oil an concessionary country exercised its sovereign right to change 
unilaterally the tax and royalty rates’.225 Secondly, such measures responded to a sense of 
international justice toward the owners of natural resources.226   
 
During the 1960s, low prices remained the norm but producer states had initiated different 
mechanisms to exert further control on rents and price, while seemingly unrelated events also 
contributed to subsequent upturn of prices. Muhammar al-Qaddafi’s increasing tax revenues 
from concessionaires in 1961 was an important innovation. Moreover, at the end of the decade, 
what was thought as the ‘peak of oil’ had been reached in both the United States and 
Venezuela.227 The peak oil notion contributed to Venezuela’s position at OPEC’s meeting in 
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1971 in favor of conservationism and price protection. Lastly, US president Richard Nixon’s 
unilateral abandonment of the dollar-gold standard put an upward pressure on oil prices.228  
 
In 1973, a concerted move by Arab countries known as the oil embargo on western powers in a 
political response to the Yom Kippur war provoked a dramatic price increase. This price hike 
was concomitant to a radicalization of the thirdworldist movement. Third world nations 
advanced a code of economic rights for developing countries and sought to strengthen the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM sought ‘the extension to the international economic 
system of the redistributive framework that had been consolidated in the social democracies of 
Western Europe after World War II’.229 A largely symbolic outcome of this movement was the 
approval of UNCTAD’s NIEO document in the United Nations’ general assembly in 1974. 
Indeed, ‘the call for a NIEO followed on the heels of the 1973 oil crisis and the demonstration by 
the OPEC of its ability to set the price of oil’.230 While the NIEO was never implemented and the 
implications of the oil price increase actually generated the basis for crises both in developed and 
developing countries that precipitated neoliberal restructuring, it consolidated the final steps for 
nationalization in major oil producing nation-states. It also meant an important ideational 
mobilizer for third world nations that sought to attain more control over their natural resources. 
For Pérez Alfonzo, the history of OPEC ‘has shaken the world and feeds hopes to build a new 
economic order’.231  
 
3.4.2. Conservationism and the shifting bargain: Pérez Alfonzo’s ‘no more concessions’ and the 
reversion law 
 
During Pérez Alfonzo’s tenure in the ministry, the Corporación Venezolana de Petróleos (CVP) 
was created in order to gain expertise at all levels of the oil industry from extraction to 
commercialization, transport and management. The CVP, created in 1960, remained a small 
enterprise during the 1960s, which worked well under AD’s conservationist paradigm as 
concessionaires continued to extract oil and the government did not wish to contribute with 
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meaningful production of its own to drive prices down further.232 Pérez Alfonzo’s conservationist 
policy derived from his understanding, mistaken as it was, that proven oil reserves had reached 
their limit and Venezuela’s crude was close to exhaustion. But most importantly, Pérez Alonzo 
was at the core a nationalist who wished to limit concessionaires’ extraction because of his belief 
that the remaining crude should be under the absolute control of the state. Lastly, he heralded a 
notion that non-oil related revenue was required to increase faster than oil revenues for 
diversification to be possible.233  
 
Throughout the 1960s, the major oil companies had no incentives to invest, as it was clear that 
once concessions expired in 1983 and in 1996 there was a consensus that they would not be 
renegotiated. Both Creole and Shell organized around the Petroleum Chamber, which in turn 
influenced the major local business confederation, FEDECAMARAS.234 The most important 
public figure to represent companies’ interest was Uslar Pietri, then independent senator, and 
well-known public speaker, who argued that the government theses of the peak oil were largely 
speculative in nature and further claimed the state was technically incapable of substituting 
foreign companies. The companies defended their positions in the political arena, opposing the 
government’s attempts to expand its claim on oil rents. Companies decided to make their 
presence in the country the least costly. As a result, underinvestment ensued, which led to aging 
infrastructure and equipment, lower exploration and stagnant reserves. Concessionaires increased 
production to the highest possible capacity in search of the ‘last possible drop’ of crude; 
production reached 3.7 million bpd in 1967.235 This evolution represented a process wherein the 
obsolescing bargaining was shifting toward the state but private companies remained in control 
over operations and thus used their power to maintain profitability in the long-term.  
 
In the process of handing over the government from AD to COPEI’s Rafael Calera for the first 
time in 1969, there was increasing concern around the prospects of the oil industry at the time 
when contracts would end. Most concessionary contracts would expire in 1983 (those granted by 
Pérez Jiménez would end in 1996), and there were fears that Venezuela ‘might inherit rusting 
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dilapidated equipment and run-down, depleted oilfields’.236 The problem was to be ‘resolved’ by 
a bill introduced in parliament from the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP)—a left-wing 
division within AD—which had backstage support of Pérez Alfonzo and much of the left. 
Congressman Álvaro Silva Calderón joined forces with AD’s nationalist faction and it slowly 
gained the support of COPEI.237 The reversion law, approved in 1971, contemplated a complete 
return of assets, infrastructure and the entire inventory of the oil industry to the state upon 
completion of the contracts in 1983 and 1996—with no compensation. In order to prevent a 
deepening in the disinvestment dynamic, companies were to create a fund of up to 10% of the 
value of their installation, which would be reimbursed if they were well maintained.238 The 
reversion law basically respected ending the terms of the concessions based on the 1943 Medina 
law, and culminated in the process of power shift with full nationalization.  
 
Despite fierce opposition from companies, the reversion law was passed with almost absolute 
consensus in Congress: ‘in fact, there was little the companies could do, so extensive was their 
loss of political influence in Venezuela’.239 Moreover, the terms of the anticipated service 
contracts became less attractive for companies, and their capacity to exert influence in the 
government was clearly on the decline. Even if there was growing agreement on the idea of full 
nationalization, in 1972 it was not a topic any major political figure embraced. Only small left-
wing parties like MEP, as well as PCV and MAS called for a rapid advancement of the 
reversion.240 
 
With the reversion law, we see a clear shift in the bargaining power of the state versus 
companies. The lead-up to the reversion law was gradual, as I have explained so far. It was a 
process marked by knowledge acquisition since the Gómez regime that crystalized with the 1943 
hydrocarbons law. This process of learning was also accompanied by the flourishing of ideas that 
linked natural resource ownership with development and a relatively stable party system. Most 
importantly, the flow and establishment of these ideas, while contextualized in a national setting, 
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were also globalized through multilateral initiatives such as OPEC and the NIEO. Underneath 
these shifts in the bargaining conditions and the strengthening of new ideas, there were also 
important disputes between nationalist factions that sought to implement changes in state-foreign 
companies’ arrangements.  
 
3.5. Nationalization: a dream come true or a truncated project? 
 
At the end of Caldera’s administration, a multi-layered process was taking place in Venezuela’s 
political economy. First, Venezuela’s rentier capitalism was reaching its peak; in 1973 the state 
appropriated about 80% of the entire oil industry’s profits from royalties, taxes and other rents.241 
Second, the industry was suffering from underinvestment and much of the light crude that was 
found in the western part of the country had been extracted during more than 50 years of the 
concessionary system. Most untapped oil reserves were located in the eastern Orinoco river belt; 
much of it was heavy and extra heavy crude. Third, the economy was already extremely 
dependent on oil rents, as around 90% of foreign currency came from oil exports and various 
economic and social actors negotiated rents from the state through a highly centralized and party-
based political system.242  
 
In December 1973, Carlos Andrés Pérez, AD’s presidential candidate, won with a resounding 
result that also gave him ample majorities in both chambers of Congress. High oil prices were 
seen as a sign to launch a radical program of industrialization and modernization anchored in oil. 
Pérez ‘dramatically presented this conjuncture as being Venezuela’s historic opportunity to 
overcome underdevelopment, to achieve its second independence and construct the Great 
Venezuela’.243 Despite having been cautious in his rhetoric during the campaign, as soon as Pérez 
assumed the presidency in 1974, he set up a diverse presidential commission of petroleum 
reversion. As such, he also called for a national consensus on the matter.244 In his first speech as 
President, Pérez stated, ‘we see the necessity of advancing the process to fix once and for all a 
new nationalist and national petroleum policy. It will be the National Congress which says the 
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final word, but not by exercise of a simple parliamentary majority; rather, by decision of the 
entire nation’.245 In fact, the presidential commission took on various proposals that had already 
emerged from Congress.246 The presidential commission worked then on a unifying bill, which 
was introduced for congressional debate in 1975.  
 
Full nationalization was, in a nutshell, a matter of national consensus by that point. In Philip’s 
words ‘the nationalization was (as far as any step of this magnitude can be) a quiet, consensual 
affair which showed, as clearly as anything could, the lack of serious political conflict in the 
country’.247 It was in fact the result of a long process of knowledge creation and the unfolding of 
a series of political contestations between the state and foreign concessionaires. It was ‘the 
logical, perhaps the only, response to a gradually woven web of political and economic 
constraints which fit into place during 53 years of oil production’.248  
 
Nevertheless, as it has been noted already, different factions within Congress interpreted 
differently how state takeover should occur and in which terms the state should nationalize the 
industry. The draft law that ‘reserved to the state the industry and commercialization of 
hydrocarbons’ (nationalization law from hereafter) was thoroughly debated and, contrary to 
Philip’s claim, there was no consensus around what kind of nationalization the country should 
undertake. The law’s main provisions included: the nationalization of the oil industry beginning 
in 1976, thus ending all concessions; the creation of a holding company whose sole shareholder 
would be the state (PDVSA); the protection of workers in the industry during the transition; the 
compensation of foreign concessionaires; and the possible association of the state with foreign 
companies in operations where technical assistance would be required (the famous Article 5).249   
 
As a result of successful campaigning by conservative forces and companies themselves through 
their media apparatus (concessionaires owned Venezuela’s only TV station at the time as well as 
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the largest network of radio stations), some of their concerns were taken into consideration at the 
time of drafting the law. Their concerns centered on the capital needed to run exploration and 
expand extraction as well as the alleged incapacity of the Venezuelan state to manage the 
industry. It was argued that the state could not handle the complexity of the industry and its 
linkages with the global economy, as up until this point foreign concessionaires had handled 
issues regarding transport and commercialization from their headquarters.250 These concerns were 
the justification for Article 5, according to which the state may ‘enter into agreements of 
association with private entities, but with participation such that will guarantee state control, and 
for a limited duration’.251 Nationalists from the left, now with the support of Pérez Alfonzo, 
fiercely opposed Article 5, arguing that this was in fact an obstacle to true nationalization; it 
meant a ‘truncated nationalization’.252 This is, in short, an important cleavage point between the 
two strands of nationalism I have described above. With Article 5 the left thought, ‘real 
nationalization’ as per the reversion law terms, was betrayed. As Mendoza Potellá put it 
hyperbolically in an interview, ‘the 1975 law really meant the negation of nationalization’.253 
 
COPEI supported their criticism via Caldera’s address to Congress from his position as 
senator.254 Citing personal experience, he said that as far as he was concerned ‘never had great oil 
transnational corporations supported Venezuela’s steps toward greater sovereignty over its 
resources. Rather, I have come to the realization that every time they have been able to erect 
obstacles, they have done so’.255 The final wording of the law allowed those ‘association 
agreements’ in vague terms especially arguing the impossibility to reach joint-venture status, 
something the left feared, as it would grant assets to foreign companies on Venezuelan soil once 
more. In his address to the senate, Betancourt stated his support of the article, as ‘it speaks of 
only two possibilities, one of operational contracts with the oil enterprise that will manage the 
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entire industry or association contracts that will not be approved without consent from both 
chambers of Congress’.256 Later, he said: ‘in reference to association contracts the article never 
stipulates joint-ventures’.257 As we shall see in chapter 5, during chavismo, joint ventures 
ironically became the preferred mechanism of association by the left in power. During the 1975 
nationalization debates, joint ventures were not contemplated by neither AD or the communist 
nationalist factions.  
 
The other concerns posed by the managerial leadership of concessionaires were resolved by an 
administrative arrangement with the new national enterprise. In short, PDVSA would inherit the 
managerial culture of Creole, Shell and Menegrande and they would be transformed into 
subsidiaries of PDVSA, known as Lagoven, Corpoven and Maraven. Thus ‘the affiliates 
maintained the original structure of the concessionaires, operating the same areas, exercising the 
same activities, and with the same personnel, apart from the foreigners at the highest levels of 
management, who were replaced by their Venezuelan deputies’.258 State control would be 
exercised through a board of directors and a president of the company (CEO) appointed by the 
executive power. Humberto Calderón Berti, who served as liaison between the Ministry of 
Energy and the presidential commission on reversion, stated in an interview that the idea was 
that PDVSA operated ‘as a private firm, with financial autonomy and granted with mechanisms 
that would impede its politicization and the government’s intervention’. The Minister of Energy 
and Mines would preside over the board but, formally, it had no say in the appointment of its 
members. The state would still collect taxes and royalties from the company, maintaining its role 
as landowner and rentier state.259 As Philip explains:  
The oil company managers who moved over after the nationalization made it clear 
that they would only remain in Venezuela if their managerial autonomy was 
respected. Government, too, was aware of the dangers of destroying the efficiency 
of the oil sector in a country whose economy was almost completely dependent 
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upon oil. Since the political elite had largely organized the Venezuelan state 
around oil rents, they did need those rents to continue to flow.260 
Neither the left parties nor COPEI were convinced by the wording of Article 5. Despite all 
efforts to reach an agreement, the nationalization law passed with AD votes alone and those of a 
pro-Pérez Jiménez minor party.261 
 
The form that full nationalization took in 1976 sought to maintain the technical capacity of the 
Venezuelan oil industry. This was achieved through state regulation but also through granting 
autonomy to PDVSA’s managerial structure. At the same time, the state left a window open for 
strategic associations with IOCs in case it was deemed necessary. There were, however, 
important provisions required for such associations of technical assistance to take place. They 
had to be approved by both chambers of Congress and they could not, by any means, undermine 
state control. Ultimately, joint ventures and other forms of association that would grant foreign 




During much of the past century, the Venezuelan state relationship with oil companies was 
marked by a constant negotiation over the terms of rent appropriation. The state’s regulatory 
capacity grew gradually over time and with it, its ability to exert greater control over the oil 
industry. The liberal concessionary system was associated with Gómez’s political system of 
dictatorial rule and arbitrariness. As I have argued, the struggles for democracy in Venezuela 
were intimately linked with the enhancement of state control over the oil industry and this 
control was considered a prerequisite for national development, captured in the idea of ‘sowing 
the oil’. Already in the 1920s, efforts to increase state control translated into notions of a 
landlord state, which began to impact the formation of Venezuela’s modern state and its national 
identity. Yet, at an early stage, the improvement of the state’s bargaining capacity was 
influenced by exogenous factors, such as Mexico’s nationalization and Roosevelt’s more lenient 
policy toward producer states like Venezuela. As the bargaining capacity of the state improved, 
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its main focus was for several decades to maximize its rent appropriation. An important 
threshold was the 1943 law, which despite criticism from AD nationalists, drew a road map to an 
end of concessions, and increased state appropriation of rents via royalties and income tax. Later, 
the fifty-fifty system marked a point of nationalist victory.  
 
The political regime that emerged in the mid-century assumed that oil was going to run out in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover, it expected not to renew the concessions signed with foreign 
companies in 1943 and 1956. These assumptions reflected the obsolescing bargaining process 
between the state and companies. Companies had the incentive to stop investments, whilst the 
state had the incentive to speed up the process of nationalization. Thus ‘nationalization was an 
inevitable outcome of a long process of rent maximization’. 262 Domestically, the idea of 
development associated with national ownership over oil was conceptualized as ‘sowing the oil’, 
which became a dominant view that most of the political establishment shared. Internationally, 
the Venezuelan state played a leading role in disseminating new international norms concerning 
the practices of the landlord state and the role of natural resource ownership in the pursuit of 
development that had in the creation of OPEC a symbolic achievement. 
 
Nationalization was indeed an inevitable step of a long process of knowledge creation and 
increased state assertiveness vis-á-vis foreign companies. Nevertheless, nationalization was also 
a contested issue and reflected important ideational contentions. Leftist nationalists preferred 
confiscation and complete state takeover of companies’ installations after concessions ended in 
1983 and 1996, granted in the 1971 reversion law. The ruling party AD, with strong 
congressional majorities, anticipated the reversion and conceded the possibility of signing future 
technical assistance agreements with foreign companies. Article 5 was a result of these 
concessions. Touted as a betrayal to true nationalization, Article 5 remained a point of criticism 
by the left and it will impact its political activism in coming decades. Most importantly, the state 
granted autonomy to the national company, PDVSA in order to procure new investments and to 
protect the oil industry’s technical capacity. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this granted 
autonomy internalized the struggles and bargains around control within the realm of the state and 
contributed to important material but also subjective struggles between the state and PDVSA. 
                                                            




Opening borne out of autonomy: 




In the previous chapter, I analyzed the historical evolution of the Venezuelan rentier state with 
reference to the main conflicts and bargains that occurred between the state and foreign 
companies until full nationalization took place in 1976. I argued that nationalization was the 
result of long-lasting disputes between the state and IOCs but also the kind of nationalization that 
was agreed upon in 1975 was the result of internal disputes between different social actors. The 
nationalization model that prevailed, heralded by AD and influenced by conservative actors and 
foreign companies themselves, allowed for eventual associations with IOCs and provided 
administrative and technical autonomy to PDVSA, the newly created NOC. 
 
PDVSA’s autonomy meant the internalization of IOCs’ logics and interests into part of the state. 
In a context when the national developmental model faced important challenges and the decay of 
the ‘sowing the oil’ project was evident, the government appropriated PDVSA’s investment fund 
and conflict between government and company ensued. The tensions between the state and its 
own company, which sought to develop its own autonomy away from state control, provoked a 
process that has been labeled in the literature as brewing ‘a state within a state’.263 A new liberal 
phase of PDVSA’s internationalization and opening to foreign investment occurred in the 1980s 
and 1990s. New investments flowed into the industry, boosting production at the end of the 
1990s. This phase occurred in tandem with the crumbling of the political system and a growing 
desire to modernize the country’s economy.  
 
In this chapter, I explain how the oil opening was initially a plan developed by PDVSA to 
achieve its goals of becoming a world leading energy firm. It was at first resisted by state actors, 
mostly AD in the second presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez, despite the President’s commitment 
to wider neoliberal reforms. Once Pérez left the presidency, both PDVSA’s opening and 
structural adjustment policies were advanced at the expense of the puntofijo political system. The 
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oil opening began a new investment cycle with strong incentives for IOCs to invest under a 
flexible framework. PDVSA used Article 5 of the nationalization law to advance this liberal 
framework—a framework severely criticized by the left. Low oil prices, the opening of marginal 
and untapped fields and the extraction of heavier crudes characterized the conditions of the new 
bargain that strongly benefited foreign investors.  
 
The ideational imperatives of this liberal turn were significantly contested, as neoliberal values 
infused skepticism in different social and state actors. The chapter argues that the oil opening 
noticeably responded to an internal maneuver by PDVSA to develop its own plans and increase 
its autonomy. PDVSA’s plans contradicted pre-conceived notions of the role of the state. While 
the political apparatus remained committed to the traditional ideas of the state as a landlord and 
rentier state (committed to maximize rents), PDVSA’s management imposed its view of an oil 
producer (committed to maximize production). Interestingly, for government officials, state 
control over PDVSA was required in the midst the neoliberal state restructuring. PDVSA defied 
the government’s control by promoting a liberal policy of its own, mirroring major oil producers 
globally. 
 
The chapter will unfold as follows. First, it will discuss the main features of Venezuela’s 
political economy in the post-nationalization period and the rationale behind granting autonomy 
to PDVSA. It will then analyze the ‘great turnaround’ attempted by Carlos Andrés Pérez second 
administration toward a more liberal economic framework and his government’s resistance to 
PDVSA’s plans. Third, it will explain the process of oil opening led by PDVSA. Lastly, it will 
briefly explore president Caldera’s hesitant endorsement of neoliberal policies and the crumbling 
of the puntofijo political system during his second time in the presidency. 
4.2. Autonomy vs. control over the national oil company and the ‘indigestion’ of rents 
 
With nationalization began a renewed relationship between the Venezuelan state and the oil 
industry. At first sight, the state now monopolized the industry. It directly engaged in trade 
relations with crude buyers abroad, while its own national company extracted the resource and 
was in charge of supplying domestic consumption. The state-company relationship seemed to be 
one of submission but, in reality, it turned out to be more complicated. As Dunning points out 
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‘nationalization marked the beginning of a long downward trend in the Venezuelan state’s 
percentage take of rents’. 264  The long process of underinvestment in which foreign 
concessionaires had been purposefully engaged obliged the government to actually reduce 
PDVSA’s fiscal burden. Corporate tax was temporarily reduced to 59%, royalties were brought 
back to the 16.6% levels of 1943 and there was a 10% exemption from corporate tax in export 
profits.265 These fiscal provisions were offered in order to allow the company to reinvest and 
develop further the industry. In the initial context of the 1970s, these sharp declines were not felt 
dramatically hard as, overall, oil revenues spiked due to price increases. Between 1972 and 1975, 
Venezuela’s fiscal income more than tripled and Venezuela’s GDP per capita reached the same 
level as that of West Germany, while it doubled Italy’s.266 Similarly, in the first decade of its 
existence, PDVSA managed to accumulate an investment fund of over US$ 5 billion.267 
 
At the same time, Pérez launched a massive development plan, known as the 5th Development 
Plan, with an ambitious industrial policy, focused on basic industries and linkages of heavy 
metals, automotive and energy intensive industries.268 These industries were either owned by the 
state or heavily protected by price mechanisms and subsidies. This control allowed the 
possibility to carry out clientelistic-type relationships between loyal worker unions, business and 
the presidency. The goal was to reduce poverty and expand demand through price controls and 
boosting employment. The public sector doubled its payroll. Import substitution was to be 
strengthened in alliance with a broader regional strategy under the Andean Pact.269 However, 
Pérez also had deep political ambitions, as he was allowed by Congress to govern by decree in 
various areas, including the economy.270 In fact, Pérez governed beyond the tacit party-based 
agreements of puntofijismo and led a more personalistic project that was independent from the 
‘old guard’ of his party, and from Congress. In this case, a group of business elites that had 
supported his election received beneficial treatment from the state (the famous group of cronies 
were known as the ‘twelve apostles’) and several other factions claimed rents in the name of the 
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Great Venezuela project. Despite attempts to create a fund with half of oil revenues to insulate 
the economy from future shocks, the fund ceased to receive any funding from 1975 and its US$ 
3.5 billion were spent during the Pérez administration, at the discretion of the President.271  
 
Pérez Alfonzo labeled this period a moment of general ‘indigestion’ of rents, wherein corruption 
and other speculative practices had become commonplace.272 His critique at the moment centered 
on the ethical consequences of windfall revenues, rather than the political economy of a peaking 
rentier state, as other scholars would later explore in more detail.273 Nevertheless, the image of 
indigestion is illustrative, just as the title of his book encapsulated the idea of the country 
‘sinking in the devil’s excrement’. While rent maximization began to decline, its capacity to be 
absorbed productively also shrank due to policy mechanisms such as an overvalued currency, a 
highly protected internal market, and closed avenues for investments in potentially profitable 
enterprises monopolized by the state. For Baptista, this was the gradual exhaustion of rentier 
capitalism in Venezuela, as a sharp decline in private investment was coupled with a decline in 
its profitability, which found a more rewarding destiny abroad.274 Simultaneously, PDVSA’s 
managerial elite remained highly trained and remunerated, in contrast with its regulating 
counterpart, now the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The company viewed the political elite with 
caution and was wary of any type of political intervention from the state, still then not engaging 
in direct conflict. As Mommer pointed out in an interview, ‘supposedly, PDVSA was a pillar of 
the party democracy that birthed it, but it turned out not to be true, it was really a subversive 
force’.275 
 
4.3. The ‘great turnaround’: neoliberalism and contested internationalization  
 
Parallel to government spending and capital flight, Venezuela accumulated massive foreign debt, 
conceived as a way to leverage industrial policy by committing future rents. International private 
lending was a pervasive phenomenon at the time due to the need to recycle petrodollars from the 
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international banking system. In turn, ‘international credits were seen as desirable because 
Venezuela, backed by its oil as collateral, could get favorable terms during the recession that 
plagued the industrialized countries’.276 Nevertheless, as price fluctuations began to affect the 
national treasury at the end of the 1970s, the model of rent distribution and market protection 
faced problems.  
 
COPEI’s candidate was elected President in the 1978 elections in spite of internal fissures within 
AD. President Luis Herrera Campins initially experienced an oil price boom with the spike of 
prices in 1979 and attempted to delay market reforms, especially a possible IMF-backed loan. 
Yet, oil prices then collapsed at the start of the 1980s. Capital flight became endemic, reaching 
over US$20 billion between 1980-1982. PDVSA had also autonomously acquired debt 
internationally to develop its investment plans. Herrera’s government, ‘unable to control state 
enterprise short-term borrowing, raided the investment funds of PDVSA’.277 In 1982, the Central 
Bank’s president Leopoldo Díaz Bruzual proposed the repatriation of PDVSA’s foreign funds. 
Humberto Calderón Berti, then Minister of Energy and Mines, opposed the idea, joining the 
concerns of PDVSA managers. Calderón Berti remembers that he ‘anticipated the disastrous 
consequences of such measure: those funds will soon evaporate’.278 Díaz Bruzual’s proposal 
prevailed and the government forced the repatriation of up to US$8 billion from PDVSA’s assets 
in September of 1982 and obliged the company to exchange all its export funds via the Central 
Bank. The government sought to improve national accounts to place the country in a better 
position with foreign banks.279 However, the system of price controls and overvalued currency 
proved unsustainable as oil prices kept declining. On February 18 1983, the government decided 
to devalue the currency after two decades of stability at 4.3 Bs per dollar. That ‘black Friday’ 
was to be remembered as the mark of the downward turn of Venezuela’s rentier capitalism but 
also, that of its puntofijista political system. 
 
As Calderón Berti and PDVSA executives anticipated, the company’s earnings were eroded by 
devaluation. The company had thus far insulated itself from the workings of the state and 
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considered its managerial behavior politics-free, but after 1982, it felt as though politics had 
looted the company. More broadly, PDVSA’s managerial elite was critical of the failure of the 
government industrial policies and previous attempts at ‘sowing the oil’.280 From 1983, PDVSA 
worked on different strategies to regain its financial (and, clearly, political) autonomy. 
Meanwhile, the government tried to juggle the new times of austerity by maintaining price 
controls and setting up currency controls to prevent further capital flight. Further, a system of 
multiple exchange rates was set up. 
 
An ambitious plan of ‘internationalization’ was carried out from 1983, whereby PDVSA bought 
foreign refineries. The justification of this move was to assure markets for Venezuelan oil but it 
was also geared toward purchasing assets before liquid funds could be taxed and appropriated by 
the state. PDVSA’s managers wanted to avoid further erosion of its funds for public spending 
and decided to purchase 50% of VEBA Öel in Germany in 1983.281 Luis Guisti, who would later 
become PDVSA’s CEO, describes this step as the NOC’s ‘realization of the need to have 
vertically integrated chains’ to locate Venezuelan crude in international markets.282 In fact, 
Guillermo Aveledo Coll argues that ‘this project of internationalization and vertical integration 
finds its roots in the Christian-democratic oil agenda laid out by Caldera’.283 In practice, however, 
according to Mommer, PDVSA sold light crude to its affiliate in Germany at discounted prices to 
leave a larger margin of profits abroad.284 The plan that PDVSA advanced was to develop a 
network of refining, commercialization and transport firms both in Europe and the US. The 
process of internationalization had to slow down in the midst of a change in government in 1984, 
but in 1986 the company purchased 50% of Citgo’s holdings in the US, even despite opposition 
from the government of Jaime Lusinchi, becoming one of the boldest business transfers from a 
company in the developing world to the north.285 Throughout the decade, while the government 
supported OPEC policies of price protection, PDVSA saw it as a handicap to the company’s 
plans. Internationalization could not expand as production and exports declined.  
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From the mid-1980s, there is a clear process whereby the conflict that had traditionally occurred 
between the state and IOCs transferred to the state and its NOC. The tipping point of the conflict 
was the government’s repatriation of PDVSA’s investment fund, which added to considerations 
of a technical nature, propelled the company to seek vertical integration through 
internationalization. PDVSA sought to become closer to its natural markets, the US, Europe and, 
once again, Caribbean islands where the country’s refining capacity had been installed during the 
Gómez regime. PDVSA’s policies were largely influenced by its identity as a major oil producer, 
rather than an agent of a landlord state.  
 
4.3.1 The great turnaround vs. PDVSA’s internationalization 
 
In 1988, Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected once more to the presidency. This time he promised a 
‘great turnaround’ in Venezuela’s political economy. In fact, the country’s accounts allowed for 
little choice. Both Herrera and Lusinchi’s administrations had kept costly controls and subsidies, 
and acquired more debt while feeding an unsustainable system of foreign exchange that 
dilapidated international reserves. Between Herrera and Lusinchi, foreign debt increased from 
US$ 9 billion to US$ 43 billion.286 A sharp decline in average income affected the poorest sectors 
of society and popular unrest was soaring, due to high inflation and scarcity in basic staples.287  
 
Pérez appointed a highly respected team of liberal-minded economists to the cabinet who, like 
their peers in other Latin American countries, were commissioned to execute bold economic 
restructuring. 288  This group of técnicos had been trained in US economics and business 
departments and most of them were based in Caracas’ famous private business administration 
school IESA.289 The government was no longer interested in putting off an agreement with the 
IMF and pursued a package of structural adjustment policies to modernize the economy 
according to new international norms. Indeed, Pérez had endorsed neoliberal reforms as the new 
principle of development for Venezuela. As soon as the government took power, it launched a 
‘package’ of structural adjustment policies. These policies included ‘the unification and massive 
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devaluation of the exchange rate, trade liberalization, privatization and financial deregulation 
[…] freeing of interest rates, elimination of nearly all restrictions on foreign investment, and the 
introduction of tax reforms, including the introduction of value-added taxes’.290 While Pérez had 
campaigned to bring the good old times of prosperity back, he started his government with the 
announcement of austerity measures, privatization and liberalization. Beyond transforming 
deeply entrenched economic policies in Venezuela, Pérez himself had made a personal 
ideological turnaround that was unwelcomed by the masses and even by the political 
establishment. Indeed, the measures lacked ‘the constitution of new political and social 
identities’ and they failed to ‘gather popular support or even strong parliamentary backing’.291  
 
Within a few weeks of the Pérez administration inauguration, protests erupted due to increasing 
transport fares that had been adjusted according to new petrol prices. Riots soon became endemic 
in most urban areas of the country in a spontaneous and disorganized manner. Massive looting 
took place targeting supermarkets and other retailers and after hours of inaction and inability to 
cope with the uprising, the government responded with heavy-handed repression by the National 
Guard and police. Official accounts acknowledged 277 killed in five days, while human rights 
organizations claim over 400 deaths.292 The popularly known caracazo demonstrated not only the 
government’s inability to communicate and convince its constituents of the need to reform, but 
also that society lacked effective forms of ‘mediation’ to communicate with those in power.293 
The party democracy established in 1958 not only had economic deficiencies but its political 
legitimacy was seriously questioned. From then on, Pérez’s reforms became more contentious 
and gradual, as the political establishment was wary of the costs and mistrusted the President’s 
ability to gather consensus for adjustments. 
 
Interestingly, it has been scarcely acknowledged that Pérez’s reformist turn did not extend to oil 
policy. He appointed Celestino Armas Minister of Energy and Mines, a traditional adeco, who 
had opposed PDVSA’s internationalization and was fully supportive of OPEC quotas.294 Arturo 
Sosa Pietri was appointed PDVSA’s president. In an interview, Monaldi claimed that Pérez 
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sought to bring ‘PDVSA to the government’s control by appointing an outsider as CEO’ but 
ultimately failed to achieve his goal.295 Armas had denounced in Congress PDVSA’s strategy to 
channel profits abroad through price differentials between the company’s headquarters and its 
affiliates.296 The ministry decided to halt PDVSA’s internationalization and ordered the company 
to cease its intentions of purchasing the other half of Citgo’s assets in 1989.297 The government 
continued to support its traditional role of a landlord state in its relation to oil, even despite the 
administration’s broader embrace of neoliberalism. Despite the government’s attempts, Sosa 
became an ally of PDVSA’s executives and with his lead, the company refuted the government’s 
decision and opted for the purchase. Upon Pérez’s demand to resell half of Citgo’s assets, 
PDVSA ‘dragged its feet’ and the relationship between the company and the presidency 
deteriorated further. 298  The process of internationalization continued even in spite of the 
government’s opposition. PDVSA evaded state control and continued to operate with increasing 
autonomy. 
 
The company built up a strong network of 19 refineries in the US, Europe and the Caribbean and 
up to 14,000 gas stations in the US in the early 1990s.299 By the end of the decade, the number of 
refineries had increased to 30.300 Sosa’s aim was to turn PDVSA into a ‘global energy company’ 
and, indeed, it became a major force in refining and transport, one of the world’s top oil firms. 
PDVSA was, however, unable to make the Ministry of Energy allow its expansion in extraction, 
which only took place due to the first Iraq war and the need to increase Venezuela’s OPEC 
quota.301 Before finally leaving his post as PDVSA’s CEO, Sosa and other executives planned 
ways to open up Venezuela’s upstream sector to foreign investors. Their concern was to keep 
PDVSA’s extraction levels up to OPEC quotas while boosting extraction in alliance with foreign 
investors above that level.  
 
The conditions of the Pérez administration became increasingly ungovernable, as a group of 
military plotters took on arms to overthrow the President in February 1992. The coup leader, 
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then Lieutenant Hugo Chávez, stated that the ideals of his movement were based on the legacy of 
independence hero Simón Bolívar and that it sought to combat corruption and re-found the basis 
of the state, through a constituent assembly.302 Another coup attempt took place in November that 
year. During their time in prison, the plotters argued that the state-led repression of the 1989 
popular revolt created a turning point in their movement, enticing them to act against the political 
establishment.303 As Mommer explains, both unrelated subversive elements that rose against the 
state—PDVSA seeking more autonomy on the one hand, and nationalist factions within the 
military, on the other—emerged in the 1980s and provoked important cleavages in the political 
system in the 1990s.304 Pérez was finally impeached in 1993, after several attempts, in a judicial 
movement that was allowed by AD in Congress. An interim presidency of Ramón J. Velázquez, 
an independent with strong ties with AD, finished his term in office, marked by a continuation of 
reformist policies initiated in 1989 but inscribed in the traditional pact-making approach of 
puntofijismo.  
 
4.4. Apertura: PDVSA’s temporary victory over the state 
 
PDVSA pursued a legal mechanism in early 1991 to open the upstream of the industry for 
foreign investment. It sought a favorable interpretation of Article 5 of the nationalization law 
from the Supreme Court based on analyses from its own legal team.305 A leading figure in this 
process was a top executive of the company, Luis Giusti, who would later become CEO. The 
interpretation of Article 5 basically erased jurisprudence from previous laws, and the 
nationalization law was given prevalence. PDVSA had to follow three conditions in order to 
develop alliances with foreign investors.306 As Giusti recalls, first the country or PDVSA ‘had to 
remain in control of all operations’, second, ‘agreements had to be signed for a limited period’ 
and, third, ‘they had to be approved by the two chambers of Congress’.307 PDVSA developed an 
aggressive lobbying strategy in Congress and simultaneously drafted contracts with ample room 
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for establishing the conditions of ‘control’ that it would exert on the new ventures. The 
mechanism devised was to create comités de control or control committees, integrated by 
PDVSA and the foreign investor, wherein the former ‘always had the last word’. For Giusti, the 
company ‘always acted in strict compliance with the law’.308  
 
After the coup attempt in 1992, Alirio Parra replaced Celestino Armas as Minister of Energy and 
Mines. Parra favored the oil opening, and faced no resistance from the executive. The oil 
opening thus became state policy.309 That year, PDVSA was allowed to open a first round of 
auctions for operating service agreements (OSA) in marginal fields, with low or no production. 
The bidding mechanism for the operations was not based on law, as the concessionary system 
was, but on a contractual model drafted by PDVSA. In these contracts, in order to minimize 
political risk, PDVSA was to compensate the investor in case of changing conditions by the 
state. Similarly, controversies were to be settled through international arbitration, a clause 
heavily criticized by the left in Congress. Lastly, PDVSA’s assets abroad served as a ‘shield’ by 
means of guarantees of investors’ interests. A crucial point here is PDVSA’s increased authority 
over other agencies, mainly the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Secondly, the terms of the 
contracts were designed to be welcoming for new investors, as the market environment was 
marked by low prices. In short, the terms of the bargain benefitted the investors.  
 
In this first round of auctions, three OSA were signed as service contracts.310 PDVSA would pay 
a service fee to the operator for the extracted crude, and the fee was to be calculated through a 
deflator of the consumer price index in the US for crude oil, so that it correlated to oil prices 
(light crude in this case). The fee was settled as 70% in the case of Guárico Oriental contract and 
54% for Monagas sur and Pedernales.311 However, only the first one was a marginal field of light 
crude while the other two were heavy crude fields, so the fee for the latter contracts was often 
higher in terms of the market value of oil, because they in fact extracted crudes of much lower 
value than the reference price. 
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The implication of these contracts was that PDVSA absorbed the contractors’ commitments with 
the state, as they were considered service providers and not extractive companies. This meant ‘an 
arrangement whereby oil was produced and sold to PDVSA at a discount, out of which 
PDVSA—not the private investor—would pay rents and royalties’.312 The royalty rate of 16.6% 
was paid by PDVSA. The corporate tax was calculated under the non-petroleum reference of 
34% instead of the petroleum rate of 67% and the operator would be reimbursed its capital 
investment (see table 4.1 below).313 Ultimately, PDVSA replaced the ministry as the regulator 
and engaged in contractual relations directly with foreign operators. The project was finally 
approved by the commission of mines and energy and later by both chambers of Congress, with 
opposition from the left and support of AD and COPEI.314 
 
For the second round of auctions, the government was transitioning from the Velázquez interim 
presidency to Caldera’s second tenure in office. Caldera was elected in 1993 under a personal, 
non-partisan platform as his strong leadership clashed with an emerging reformist group within 
COPEI. In an unlikely move by a conservative leader, he allied with most traditional leftist 
parties. Caldera had a staunch anti-reform rhetoric supported by both moderate socialists (MAS) 
and the PCV. Nevertheless, his government had little support in Congress, still dominated by AD 
and COPEI. At this point, PDVSA’s executives continued their lobbying with parliamentarians 
for support of the company’s investment plans. A close ally in this case became COPEI, which 
Caldera once led. Luis Giusti was appointed CEO, with hopes to build good relations between 
government, PDVSA and Congress.315 PDVSA was now ready to push for a grand plan to attract 
massive foreign investment in marginal fields, mainly in the Orinoco river belt but also in other 
parts of the country such as in off-shore areas of the Caribbean.  
 
The government, facing a deep crisis of the banking sector, was eager to welcome fresh 
investments and, unlike the Pérez administration, was less critical of PDVSA’s opening than it 
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was of a wider structural adjustment plan. 316  Fernando Egaña, former Minister of 
Communications under Caldera, explains it in this way ‘a determining factor in the government’s 
oil policy was the economic crisis the country was facing’. Egaña stressed that with oil prices 
around US$10, and a banking crisis incubating in the financial system, the government ‘saw in 
the oil opening an alternative policy to face the looming crisis’.317 The attitude of the Caldera 
administration toward opening the oil sector for investment was influenced both by the context 
of an economic crisis but also by the increasing power the company had acquired within the state 
structure. Calderón Berti argues that Caldera’s acceptance of the oil opening was the result of 
Giusti’s personal lobbying of the President.318 
 
The second round of auctions took place between 1992 and 1993. This round involved 13 new 
service contracts for OSAs but a new association agreement or strategic association contracts for 
crude enhancement and the development of new camps were also approved for the Orinoco river 
belt. Four joint-ventures were created with large IOCs, including ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips as well as Total and Statoil. In all these ventures, PDVSA had minority shares, 
from 15% to 49%. For the first 10 years, the royalty rate was set at 1% and corporate tax was 
agreed under the non-oil reference of 34%.319 In a third round, 18 new OSAs contracts were 
auctioned as well as risk exploration agreements under revenue-sharing schemes. The 
government auctioned 10 camps but 8 received worthy biddings. This round offered a large area 
of 1.3 million hectares.320 The royalty payment would be 1% for oil discovered under a certain 
internal rate of return (geared toward extra-heavy camps) and 16.6% for discoveries with a 
higher rate of return. The corporate tax was 67% and the revenue sharing level was agreed at 
50% for the state. Fourteen companies were awarded contracts for 39 years, and three 
commercial viable discoveries were made and subsequent joint-ventures were created (see table 
3 below).321 
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When the third round of auctions was up for congressional approval, Alí Rodríguez Araque, head 
of the mines commission and congressman for the opposition left-wing party Causa Radical 
(Causa R), developed a comprehensive critique of the opening strategy. He stated that the 
apertura had the objective of ‘decreasing to the minimum the petroleum royalty’.322 He argued 
that those who were subject to regulation (PDVSA and its partners) integrated the control 
committees instead of the state, creating a clear conflict of interest. For Rodríguez Araque, this 
amounted to a deliberate plan to privatize PDVSA.323 Some argue that indeed PDVSA executives 
were explicit about their idea of privatizing the company.324 Most importantly, the apertura 
meant a final move from PDVSA to replace the ministry in the regulation of the upstream level 
of the industry.325 In his speech in Congress, Rodríguez Araque cited president Caldera when he 
was a senator in 1975 and rejected Article 5 of the nationalization law, pointing at the threats to 
the national interest that this kind of associations entailed.326 The arguments expressed by the 
Causa R fraction in Congress were at the time considered rooted in old-fashioned nationalism 
that neither traditional political parties nor the moderate left shared. This view was inspired by 
what some pejoratively called a ‘petroleum stinginess’ inherited from Pérez Alfonzo,327 while the 
leaders of apertura did not hesitate to call this ‘strident group of university professors’, a bunch 
of ‘autarkic nationalists’.328  
 
These contrasting nationalist narratives find their origins in the Medina-Betancourt cleavage I 
analyzed in chapter 3 as well as its continuation through the reversion versus nationalization 
dispute of the 1970s. Left wing nationalists would later gain more prominence—with a 
pragmatic variance supporting joint ventures—during the Chávez’s government.329 The evolution 
of the leftist position would be closely associated with the state’s fears about PDVSA’s 
autonomy and also the opening’s capacity to bring about an increased output of heavier crude 
through massive investments.  
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Manzano and Monaldi argue that ‘in terms of investment and production, the oil opening was a 
major success’. In summary, the apertura brought ‘32 operating agreements, eight exploration at 
risk and profit-sharing agreements, four strategic associations and one association agreement for 
production of Orimulsion’.330 Between 1994 and 2006, over US$ 25 billion in investment entered 
the industry. For Giusti, the amount was up to ‘US$ 40 billion’.331 More significantly, PDVSA’s 
plan to increase production was achieved. The OSA contracts were producing up to 600,000 bpd 
by the end of the 1990s. The other association agreements produced 200,000 bpd then and 
totaled 650,000 by the mid-2000s. In terms of production, PDVSA waged an intense battle with 
the government and OPEC. Giusti recalls: ‘I had to fight in OPEC, despite the fact that I was not 
the Minister’ to increase production. The logic of the operating company, rather than that of a 
landlord state, was clear in his reasoning. For him, ‘Venezuela had silently and gently accepted a 
quota of 2.15 million bpd, which did not correspond with the nation’s reality, our population, our 
reserves’.332 While the material justifications for this policy were clear from the perspective of 
the company (need of investments to increase production), the managerial discourse reveals the 
contrasting logics between the firm and the (rentier) state, even if the latter formally owned the 
former.  
 
By 1998, Venezuela had increased its output by 800,000 bpd. PDVSA argued that heavy and 
extra-heavy oil was not oil but bitumen and this move justified breaking the OPEC quotas, as the 
conventional fields’ production remained stable. For Philip, ‘it was possible to argue in 1994, 
when PDVSA was only modestly in breach of its OPEC quota, that Venezuela was simply 
becoming a more individualistic, less team-spirited, member of OPEC in recognition of the fact 
that its good behavior in the past had not been recognized’.333 Yet, he continues, ‘this argument 
was clearly unsustainable by early 1998. There can be little doubt that 800,000 b/d is a high 
enough to influence the world price of oil. This means that[…]Venezuela is increasing its oil 
income by less than it is increasing production’.334 Mommer also blamed PDVSA for low oil 
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prices: ‘world petroleum prices broke down again, and this time it was PDVSA to blame, not the 
ministry or OPEC’.335  
 
The struggle of PDVSA against the state not only translated into greater autonomy to operate 
abroad but also effectively imposed a new framework that governed investments in the country. 
The company had replaced the Ministry in its regulatory capacity and it also contradicted the 
government’s foreign policy priorities by actively challenging OPEC’s quotas. At the end of 
Caldera’s administration, PDVSA had successfully achieved its managerial integration from the 
holding structure left after nationalization, it also internationalized and integrated its transport 
and commercial circuits abroad while it opened the country’s untapped reservoir to international 
investors. These mixed ventures allowed incorporating some 800,000 b/d of output into the 
market, a significant figure that would later become crucial for the Venezuelan state to maintain. 
The conditions of the new associations benefited foreign companies, as the context of the bargain 
was favorable to them. Oil prices were low, the type of crudes to extract was of a heavier nature, 
and the exploited camps required initial and significant investments.  
  
                                                            









Type of contract Regulatory features Financial features  






• PDVSA merged into a 
holding with three major 
operators: Maraven, 
Lagoven and Corpoven 
and other affiliates. 
• Managerial autonomy 
was preserved. 
• 67% income tax, 
reduced to 59% initially.  
• 16.6% royalty. 
• 10% exemption in 
income tax for export 
profits. 
1991 
First round of 
auctions, 
apertura 




• International arbitration 
was introduced in case of 
controversies. 
• PDVSA’s debts and 
assets abroad were 
collateral for 
investments. 
• A control committee 
between PDVSA 
controlled ventures. 
• Service fee raged 
between 54% and 70% of 
oil price.  
• PDVSA covered the 
royalty. 





• 13 OSAs 




• Regulatory features 
remained. 
• PDVSA held minority 
shares in joint-ventures. 
• Join-ventures had a 1% 
royalty for the first 10 





• 18 OSAs. 




• Up to 39-year contracts 
and joint ventures for 
new discoveries under 
RE agreements. 
 
• 1% royalty for low rate 
of return and 16.6% for 
higher rates of return. 
• 67% income tax and up 
to 50% profit sharing. 
 
4.5. A hesitant endorsement of neoliberalism 
 
Venezuela suffered a catastrophic financial crisis in 1994 due to lack of oversight and banks’ 
mismanagement, which put 54% of the banking system at risk. In total, more than a third of 
banks went bankrupt and were subject to state intervention.336 The government pursued exchange 
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and capital controls during 1994 and most of 1995, with meager results.337 The costly bail out to 
the banks meant increasing inorganic money that spurred inflation. By the end of 1995, the state 
of public accounts forced the government—although reluctantly—to opt for major reforms 
labeled the Agenda Venezuela. These reforms were similar to the Pérez package, focusing on 
liberalization of prices and controls, privatizations, increasing gasoline prices, freeing interest 
rates and increasing the value added tax. At this point, Caldera’s overall economic policy was in 
line with policy of opening up the oil sector. The government’s approach to foreign investment 
became generally open and aligned with broader regional trends. The President appointed 
Teodoro Petkoff, former guerrilla commander and leader of the moderate leftist party MAS, 
Minister of Planning and the head of this package of reforms. Together with the liberal policies, 
some social programs were adopted to mitigate the effects of the adjustment and to prevent 
massive popular unrest. 
 
In fact, Caldera was suspicious about the plan, mainly due to his entrenched statist tradition but 
also due to his fears that a popular outbreak similar to the caracazo could happen again. 
President Caldera publicly said that he had no other choice but to go ahead with the reforms.338 
As Egaña said in an interview, ‘the depth of the economic crisis was the main driver for the 
application of structural adjustment policies, well beyond any ideological consideration’.339 In 
short, Caldera’s administration neoliberal policies were more the result of constraining economic 
circumstances than a consequence of ideological conviction. The reforms pursued a radical 
restructuring of labor laws and social security provisions, which were highly controversial, and 
implied important resistance. Protests became common during the 1996-1998 period. The 
Caldera administration followed the principles of party alliances in Congress and committed to a 
tripartite corporate commission that included the main labor organization, the main business 
confederation and the government to negotiate wage levels and labor reforms. Yet, the tripartite 
commission was largely composed of like-minded representatives that lacked a significant social 
base. 
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The IMF offered a stand-by loan upon the implementation of the Agenda Venezuela. Eventually, 
the economy seemed to finally adjust to some ‘market fundamentals’; the GDP grew at a 6.4% 
rate and inflation was reduced to 37% in 1997, after peaking at 103% in 1996, when price 
controls were lifted and devaluation took place.340 These results were did not match the IMF and 
government’s expectations, which sought to bring inflation below 20%. The oil price did not 
help strengthen the reforms and deep-rooted popular discontent was not channeled through the 
traditional party system in the midst of increasing poverty and marginalization. Poverty levels 
had reached 86%, including a 65% of extreme poverty,341 which fuelled the complete discredit of 
the political system. At the end of the 1990s it was clear that the consensus around development 
through rent redistribution and ‘sow the oil’ plans had crumbled. But the new liberal paradigm 
had not taken root either. Neoliberalism was finally endorsed by political elites but after years of 
reluctance and clumsy implementation. The social bases of puntofijismo, however, did not follow 
this consensus.   
 
In 1998, the time was ripe for a rupture in a so far stable political system that had already faced 
substantial challenges in the past two decades. Hugo Chávez toured the country after his release 
from prison in 1997 and unified a heterogeneous political movement with the support of some 
traditional left-wing parties (including MAS and PVC, which had been part of Caldera’s 
administration). His candidacy gained strength with time. His anti-system rhetoric was tilted 
toward nationalist sentiments, promising the re-foundation of the state through a constituent 
assembly and wiping out the old, corrupt, and dismissive political elite, with a bottom-up 
movement that included marginalized populations. Chávez’s movement—at this point, it was 
largely a personal platform organized around a new political party called Movement V 
Republic—promised a still unspecified form of ‘participatory democracy’ as opposed to 
‘representative democracy’ and opening space for representation of the masses, at least in 
discourse. This movement included members of the traditional left and university professors, 
together with an important group of former military men associated with the clandestine 
subversive faction that rebelled in 1992.342 Traditional parties did not manage to gather support 
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for their presidential candidates and finally ended up rallying around a businessman and 
conservative governor with ties to COPEI. Chávez’s discourse ‘brought to the fore issues of race 
and poverty in a country upheld by a (white) elite as a model for racial equality’. 343 
Unsurprisingly, the result was a whopping victory of over 56% of the vote for Chávez and a 
strong mandate to overhaul Venezuela’s party democracy and with it, its oil policy.344 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
As I have shown in this chapter, the struggles for rent appropriation and control over the oil 
industry did not end with nationalization. With nationalization, a decline in rent appropriation 
from the state ensued, as a result of a deliberate decision to give autonomy to the nascent NOC, 
PDVSA. Later, the government’s intervention on PDVSA’s foreign funds provoked an 
intensification of PDVSA’s desire for autonomy and the company slowly undermined the 
regulatory capacity of the state. The national enterprise developed several strategies to enhance 
its financial independence and increase production. Internationalization and vertical integration 
was the first one. Later, PDVSA lobbied the Supreme Court to advance a lax interpretation of 
Article 5 of the nationalization law that allowed the effective constitution of a new legal 
framework governing investments in the resource sector. In fact, PDVSA replaced the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines as the regulator of the oil industry and opened the Orinoco river belt for a 
new cycle of investments. This new cycle was marked by consistently low oil prices. Following 
obsolescing bargain insights, foreign companies had the upper hand in the bargain, but the host 
state’s interests seemed rather blurred by the emergence of another actor, Venezuela’s NOC. 
 
This classic case of a principal-agent problem has been explained as the rise of a ‘subversive’ 
force within the state. As it has been noted in this chapter, the AD strand of nationalists even 
until the second Pérez presidency attempted, unsuccessfully, to exert control over PDVSA in 
spite of its internationalization and opening plans. Running in the background of this history is 
the failure of successive governments to make Venezuela’s economy independent from oil. The 
country’s dependence on oil rents, however, never ceased. The plans that the government carried 
out to ‘sow the oil’ were always associated with, and largely dependent on, oil rents. The 
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political economy of the country was distorted by policy mechanisms, which protected various 
economic actors, but also hampered their competitiveness and incentivized clientelism and 
corruption.  
 
While neoliberal policies had already been established as an important consensus in policy 
circles of Latin America, in Venezuela, political parties, businesses and organized workers 
remained skeptical even despite initial government support for them. Oil opening was first 
instituted despite the AD government’s opposition. Later, the oil opening was recourse for the 
Caldera administration to postpone the application of neoliberal reforms. By the end of the 
1990s, the government implemented both the oil opening and structural adjustment at the 
expense of the wrecking of puntofijismo political system. The social bases of the traditional 
parties did not follow their endorsement of state restructuring and the trade unions, business 
confederations and professional gremios lacked representation in the masses.  
 
In sum, the opening of the oil sector in the 1990s responded primarily to a preconceived plan by 
PDVSA. In ideational terms, opening was, rather than an outcome of commitment to neoliberal 
policies, a result of the company’s own managerial culture. PDVSA saw itself mostly as an oil 
producer rather than an agent of the landlord state’s interests. The company’s managerial elite 
interpreted its own place in the country and the energy market as a large oil producer. In this 
period, these ideational disputes embodied in the conflict between PDVSA’s autonomy versus 
the state’s desire for control, carried heavier weight in the determining of state treatment of 
foreign investment. PDVSA imposed its view on foreign investment on other public institutions 
despite government opposition. The type of association with foreign investors that resulted was 
largely influenced by the early stage of investments in marginal and heavy crude camps, so these 
material variables benefitted companies. The market context was marked by low oil prices, 






‘Red, very red’: the politics of PDVSA’s control and the use of foreign investment in 
Venezuela’s socialist rentierism345 
 
‘There cannot be a socialist project if our country does not have command and control over its 
wealth, its natural resources and its economy’.346  
Hugo Chávez,  




Building on the last chapter’s discussion about the conflicts between the state and PDVSA, this 
chapter explores how in the early stages of the Bolivarian regime, state-PDVSA tensions became 
unsustainable. The initial efforts to seize control over the company were met by fierce 
opposition, including attempts by the managerial elite of the company to overthrow the 
government. The failure of these attempts, in turn, prompted the full takeover of PDVSA by the 
government. The new state-company relationship helped reinvigorate Venezuela’s rentierism but 
with new distinctive features, including its linkages with foreign investment.  
 
I argue that the current relationship between the state and foreign companies is a hybrid model 
that incorporates important mechanisms of state control but where foreign investment is crucial 
to achieve the state’s objectives. The joint-venture framework was approved by law in 2001 but 
the government chose to keep the oil opening contracts in place for the first few years of the 
administration until existing contracts expired. In 2007, however, the Chávez administration 
shifted its relations with foreign companies forcing the complete migration of contracts signed 
under the apertura to joint-ventures offered to foreign companies with state majority shares. This 
partial nationalization only began once investments in the Orinoco belt had been producing 
considerable results and with a sustained increase in international oil prices. Investors’ costs 
were considerably sunk and the government used the largest world oil reservoir as a bargaining 
chip for companies to accept the new terms. The government simultaneously pursued increased 
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state control and enhanced diversification of investors, potentially exerting control over a less 
concentrated industry. The rise of China in this case became instrumental for state objectives as 
Chinese SOEs offered better investment and cooperation conditions to the state, which leveraged 
advantageous deals with investors. The ideas that prevailed in this period were centered on a 
socialist project, which featured prominently direct government control over the distribution of 
rents as a mechanism of political control and legitimation. As Hugo Chávez emphasized during 
the partial nationalization of the Orinoco river investments, control over the oil industry was a 
foundational element of his socialist project. Yet, paradoxically, this project was only made 
possible through continuing association with foreign investment. 
 
Existing explanations of the turn towards more nationalist policies towards IOCs in Venezuela 
have tended to focus on either the material incentives rooted in obsolescing bargain arguments347 
or the role of (socialist) ideology.348 As I have mentioned, the imperative of control over PDVSA 
is a fundamental factor that has been largely ignored in these explanations. The government’s 
ideas of socialist rentierism prevailed over the identity of PDVSA’s managerial elite who wanted 
to keep autonomy of the company, mirroring large global oil producers. Moreover, the impact of 
changes in the global energy market of the past few years, especially the rise of China in the 
global economy offered the Venezuelan state the possibility to enhance this hybrid model. In 
consonance with the broader contributions of this dissertation, in this chapter I show the 
importance of highlighting a broader diversity of actors beyond the dyad explored in OBM 
models, both within the state and among IOCs to explain the shifts in state-foreign companies’ 
relations, while also stressing ideational contestations in explaining state linkage with foreign 
investment. I demonstrate the Bolivarian strategic need for and use of foreign investment in 
Venezuela’s oil sector. But, in an historical perspective, this study underscores that foreign 
investment has been far more important for revolutionary nationalists today than it was in the 
1970s when nationalists pursued full nationalization as an ultimate goal. In this case, the state’s 
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alliance with foreign companies in order to advance its political goal of controlling PDVSA, 
proves the relevance of the agency of Venezuela’s state and, paradoxically, its own vulnerability.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I analyze the initial reforms that the Chávez 
administration put into place and how these measures provoked conflicts with various sectors 
and interests, most notably the managerial elite of PDVSA. Second, I examine the campaign ‘full 
oil sovereignty’ that the government carried out until 2007. Third, I explain how association with 
foreign investment is conceived as vital for the control of PDVSA and the sustainability of a new 
type of rentierism that emerged in Venezuela under the Bolivarian regime. I focus particular 
attention on the Venezuelan government’s dynamic relationship with China because it has 
become the most lucrative one for the Venezuelan government. Fourth, the chapter finishes with 
a characterization of the recent economic crisis in Venezuela and how the government continues 
to use foreign investment strategically for the survival of the Bolivarian model of socialist 
rentierism. 
  
5.2. The emerging conflicts in the re-foundation of the country 
 
Upon taking office in 1999, the Chávez government went through a long process of political 
instability until 2003. In that period, the Bolivarian political movement sought to implement a 
series of drastic changes to the operation of the Venezuelan state and its relationship with 
society, whilst contending with a strong political opposition to those very changes. This 
resistance was carried out both through institutional strategies such as Congressional opposition 
and legal challenges in the Supreme Court, as well as more subversive means such as a coup 
attempt and the sabotage of the oil industry.349 During this time, Venezuela also became the 
subject of increasing media and scholarly attention, after decades being relegated to an 
uncommon normalcy in the Latin American region.350 As a result, this period has been studied 
extensively, albeit through a prism of polarization that remains present today. Within this 
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conflict, the role of oil, and the national oil company in particular, plays an especially central 
role. 
 
5.2.1. The Bolivarian constitution  
 
Hugo Chávez promoted the writing of a new constitution as a way to re-found the nation-state. In 
doing so, he invoked the ‘constituent power’ of the sovereign—‘the people’—through the means 
of a referendum. Chávez lacked the super-majority in Congress that would have allowed him to 
enact a constitutional re-writing through a congressional mandate. Despite resistance from the 
previous regime, the Supreme Court allowed the referendum to take place and later on to call 
elections for a Constituent Assembly. The assembly was elected with an overwhelming majority 
of chavista constituent members, in charge of writing the new constitution. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court eventually resolved conflicts of overlapping power between Congress and the 
Constituent Assembly in favor of the latter, dissolving Congress in 1999.351  
 
Despite the social enthusiasm that the Constituent Assembly produced and its role in producing a 
national debate around political, social and economic issues, the writing of the constitution was a 
centralized, top-down process managed by Chávez’s inner circle and led by a moderate political 
operator who controlled the Assembly.352 The new constitution strengthened the role of the 
executive in various areas, such as in the armed forces where the President could now appoint 
generals without parliamentary approval. Meanwhile, the National Assembly—now a unicameral 
entity with both proportional and majoritarian representation—could give the President 
legislative powers in any area of national interest, even in the absence of a national emergency. 
The constitution further eliminated public financing of political parties, making it harder for 
minorities to be represented, increasing incentives for illegal appropriation of public funds to 
benefit a political group and enabling powerful economic actors to influence policy.353 However, 
the constitution also upheld progressive implementation of human rights agreements at the 
international level and promoted popular participation in legislative processes, further enabling 
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the possibility for elected officials to be recalled once they had completed half of their term in 
public office.  
 
The new constitution ratified the mandate of national ownership over hydrocarbons and 
minerals. In terms of the oil industry and its management, the 1999 constitution established that 
PDVSA would continue to be a holding company whose only shareholder was the Venezuelan 
state. Nevertheless, the wording of the constitution stipulated that this requirement did not 
pertain to its affiliates, including joint ventures and strategic associations.354 PDVSA was to 
remain a state-owned enterprise but all its affiliates could, in principle, be privatized. According 
to Mommer, PDVSA successfully lobbied the constituent assembly in the writing of Article 303 
in order to allow a process of slow privatization. In essence, Mommer suggests that since 
‘PDVSA does not produce a single barrel of oil’, the managers’ idea was to turn the company 
into a ‘licensing agency’ with private companies operating on the oil fields.355  
 
5.2.2. The new oil policy 
 
The objectives of the new oil policy promoted by Chávez centered around three main issues: 
strengthening OPEC and bringing Venezuela back to its traditional landlord position of 
defending prices; restoring the regulatory capacity of the Ministry of Energy and Mines over the 
industry in general and over PDVSA in particular, and in doing so maximizing rent acquisition 
via royalties.356 Chávez first appointed Alí Rodríguez Araque as Minister of Energy and Mines. 
Rodríguez Araque was a former congressman for Causa R, and well-known oil nationalist who 
relentlessly opposed the apertura (see chapter 3). General Guaicaipuro Lameda was asked to 
lead the company in 2000 in order to carry out further reforms the government deemed to be of 
strategic importance. Lameda had previously been in charge of the national budget office and his 
appointment was initially seen with skepticism within the company as he was a military man 
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rather than an oil expert, but Chávez highlighted his academic credentials and lauded him as a 
capable technocrat.357  
 
The goals of the oil policy at home had clear resonance with the government’s goals 
internationally. The objective of reunifying OPEC was a priority that produced quick results as 
Chávez invited the heads of state to a meeting held in Caracas in 2000. At this point, Chávez had 
already showed signs of his willingness to go against the grain of international politics, being the 
first western leader to visit Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Still, Chávez’s active diplomacy paid off, playing a role on successfully reactivating 
OPEC quotas and unifying objectives from the main producers. As prices began to spike in 2000, 
Rodríguez Araque was greeted with respect by other OPEC members who offered him the 
position as the organization’s new secretary general in the midst of disagreements between Gulf 
ministers.358 Chávez then named Álvaro Silva Calderón, author of the reversion law of 1971, as 
his new Minister of Energy. In order to carry out the rest of its oil policy objectives, the 
government approved in 2001 a new organic law of hydrocarbons via presidential decree. The 
year before the National Assembly had partially surrendered its legislative power to the 
executive through ‘an enabling law’ that allowed the President to legislate in various areas.359  
 
The historical antecedents cited in the law recalled the 1829 decree authored by independence 
leader Simón Bolívar who, borrowing from Spanish jurisprudence and continuing the spirit of 
the mines ordinance of New Spain signed in 1784, declared that the Republic would be the sole 
owner of mines and bitumen. The law stipulated that ‘the state reserved activities of yield 
exploration, extraction, collection, transport and initial storage’ all of which were denominated 
‘primary activities’ (upstream).  The law also secured ownership over existing refineries and 
their potential expansion or improvement. However, the law also considered the inclusion of 
mixed companies through joint-ventures, mandating a state company to own at least 50% assets. 
According to the law: ‘the state is obliged to intervene directly in the business, overcoming the 
role of simple rent collector that had until the time of nationalization; moreover, it allows the 
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state to keep real control and it gives decision-making power in all businesses and operations in 
companies that take part in reserved activities’.360  
 
In terms of its financial features, the new law increased the extraction royalty to 30%, while 
reducing corporate tax from 67.7% to 50%. The corporate tax of the non-petroleum sector was 
reduced to 30% from 34%. The hydrocarbons law allowed the state to keep levying non-
petroleum sector corporate tax to extra heavy crude projects. However, most heavy crude oil 
projects operating through service contracts would pay oil-sector corporate tax. Ultimately, the 
state could never levy a royalty lower than one sixth (16 2/3%).361 The law sought to erode the oil 
opening, as it did not contemplate operating contracts henceforth. Yet, it still offered incentives 
that made investments more attractive in contrast to the conditions that ruled prior to the 
apertura.362 The government argued that these tax and royalty conditions were easily met by the 
ongoing projects as their extraction costs had already shrunk due to improved technologies and 
enhanced learning in the areas. The new law revoked the 1943 hydrocarbons law, the 1971 
reversion law and the 1975 nationalization law together with three other minor laws, all of which 
had remained in place until then. As part of the larger change in oil policy, the government 
initiated solidarity exchanges with Cuba, which involved trading oil for access to healthcare 
practitioners and other social programs.  
 
5.2.3.  An ‘apolitical’ coup   
 
Together with the hydrocarbons law, Chávez approved a package of 49 laws that varied from 
land reform and banking to elementary education oversight. All of these were approved in 
absence of significant debate within society at large. Once enacted, however, the reforms 
attracted considerable public attention (both in favor and against their implementation), 
provoking protests that intensified over time. In December 2001, the largest business 
confederation, FEDECAMARAS, called for a 24-hour national strike in protest against the 
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package of laws and demanded that the government rectify its authoritarian tendencies.363 The 
government’s position remained firm, however, defended by fiery speeches given by Chávez, 
rallying against the ‘oligarchy’ and party elites. Both the reforms and government’s discourse in 
turn spurred opposition from civil society activists associated with the political opposition and 
the members of the PDVSA managerial elite who feared further government intervention over 
their autonomy. In February 2002, PDVSA’s president, Guaicaipuro Lameda, backing other 
managers of the company, publicly criticized the hydrocarbons law and was subsequently 
removed from his post. Chávez was facing probably the lowest popularity ratings in his entire 
tenure as President, with polls showing 30% of support.364 Initial fractures within his movement 
also surfaced between those that sought even more radical transformations and a moderate 
reformist side that progressively joined the opposition and traditional political forces to demand 
the withdrawal of the laws Chávez had approved by decree.  
 
As legislative issues regarding land distribution and private education oversight attracted 
attention from Venezuelan society and media, PDVSA began to enter into open conflict with the 
President. Chávez appointed Gastón Parra Luzardo as PDVSA’s president, after firing Lameda. 
Parra Luzardo was the fourth president of the company in just three years and came from an 
academic background. He was a dependency theory scholar, having no managerial experience in 
oil.365 Moreover, Chávez promoted a group of revolutionary supporters to managerial positions of 
the company in breach of the meritocratic procedures that had been traditional to the governance 
structure of the company previously. Former manager Eddie Ramírez recalled years later: ‘we 
never objected to the President’s appointments of the company CEO and board members, that 
was his prerogative […]’. But he went on, ‘what we objected to was the appointment of internal 
directors that came from our own ranks: they were good professionals but did not have enough 
merit to be directors, except for the fact that they were in favor of the revolution. We thought that 
violated [PDVSA’s] meritocracy’.366 
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The corporate leadership of PDVSA made its discontent public in a manifesto published in 
national newspapers, in early April of 2002. The managerial elite of the company, wary of 
political interference, became increasingly politically active and developed a militant movement 
that rallied support from various sectors of society, mostly represented in FEDECAMARAS, and 
the AD-identified workers’ union, Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV). The 
corporate leadership of PDVSA, with the support of the business organization and the largest 
trade union, asked the President to restore meritocracy by removing the newly appointed 
managers. Conversations with the new CEO failed, as he abided by the President’s decisions, 
and confrontation ensued. Chávez dismissed the entire body of dissident managers at PDVSA on 
live television during his Sunday show Aló Presidente. 367  The dismissal provoked an 
unprecedented action from PDVSA’s top managers: a call to strike against the government. It 
was not a workers’ strike in the traditional sense, as they were not making demands for increased 
wages or working conditions but instead demanded the shareholder—the state—to respect the 
company’s corporate culture and autonomy. A one-day strike was followed by a general strike 
from the business corporation and the workers’ confederation and street protests on April 11. 
Hundreds of thousand protesters gathered outside one of the corporate buildings of PDVSA—
rebranded as the ‘square of meritocracy’—and it was suddenly transformed into a march to the 
presidential palace to demand the President’s resignation.368 A coup d’état was underway. In the 
midst of killings by snipers (both of government supporters and opposition protesters), top 
generals of the army ousted the President for just over a day.369 Some reports document at least 
some financial and moral support from the United States government to the opposition cause.370  
 
The short-lived government of Pedro Carmona Estanga, former head of FEDECAMARAS, 
summarily dissolved the parliament, members of the Supreme Court, governors, electoral council 
and nullified Chávez’s 49 executive decrees. Carmona as a de facto President renamed Lameda 
as PDVSA’s CEO. Within hours, PDVSA made public its decisions to immediately stop oil 
shipments to Cuba and initiate an aggressive campaign to recuperate markets. PDVSA was 
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located as the center of oil policy once more, abrogating competences that belonged to the head 
of state and the Ministry of Energy.371 Nevertheless, equally strong street demonstrations calling 
to reinstate Chávez to power fueled a military operation from loyal garrisons that brought him 
back on April 14.372 Upon his return, Chávez’s attitude seemed less intransigent and sought basic 
reconciliation with his adversaries. A sign of this new attitude was his decision to rectify his 
previous removal of PDVSA’s staff. Top managers were reinstated in their posts and Parra 
Luzardo was dismissed, while Alí Rodríguez Araque was asked to return from Vienna to head 
the company. Judges from the Supreme Court pardoned coup plotters and Chávez reformed his 
cabinet to include more conciliatory figures.  
 
The dynamic of street demonstrations and institutional rupture continued in the months ahead. 
The militant opposition took over a public square at the east of Caracas, Plaza Altamira, where it 
kept constant mobilization. Military men joined the protests at the square over time until over 
one hundred commanders had declared their opposition to the government. Nevertheless, Chávez 
never withdrew the 49 laws. On December 2, FEDECAMARAS called for a general strike that 
was supported by the workers’ confederation and the media calling for Chávez’s resignation. The 
next day the strike was extended, as it would be everyday for the next two months, and 
PDVSA’s managers soon joined, this time with the support of thousands of workers in various of 
the company’s installations around the country. Oil production stopped, oil shipments stalled and 
economic activity came to a standstill for weeks. Long line-ups emerged in gas stations and 
cooking gas disappeared for consumers in one of the world’s largest oil producing countries. The 
strike leaders thought the government could not withstand this pressure and the President’s 
resignation would come. Rodríguez Araque claims that: ‘PDVSA was not only a state within the 
state, it sought to overcome the state and the nation’.373 Throughout these struggles, however, the 
battles between government and opposition had a strong symbolic weight. They seemed to 
signify irreconcilable forces of ‘the people’ (generally those who are poor and have been 
historically marginalized) versus ‘civil society’ (seen as apparently autonomous productive 
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forces of society with democratic and modern values).374 Again, these symbolic struggles were 
also present with respect to the oil company, as the government sought to impose a renewed 
notion of social justice associated with ownership over oil, while PDVSA defended its own 
image of a global oil corporation.  
 
While the government did not repress the protest openly, apparent government supporters carried 
out violent paramilitary attacks, including a one-man shooting that killed three civilians and 
injured dozens in Plaza Altamira. In time, the armed forces and organized government supporters 
also took over the oil industry. A famous incident was the navy’s takeover of the oil tanker Pilín 
León that had been anchored by its captain in the navigable waters of Maracaibo Lake. The oil 
company, which had stopped almost completely, was eventually taken over by the government 
with the leadership of Rodríguez Araque, the military and government supporters. After losses of 
billions of dollars, the strike lost strength and its leaders formally abandoned it in February 2003 
with a mass mobilization to collect millions of signatures to recall Chávez’s government in 
national referendum. This time, the government announced that all PDVSA workers who joined 
the strike had been dismissed due to unjustifiable absence from the workplace. Through these 
dismissals, the government successfully purged the company of some 18,000 workers (more than 
half its total payroll), a truly radical corporate restructuring.375  
 
The battle over the oil company ended with full government control. The government centralized 
PDVSA’s management and even gave up several of its administrative buildings in Caracas and 
other parts of the country to new higher education projects. The isolation of PDVSA’s 
managerial elite since nationalization was such that it was unable to comprehend the process of 
societal change that had begun in the country. Even somewhat sympathetic accounts of the strike 
assert that it was ‘a profound misjudgment rooted in the management’s history of 
independence’ 376  and ‘an extreme and miscalculated reaction’ 377  to Chávez’s provocations. 
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Meanwhile, as a result of the strike, the government opted to privilege loyalty over technical 
capacity in the management of the industry and has exerted since then different mechanisms of 
political control over PDVSA that have negatively impacted its business capacity. Indeed, the 
initial recovery of the company was remarkable after the strike, but it has never reached pre-
strike levels. Oil production remained below 3 million bpd in the following years which, even 
discounting OPEC quota restrictions, was significantly below Venezuela’s capacity.  The loss of 
human capital meant ‘a real and sustained setback to PDVSA’s productive potential’.378 The  
government chose to sacrifice the technical expertise of the company for the expediency of 
having a compliant company. Ultimately, the goal of advancing a renewed form of rentierism, 
now under socialist principles, prevailed over building a strong NOC even if different from the 
old PDVSA. Venezuelan political expert Margarita López Maya argues that ‘Chávez never 
overcame the 2002 trauma, and the government never set up a sustained training mechanism to 
equalize the new personnel’s capacity with the one that existed previously’.379 The notions of the 
state as a landlord and a rentier state prevailed, while PDVSA’s image of an outward oriented oil 
company was significantly curtailed. 
 
The government assured control over the company in 2003 but only much after that did it start to 
develop mechanisms to implement the changes it sought in oil policy. This process of 
implementation was gradual and it materialized with the Full Oil Sovereignty campaign. 
Meanwhile, struggles between government and opposition continued, but the opposition was 
then fractured after several defeats. In August 2004, the recall referendum took place with a 
Chávez solid victory, while the opposition claimed fraud.380 The year 2005 was crucial. It was an 
election year to renew the entire National Assembly and despite disagreements within the 
opposition, the coalition decided to boycott the elections, arguing institutional bias and threats of 
fraud. This weakened the opposition further. The government—and Chávez personally—
managed to control the parliament and from the National Assembly it was able to exert its 
influence in every other public power. Since then, the vast majority of electoral council 
members, judges in all courts, the prosecutor general, comptroller general and Ombudsman have 
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acted like government representatives rather than autonomous authorities.381 Hence, decisions to 
overrule the oil opening would later come from both parliament and the Supreme Court. The 
opposition decided to regroup into an electoral and constitutional platform in 2006 but it was too 
late. Chávez won his second reelection by landslide, now openly promoting a socialist agenda, 
surfing the wave of high oil prices, complete institutional control and a formidable international 
setting with left-leaning leaders governing most of South America.382 
 
5.3. Full oil sovereignty: mixed-companies type of nationalization  
 
The government action that started roughly in 2005 and ended in May 2007 with the migration of 
all contracts signed under the oil opening to joint-ventures was known as an era of ‘re-
nationalization’.383 Scholars and analysts have pointed out that the intention of the Venezuelan 
regime in this process was to enhance state control and leave private investors subject to the will 
of the state.384 The logic of this strategy, however, was notably not to bring all assets back to state 
ownership (as it had been in the 1970s nationalization) but rather to continue the association with 
foreign investment under a scheme that assured full operational control by the state. There are 
several reasons for this. In what remains of this chapter, I will spell out how the different 
material and ideational motivations are interwoven and how they are affected by different actors’ 
interests. The material motivations responded to the state’s interest of attaining more rents from 
oil extraction, which was mostly possible with the input of foreign investment. There are also 
ideational motivations that refer to the wider foreign policy of the government, its desire to 
protect its political project and its commitment to advancing a socialist model. In sum, during the 
surge of Bolivarian resource nationalism, asserting state control was conceived as possible 
because of association with foreign investors. The association with foreign companies has been 
instrumental in the development of the Bolivarian model of socialist rentierism.  
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After the new hydrocarbons law was approved in 2001, the disputes between the government and 
PDVSA impeded efforts to change the terms of the relationship with foreign companies. Even 
government officials assumed that the new legal framework would be applied only to new 
investments, and that the contracts already underway would remain in place until they expired.385 
This idea was based on the principle of non-retroactivity and the respect to law-abiding 
contracts.386  However, once the government assumed control over PDVSA (in the context of 
rising oil prices), it faced new incentives to change the terms of the ongoing contracts. First, the 
initial investments in the 32 operating OSA contracts for light and medium heavy crudes were 
already set and production was flowing reasonably well. The association contracts and four joint 
ventures at the Orinoco belt had already committed investments and production was underway. 
Second, the new oil price was significantly higher than the reference price when the contracts 
were signed. As Philip and Panizza argue ‘the desire to renegotiate the contracts, in itself, was 
understandable […] it could well be argued that the general increase in international prices after 
2000 might have made it irresponsible to do anything else’.387 Monaldi asserts that it was a 
prototypical scenario where the sunk costs of the industry made investors ‘prisoners of the 
changing conditions’ of international prices and government bargaining. 388  Traditional 
obsolescence bargain incentives became crucial for the government, which already questioned 
the legitimacy of the oil opening.  
 
The government increased all royalties from 1% to 16.3%, concerning projects that were already 
producing at full capacity. Later, the government increased corporate tax on the Orinoco 
investments.389 In March 2006, Rafael Ramírez, PDVSA CEO and Minister of Oil, declared 
before the National Assembly the executive’s desire to migrate all contracts to joint-ventures, 
asking the parliament to approve a model for new contracts, while forcing investing companies 
to negotiate the migration to the new framework. In his speech, Ramírez argued that the rationale 
for the change was rooted in the notions of national sovereignty over natural resources as 
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protected by the UN resolution 1.803 from 1962. Ramírez stressed that all operating contracts 
violated the principles of sovereignty. According to him, the state, ‘captured by PDVSA’s 
technocratic and transnationalized elite’ gave up on the rights of the landlord to levy royalties 
over extraction and relinquished its capacity to regulate the business.390 He stressed the idea that 
these agreements violated the nationalization law of 1975 because private contractors were given 
concessions disguised as service contracts. Moreover, the fact that PDVSA gave legal guarantees 
to the investors and potential disagreements could be elevated to international arbitration 
allegedly violated the constitution and Venezuelan laws.391   
 
Two weeks after the draft contract was submitted to the parliament, it was approved 
unanimously. This was not surprising, given that the parliament had no opposition members until 
a handful of dissenting chavistas became a minority opposition faction in 2007. The minister’s 
arguments about the illegitimacy of the 1990s contracts were used to support the new 
framework. The contract model stated that an integrated joint-venture had to be created with 
majority shares for the Venezuelan operating firm, PDVSA’s filial CPV. The new contract was 
to last for 20 years. It regulated an immediate return to the regular royalty and corporate tax 
levels (33% and 50%, respectively); in some cases where the production of extra heavy crudes 
was determined, a lower royalty of 20% or 16 2/3% could be levied (see table 4 below).392 The 
parliament also approved a law of ‘regularization’ in April that determined the associations 
approved during the oil opening to have been illegal.393 As this process was ongoing, companies 
were forced to pay compensation to the state for the foregone fiscal burdens during the 
apertura.394 Notwithstanding, in 2008 the government imposed a new tax that ‘operates as a 
surcharge royalty’ and is imposed any time the basket of oil increases above the US$ 70 mark. If 
the price is above US$ 70, a 50% tax is imposed on the differential between the actual price and 
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US$ 70 and when the price goes above US$ 100 the tax imposed is 60%.395 This marked the first 
progressive reform to the fiscal code governing the oil industry since the fifty-fifty. 
 




A senior attorney who represented private companies in this process, mentioned in an interview 
that the sector considered this an illegal move from the government. The private sector’s main 
argument was that a newly imposed framework became retroactive. This private attorney, the 
government made a ‘confiscatory action’ by forcing all service contracts to migrate to joint-
ventures and deeming them illegal in a ‘retroactive change of legal regime’.396 In response to the 
arguments of companies, a senior member of the government’s legal team states that the 
contracts had been comparable to ‘privatizing acts’ that were ‘absolutely null’ in their origin. In 
this case, the state was confronted with a problem of restoring legality and needed to eliminate 
‘invalid associations that violated public order’.397 She illustrated the case by posing a question: 
‘imagine if in Venezuela a law had been approved to privatize rivers, seas and lakes, and 
therefore transferred to individuals, could it be argued that those who benefitted from these 
privatizing acts had legally acquired rights?’398 In other words, the government justified the 
application of the new framework to contracts signed previously, on the grounds of illegitimacy.  
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ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were the two major private IOCs that did not settle with the 
government and opted to file cases of arbitration against the state, though most other companies 
decided to accept the new terms of engagement, or settled an expropriation of assets agreement, 
with compensation from the state. Despite the reputational damages the legislation changes may 
have caused the government, the legislation proved successful in facilitating companies’ 
compliance with the new framework. Ivan Capriles, a researcher on Venezuela’s oil policy, 
asserts that this was because ‘companies were fully aware of the strategic resources that exist in 
the Orinoco belt’. Capriles went on, ‘this is a profitable business even despite the change of 
conditions’.399 For a corporate attorney interviewed ‘it was a matter of costs: many companies 
preferred to keep the business going rather than engage in a long and expensive arbitration 
process’.400 In this context, a senior official in the ministry of oil also claimed that ‘companies 
did not want to lose out from the riches of Orinoco’.401 Indeed, ‘Venezuela is one of the very few 
countries with abundant oil reserves that is currently open to foreign investors’.402 Recent 
research demonstrates that the Venezuelan government strategically used access to the largest 
world crude reservoir as a bargaining chip to force renegotiation.403 This strategy was successful, 
in part, because if companies decided to leave, the costs of re-entry were anticipated to be even 
higher at a later date.  
 
5.3.1. Market diversification and multipolarity: building alliances and self-protection 
 
The Venezuelan government had plenty of reasons to keep foreign investors in the Orinoco belt. 
A corporate attorney who represented oil companies during the nationalization process points out 
that one reason was ‘to keep getting the capital and technology it needed to develop these 
fields’.404 In a more strategic sense, a PDVSA spokesperson noted that ‘these are largely empty 
territories [near the Orinoco belt, see Map 1 below] that need vast investments’. Thus, it was 
logical for the state to seek sharing risks and costs with third party partners in a generally costly 
business. Nonetheless, the government also sought to accomplish other goals with involving 
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foreign actors in its oil industry. In terms of its business strategy, the government wanted to 
diversify its investment portfolio, while at the same time develop new markets abroad. In a 
similar logic to the 1990s when PDVSA sought to diversify its investments by accessing 
consumers in the US and Europe, now the government sought to welcome investors from new 
political and economic partners that have an increasing weight in the world economy. For a 
PDVSA manager, ‘opening investments to new markets was a crucial step, as the oil industry is 
characterized as being a global industry’.405  
 
The desire to diversify markets and investments also had political underpinnings as it 
corresponded well with Chávez’s overarching push for ‘multipolarity’ in his foreign policy. For 
Radamés Gómez, director of international cooperation at the ministry of oil, ‘diversifying 
markets has been a central strategic objective of the government as a way to support a multipolar 
world’. Gómez argues that ‘oil has become a weapon to promote Latin America’s integration’ 
but also, diversified investments have allowed Venezuela to ‘safeguard its position in the 
world’.406 An idealistic view emerges in this context, as the government encouraged the creation 
of joint-ventures with allied countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe 
and Asia, including many that had little capacity to actually extract oil in the Orinoco belt (see 
Figure 5.1 below). Hults argues that ‘despite the grandiosity of the initial announcements, several 
of these assignations are largely superficial’.407 In fact, many argue that alliances with Latin 
American countries and other minor players in the industry have not advanced a great deal. As 
Gómez recognizes, ‘Chinese investments in the Orinoco basin are by far the most advanced in 
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Figure 5.1 Map of operational joint-ventures in the Orinoco river belt  
 
Source: PDVSA’s business report 2013. 
 
The diversification of the investment portfolio was aimed at a wide range of companies, western 
and non-western alike to help protect the country from potential threats. Various informants 
backed this view, as the government’s motivation focused on its desire to use the geopolitical 
importance of its oil to protect the country’s sovereignty and its political regime. A former 
advisor to the ministry of oil and the National Assembly stated that ‘the Iraq invasion 
demonstrated that policies of isolation or autarky were plausible only in the time of the cold 
war’. By associating with foreign companies, ‘Venezuela assures supply to different countries 
and regions, playing an interesting geopolitical game that benefits us [referring to the 
country]’.409 An engineer in the ministry of oil who regulates operations in the Orinoco belt said 
‘we have to admit that we have enemies abroad and they want our resources, they are hungry for 
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energy’. In his view, ‘by negotiating with them we are preventing conflicts’.410 Venezuela’s 
government assumed that by bringing a diverse set of interests from abroad it could prevent 
direct military intervention as the country assured supplies to different partners around the world, 
despite its proclamation of fierce revolutionary rhetoric and policies. While the validity of these 
assertions is hard to assess, the abovementioned perspective serves as one of the various 
discursive justifications for associating with foreign companies. Most importantly, they also 
suggest that the goal of enhancing a less concentrated oil industry was an objective that increased 
the state’s bargaining capacity and room for maneuver.  
 
5.3.2. Red, very red: putting PDVSA under control 
 
‘I want our comrade managers to help erase from any corporate guideline, from our internal 
emails, from any component that leads the company, anything that could cast any doubt as to our 
support for president Chávez.  
We have to say clearly, as you have been hearing me say in the areas I have mentioned […] and 
that I even said in the press:  
that the new PDVSA is red, very red, from top to bottom’. 
 
Rafael Ramírez, PDVSA CEO and Minister of Oil, November 2006  
 
In charge of the oil company and the ministry in 2006, Rafael Ramírez gave a speech to PDVSA 
high managers and other workers that was leaked to the public, serving twin roles as an 
important announcement and a threat. It stated unambiguously that PDVSA’s political partiality 
should not be disguised and that the company ought to be, in his own words, ‘red, very red’. It 
was clear that the government’s control over PDVSA and its use as a political tool was a state 
policy. It was also a threat to potential dissenting forces within the company that may have 
attempted to reinstall autonomy from within. With Rafael Ramírez, the duality of shareholder 
and agent blurred further as he remained in both posts for a decade. Traditional checks and 
balances between state and company that should have been enforced and that nationalist actors 
advocated for in previous decades were undermined or eliminated entirely.411 The President 
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relied personally on Ramírez’s leadership over the company and the company tried to 
accommodate itself to government demands, mostly as a bankroll agency.  
 
Ultimately though, the creation of joint-ventures also supported the goal of control over the 
industry, via controlling PDVSA and allowing the government to pursue its own socialist model. 
For Mommer, who was then deputy minister of oil and according to many observers architect of 
the new oil policy, ‘100% state ownership does not secure control; PDVSA belongs to the state 
but if something is true, we were not able to control PDVSA’. Thus, partial nationalization 
included bringing in foreign companies as associates that actually owned assets as minority 
partners in joint-ventures. Mommer stated that ‘a partner can help the state control its national 
company and make sure PDVSA is focused doing what it is supposed to do’.412 For the 
Venezuelan government, keeping PDVSA focused on ‘what it is supposed to do’ means 
centering its resources in what it has conceived as development in the current era: efforts to 
alleviate poverty and the advancement of a model of socialist redistribution. Moreover, alliances 
with foreign companies allowed the government to keep PDVSA under control, something that 
would be near impossible to achieve if it monopolized the industry entirely. When asked what re-
nationalization meant for the Venezuelan government, Mommer said ‘in politics there is usually 
an inflation of words. For Chávez re-nationalization really meant having majority partnership in 
investments’. In fact, for Mommer ‘nationalization does not have to mean anything else’.413 
PDVSA’s head of public relations also supported this notion: ‘when there is no foreign 
counterpart, the state lets its guard down as the NOC supposedly represents the interests of the 
state, but it does not have to be the case’.414 The government conceived foreign partnerships as 
one mechanism to ensure its control over PDVSA. As I will show in more detail below, the 
government used PDVSA noticeably as a bankroll agency, requiring foreign investment to keep 
capital flows into the industry to maintain production. 
 
This view of nationalization differs greatly from the ideas left-wing nationalists held in the 
1970s. At the time, the actors who opposed article 5 of the nationalization law —those on the left 
of the political spectrum—made sure joint-ventures would not be considered as a policy option. 
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Yet somewhat surprisingly, in the current moment joint-ventures represent the preferred policy 
option by these very same actors. This is due to the fact that the 2002 coup and oil strike fueled 
suspicion over opponents, and control over PDVSA became such a primordial objective that 
these leftist nationalist sectors now preferred to ally with foreign investors in extractive 
activities. These alliances meant a way to balance the loss of profitability that political control 
over PDVSA produced. As a legal advisor to the government stressed, ‘joint-ventures with 
managerial control for the government assures efficiency in the oil activity’. 415 Francisco 
Monaldi asserted in an interview that ‘while the government wanted to exercise clear operational 
control, it also sought the technical know-how and the potential expansion of business with 
foreign investors’.416 Ironically, nationalization in the era of the Bolivarian revolution has been 
more pragmatic and open to foreign investment than what AD nationalists were willing or 
allowed to advocate in the 1970s due to domestic pressures from different groups that demanded 
tough stances on foreign corporations. The current version of nationalism focuses on controlling 
the resource, maximizing rents and protecting the crude via larger producer-based agreements in 
OPEC. But most importantly, it centers on exercising direct control over PDVSA, even at the 
expense of the monopoly over the upstream level of the industry. The result of this course of 
action is a government that seeks to centralize decision-making and enhance statist action in the 
economy but not in complete contradiction with foreign investment. In other words, the pursuit 
of global actors in the oil industry is an inherit part of resource nationalist policies and ideals in 
today’s Venezuela.  
 
The reasons for this changed perspective are based on both conjunctural and structural features. 
In terms of the historical juncture when these changes occurred, the oil strike headed by former 
PDVSA managers cannot be underestimated. Several informants agreed that the strike changed 
the perspective of the government on its treatment of PDVSA. Margarita López Maya, for 
instance, argues that ‘Chávez did not trust the middle class, university professionals and business 
sectors of the country after 2002, so he relied on foreign investors and imports’ to advance his 
project.417 The desire to control PDVSA responded in a broad sense to the long-lasting subjective 
disputes between the state and the company. Others also pointed to the changed conditions of the 
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oil business in general since the 1970s. Because conventional sources of oil are currently scant, 
the extraction of unconventional oil such as that of the Orinoco belt required more investment. In 
this way, states share potential risks and seek capital from foreign lenders and investors. This is 
something of which Venezuelan nationalists were well aware of at the time of Chávez’s rise. As 
Luis Lander points out, ‘the new industry does not allow for completely integrated firms and the 
flexibility of new business models requires different levels of association’.418 Emerging corporate 
relations in the current context of the energy market therefore also influence the kind of relations 
the state develops in nexus with global capital.419  
 
On the one hand, there were clear material motivations to pursue partial nationalization around 
2006 and 2007, such as the maturity of investments and increase in oil prices. At the time, the lax 
fiscal arrangements of apertura had been considered illegitimate by the government, which 
controlled all other public powers. On the other hand, there was a clear desire to control PDVSA 
and a general mistrust of local autonomous actors due to the recent past of political 
confrontation. Various scholars have argued that in fact ideology—nationalism or socialism—
has played only a minor role in the nationalizing attitude of the government.420 These studies 
stress the obsolescence arguments and the regressive fiscal arrangements that were set up in the 
times of neoliberal reforms as incentives for nationalization. While my findings back these 
explanations in terms of when and how the changes took place, they are only part of the story.  
 
Ideational considerations played an important role in this nationalist process as the government 
sought to eliminate political opponents from PDVSA who have been seen as a threat to the 
interest of the nation. But more profoundly, ideology has played a role in so far as the 
Venezuelan government has engaged in a model of redistributive or redemptory development. 
This model, touted as Bolivarian socialism, requires constant and ever growing rent 
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appropriation for redistributive purposes.421 In this case, the capacity for Venezuela to continue 
extracting and exporting oil becomes paramount for the model, which some have identified as 
the emergence of a renewed form of extractivism.422 Nevertheless, the Venezuelan oil company 
has compromised part of its productive capacity due to the loss of important skilled labor as 
result of the early company-government confrontations and to the ever increasing commitments 
it has acquired as a source of government discretionary income. Association with foreign capital 
is crucial for the advancement of this model as it satisfies the much needed oil extraction and 
ground rents that provides legitimacy and stability to the government.  
 
5.4. Bolivarian socialism: the model 
 
Government officials have stressed the centrality of rent appropriation and distribution as the 
main pillar of the current Bolivarian development model. Rafael Ramírez in April 2014 
explained that Venezuela had been struggling for fifteen years to build a ‘profoundly sovereign 
economic model’. This model consists of ‘recuperating the control over our natural resources’ 
and the ‘distribution of oil rents to the poorest sectors of our country’.423 In this regard, Margarita 
López Maya states that the government ‘settled with the fact that Venezuela is a petro-state, and 
following the line of Chávez, decided to mainly engage in a process of rent distribution, 
especially to the poorest sectors of society’.424 The meaning of development had been replaced 
from the notion of ‘sowing the oil’ to a model reliant on oil revenues for distribution to the 
general population via social policies and various forms of cash transfers. The Venezuelan 
government has also established subsidies and a strict regulatory framework that limits increases 
in profits of most productive chains and maintains retail price controls.  
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This model has been carried out mainly through two fundamental mechanisms: 1) an exchange 
control policy that pegs Venezuela’s bolivar to the US dollar; and, 2) the creation of special 
government-controlled funds denominated in US dollars parallel to the national budget at the 
discretion of the President. The first mechanism emerged initially in 2003 when the government 
established currency controls in the midst of increasing political tension and under the pressure 
of massive capital flight.425 While at first it helped stop the depletion of reserves, this currency 
policy stimulated increasing imports especially of finished manufactured products due to the tacit 
appreciation of the currency. During the 13 years of exchange controls, the government has been 
forced to devalue the currency several times and an illegal foreign currency market has emerged 
and flourished, especially in the past four years.  
 
The Bolivarian model has also been sustained through the underestimation of oil prices in the 
regular budget and creation of parallel sovereign funds that do not have formal institutional 
oversight.426 The Venezuelan government established legal mechanisms to feed these funds from 
oil rents. This was achieved first, through ‘exceeding’ reserves resulting from higher oil prices 
than the official annual budget calculations. The government has constantly calculated the price 
of oil much below its actual level, apparently to be  ‘prepared’ for price distresses. In effect, 
however, this strategy has been used to channel surplus earnings through unchecked spending 
funds.427 Second, the parliament modified the central bank law in order to allow the government 
to use ‘surplus’ foreign reserves that exceed the ‘necessary’ levels. Necessary and surplus 
reserves are determined by the central bank through an ad hoc determination made ‘according to 
parameters based on the structural characteristics of the Venezuelan economy’.428 These reserves 
would be transferred to a fund created by the government with the purpose of ‘financing 
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investment projects in the real economy, as well as in health and education; the improvement of 
the public debt; and in attention of special and strategic issues’.429  
 
The most important one of these funds is the National Development Fund (FONDEN). In 2005, 
FONDEN was created with an initial endowment of US$6 billion. Although it was originally 
established as a one-time endowment, the law was modified later to allow more transfers to the 
fund.430 With the reform to the central bank law, PDVSA was no longer obliged to exchange all 
its foreign currency through the monetary entity but it could directly send exceeding resources to 
funds like FONDEN. For instance, in 2008 alone, PDVSA transferred over US$12 billion to this 
fund. Official estimates show that the Venezuelan government has invested over US$ 115 billion 
through FONDEN in various infrastructure, productive and social projects. A total of US$ 600 
billion has been invested in social spending between 2000 and 2014.431 Nevertheless, as oversight 
is negligible in the current make up of Venezuela’s parallel spending, independent analysts and 
critics have pointed out that FONDEN has been a major source of embezzlement and other 
irregular financing in Venezuela and abroad.432 
 
The government did not consider other ways to manage the windfall of oil rents via sovereign 
wealth funds or by activating the already existent Macroeconomic Stability Fund (FEM) that 
established an institutional and transparent framework for saving and investing oil rents.433 
Instead, it chose to magnify the type of discretionary spending that Carlos Andrés Pérez initiated 
in the 1970s, when the previous windfall of rent money entered public coffers. The rationale 
behind taking this course of action was that the government had constantly been under attack by 
domestic and foreign actors and thus, it required using the state’s wealth to improve the 
conditions of its people. Palma explains that the US$120 billion that have been channeled to 
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FONDEN ‘are resources for which the Central Bank and PDVSA receive no compensation at all 
and end up spent discretionally by the President’.434  
 
PDVSA has contributed several billion dollars to social spending and it has continued to 
subsidize petrol for domestic consumption, which stimulates overconsumption and creates 
incentives to smuggle fuel to neighboring countries, where market prices are exponentially 
higher.435 Between 2004 and 2008, PDVSA’s contribution to government revenues was as high 
as US$ 175 billion, but the result of this was an apparent decay in its cost structure: ‘investment 
projects were delayed, and maintenance spending declined’.436 From 2010 to 2012 alone, PDVSA 
transferred US$ 24,5 billion to FONDEN and invested some US$79 billion in social programs, 
and in 2013, contributions to social development rose as high as US$33 billion.437 In its most 
recent and consolidated account, PDVSA reported having paid over US$223 billion compounded 
towards social contributions and FONDEN between 2001 and 2014.438 Over US$ 84 billion were 
disbursed to discretionary funds and over US$130 billion were disbursed through social missions 
and other ad hoc government policies. This counts only as PDVSA’s corporate contributions 
because royalties, income tax and other traditional income appropriated by the state count as part 
of the national budget.  
 
The use of oil rents has been crucial to the meaning associated to development in the Bolivarian 
government, which is otherwise subject to intense confrontation.439 The policies of command and 
control, from land and productive enterprise expropriation to price and exchange controls, could 
only be possible within a rentier state in the context of increasing oil revenues. From the year 
2004 onward, when the Venezuelan government explicitly declared the socialist nature of the 
revolution and domestic struggles seemed to become partially solved in favor of chavismo, 
nationalizations (beyond the oil sector) became more common. The government effectively took 
on all public utilities that had been privatized in the 1990s, expropriated all cement plants, 
nationalized several retail food stores, the main agricultural supplies company, food distribution 
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enterprises, and set up a wide chain of local food stores (in this case directly managed by 
PDVSA).440 The government supplied food and other finished products mostly through imports, 
subsidized by an overvalued currency. In fact, an important feature that differentiates the 
Bolivarian model from traditional Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies is that 
rather than discouraging imports of finished manufactured goods, this model heavily relies on 
them.441 This, in turn, was made possible not only by increasing oil prices but also through 
sustained investments and loans that kept the oil industry going. Such investments were 
especially crucial because government control over PDVSA has meant its channeling of funds to 
social spending, being less focused on productive investments, for which foreign investors have 
become necessary.  
 
5.4.1. China: a necessary partner to sustain the model 
 
After reversing the liberal oil policies of apertura, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec) took over some of the fields left by ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips.442 This move 
added to the already deepening relationship between Venezuela and China, which reached the 
level of ‘strategic partnership’ in 2001. As the Venezuelan government created various 
mechanisms to redirect oil rents from its traditional channels to discretionary spending, it also 
pursued China as a partner for development assistance. Both governments set up an on-going 
funding mechanism for short term spending in various productive and social matters. The first 
one is the China-Venezuela development fund, which was originally set up by a 60% 
contribution from China’s Development Bank (CDB) and 40% by Venezuela’s Economic and 
Social Development Bank (BANDES). This fund, also known as Fondo Pesado (Heavy Fund) 
was established as a lending mechanism in three tracks that started in 2007 with a contribution 
from CDB of US$4 billion and US$2 billion from Fonden, expired in 2010.443 Track B was 
agreed upon in 2009 for US$4 billion from CDB and, finally, in 2013 ‘track C’ was signed for 
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US$5 billion. All tracks have been renewed several times, adding to over US$30 billion in debts, 
some of which has already been paid. These loans are commodity-backed. They are repaid 
through oil exports that are estimated to be around 330,000 b/d.  
 
A different funding mechanism called Gran Volumen (Grand Volume) was agreed in 2010 for 
US$20 billion destined for infrastructure and housing. In contrast to the Heavy Fund, the Grand 
Volume is a longer-term development fund. It is a ten-year loan that is denominated half in US 
dollars and half in RMB.444 With Gran Volumen, Venezuela holds the largest RMB-denominated 
loan outside Asia and it is also a commodity-backed mechanism that is repaid with oil exports. 
The Venezuelan government has used it to import large amounts of Chinese manufactured 
products. Among other programs, Grand Volume allowed the Venezuelan government to set up a 
policy of affordable electric devices, from laundry sets to TV and DVDs.445 
 
The diversification of the investments portfolio has been considered as an important feature of 
the Venezuelan state’s advantageous position in the renegotiation of arrangements with IOCs. In 
that line of thought too, it is important to consider that the Chinese involvement in Venezuela’s 
oil industry shows divergence within foreign companies’ behavior. In this case, Chinese 
investments replaced important ventures that major IOCs left behind after the migration to the 
new framework. Furthermore, the Chinese involvement also provided other benefits for the 
Venezuelan government such as considerable lending which other market and multilateral agents 
were unwilling to provide. As a risky destination for capital markets, Venezuela has become 
more reliant on China’s loans and they are paid through oil shipments calculated at market 
prices.  
 
China and Venezuela have signed various commitments to develop the Junín-4 block at the 
Orinoco river basin. This includes lending to PDVSA to pay for its required contributions in 
joint-venture investments. As oil stocks in the Orinoco basin are extra heavy, they are difficult to 
access, and their exploitation is costly. One of the central ventures between China and Venezuela 
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involves the construction of refineries in both countries with the capacity to refine Orinoco 
basin’s crude oil.446 The first of these projects, which began to be built in 2012, is a mega refinery 
in China’s Guangdong province with capacity to refine 400,000 barrels of extra-heavy crude oil 
per day.  
 
In September 2013, president Maduro signed a new deal to further develop the Junín block for 
US$14 billion, together with a renewal of the Heavy Fund. This investment will require the 
creation of a new joint-venture and it is expected to produce 200,000 barrels more per day.447 
Later, in May 2014, PDVSA reached agreements with Schumberger, Halliburton and 
Weatherford for new investments that amount US$2 billion.448 Although small in comparison 
with the on-going sums of Chinese commitments, these agreements are testament of Venezuela’s 
willingness to continue pursuing foreign investment as long as they allow keeping the industry 
alive and state control is not compromised.  
 
In July 2014, the Venezuelan government renewed agreements with China that allowed it to 
delay some seemingly pressing adjustments in its own economic policy due to increasing 
inflation and scarcity. This set of agreements, signed in the midst of the Chinese Premier’s visit 
to Caracas, included a second extension of Track A in the China-Venezuelan Development Fund 
for US$ 4 billion. China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE) and PDVSA 
agreed to US$ 1 billion more to supply Venezuela’s NOC with needed cash to pay commitments 
with contractors and engage on new oil projects. Around US$700 million were agreed directly 
with the Bank of China to embark in projects of gold extraction. Several other minor accords 
were signed to increase Chinese imports and investments, from the purchase of vehicles to more 
construction projects, training, and the setting up of cement and petrochemical firms in 
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Venezuela.449 These agreements account for some US$14 billion, which adds to the deal that 
president Maduro had secured in September 2013. Other significant deals with international oil 
companies remain modest in contrast to contracts with the Chinese. In 2010, PDVSA signed an 
accord with the Italian ENI to develop block 5 of Junín for US$ 7 billion for a period of 7 years. 
However, ENI agreed to lend PDVSA its part as majority partner for the necessary joint 
investment for up to US$ 1.7 billion.450 Smaller amounts have been agreed with Repsol and 
Gazprom to develop natural gas projects.  
 
The government has denied that China imposes harsh conditions associated with its loans and 
investments. Its arguments in favor of cooperation with China focus mostly on the fact that 
China does not impose larger economic restructuring on partner states. Maduro has said ‘the 
funding China provides is not conditioned to economic adjustments, to social subjugation or the 
denial of our people’s fundamental rights’.451 Mendoza Potellá actually stresses that the alliance 
with China helps ‘leverage a development project through the transfer of technology and 
provision of loans’.452 The Chinese partners may not have a special interest in imposing IMF-type 
conditionality, but instead sectoral bilateral agreements that benefit Chinese companies and 
general business strategies as well as China’s energy security have been signed in the evolution 
of the relationship. As Gonzalez-Vicente argues: ‘it is a form of intervention that channels 
economic activity through the nation state, which becomes a facilitator of a business-centric 
logic of development’.453 This form of intervention shows an emerging pattern of a globalizing 
Chinese state. In its dealings with a peripheral state, China has turned into a lender of last resort 
and a fundamental source of investment in exchange for natural resources. With Venezuela, the 
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state-capital nexus becomes clear in the chain of business where the Chinese intervene,454 
frequently backed by state action. 
 
Even though the terms of the loans China provides Venezuela are not fully transparent, there are 
clear policy decisions that have benefited China since its increased role in Venezuela’s public 
finance. China has benefited from Venezuela’s statist model that has granted ample access to 
Chinese firms in various sectors. Both oil nationalizations and massive housing policies under 
the Chávez and Maduro governments have meant open doors to Chinese investments and 
imports. Sanderson and Forsyte stress that contrary to other investing institutions, the CDB 
openly applauded Venezuela’s nationalizations and other policies. In an interview, Liu Kegu, 
CDB’s vice-governor ‘praised Chávez’s nationalization of the oil industry as a move to bring 
more of the country’s oil riches to the Venezuelan people’.455 As Venezuela’s economy has 
entered into a more critical situation after the last quarter of 2014, China has been less generous 
toward the Venezuelan government, alleging there has been irresponsible spending and worrying 
about the likelihood of default.456 Already in the last renewals of the active lines of credit, China 
has offered the funding granted that certain conditions are met, including their approval of how 
the spending is done (RBV 2010b). Hogenboom highlights that the CBD has given Venezuela 
recommendations ‘regarding macroeconomic policy, long-term strategic planning and 
infrastructure investment’.457  
 
More importantly, in September 2014—simultaneous with a renegotiation of the terms for re-
payment of the loans—the Venezuelan government approved by executive decree a law to 
facilitate the creation of Special Economic Zones in Venezuelan territory, wherein only Chinese 
investors have been given preferential treatment.458 The law stipulates that Chinese investors 
were exempt from tax burdens and that tariff would be eliminated for primary product imports of 
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Chinese firms, among other benefits. During 2015, China has refused to offer more loans to 
Venezuela and has instead granted more investment funds tied to its own oil companies, for 
expanded production in the Orinoco river basin, clearly geared toward securing repayment.  
 
Just as the Venezuelan government’s nationalist behavior became more assertive with increasing 
oil prices, its attitude has been more conciliatory when prices have decreased. Since 2014, the 
government has taken a clearly more pragmatic attitude toward investment, not only seeking 
loans and new agreements but also changing the terms of operational control.  An indication of 
Venezuela’s willingness to give up operational control over the industry in order to secure 
financing is evident in latest changes to its joint-venture arrangements. These were first geared to 
provide more ‘autonomy’ to joint-ventures and later to allow operational control to the foreign 
concessionary.459 Indeed, Monaldi asserts that PDVSA has given important concessions to 
foreign investors, allowing for example Chinese operators ‘to appoint the chief operating officers 
in their mixed ventures at the Orinoco Basin, giving significant operational control over the 
construction and operation of the projects’.460 Moreover, the Venezuelan government has offered 
foreign companies operating in the Orinoco belt the option of using the more flexible exchange 




In this chapter, I have analyzed the changes that the Bolivarian revolution has undertaken in its 
relationship with foreign investors in the oil sector. I contended that in order to enable such 
changes to take place, the government first waged a direct political struggle with its own NOC, 
PDVSA, to assert its control. These contestations, however, were not entirely new; they were 
rather latent since the 1980s and responded to a subjective divergence between the state’s role as 
a landlord state and PDVSA’s managerial elite’s self-identity as a global oil producer. With the 
rise of Chávez, political confrontation became more endemic and, at least in the years 2002-
2003, the struggle between the government and PDVSA exemplified the broader confrontations 
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taking place between a rising social force and the previous establishment. Once this struggle was 
settled in favor of the government, after considerable economic and human capital loses, a new 
oil policy could be put forward. This confrontation, however, had an enduring legacy of distrust 
that encouraged the government to keep foreign investors in the industry as a way to secure 
control over the company. 
 
The 2001 hydrocarbons law regulated oil policy but only in 2006 did it begin to change the 
relations with foreign companies. The reasons for this timing were based on the fact that only 
then did the state have enough confidence and material incentives to move on and transform the 
contractual arrangements that had been agreed upon during the 1990s with foreign oil 
companies. The facts that companies had already committed resources to investments that were 
in motion and the international price of oil was rising far above the parameters originally 
established in the contracts were important motivations for the nationalizing move that took 
place in 2006-2007. Appropriating windfall rents then became a crucial factor for the 
government to take on what some considered a retroactive application of a new legal framework. 
The government risked costly arbitration processes but negotiated strategically and aggressively 
with companies’ possible access to the world’s largest oil reservoir. Furthermore, the privileged 
position of China as investor and financier of the Venezuelan government shows that the 
changing conditions of the global energy market impact the forms of association that peripheral 
states have configured with foreign capital, allowing for hybrid relations with strong state 
presence and continued involvement of foreign investors. It further demonstrates that foreign 
capital takes different forms. After the reforms approved by chavismo, Chinese SOEs seemed 
more willing to take on potentially risky investments possibly due to the backing of their home 
state, something that differs greatly from other IOCs. 
 
The guiding ideas of sovereignty and control were also part of the state’s desires to eliminate the 
arrangements created under the oil opening. Yet, in stark contrast with nationalists in the 1970s, 
these ideas included associating with foreign investors, and with a wide range of them, for 
various purposes. Rhetorically, these purposes respond to a strategic maneuver of Venezuela’s 
foreign policy to enhance a multipolar world and to defend the interests of the state through 
crafting a diverse set of alliances with different actors from abroad. In practice, it corresponds to 
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the needs of the Bolivarian regime to control PDVSA and, more broadly, to put forward a new 
model of rentierism centralized in the Presidency. This socialist rentier state promotes rent 
distribution, command and control policies in various areas of the economy and assures political 
control, for which increasing oil revenues is a requirement. Socialist rentierism has replaced in 
the current Bolivarian era the notion of ‘sowing the oil’ that had historically dominated 








Contentious nationalization and the embrace of third-worldism: 




In the history of Ecuador’s linkage with foreign investment, the 1970s emerge as a period of 
nationalist discourse and policies. This period was dominated by military regimes, led first by 
Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, and later by a triumvirate of army Generals. The dictatorships of the 
1970s have been regarded as nationalist and progressive. Some have argued that the military 
nationalized oil. In the words of Gabriela Valdivia:  ‘in 1971, a military coup nationalized all 
subsurface elements as patrimony of the state, in order to better control rents drawn from foreign 
investors’.461 In a similar fashion, it is understood that the purpose of such nationalization was ‘to 
define a consciousness of national sovereignty based on the governance of petroleum’.462  
 
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of Ecuador’s oil industry paying attention to the general 
changes in the relationship between the state and foreign companies during the military regimes 
of the 1970s, when Ecuador became an oil exporter. The aim of the chapter is to historicize oil 
nationalism in Ecuador and its relationship to IOCs, showcasing how internal ideational 
contestations and intra-firm maneuvers led to stringent treatment of foreign investors by the 
Ecuadorian government. It considers the influence of nationalist and developmentalist ideas in 
the military as important drivers for these nationalist tendencies. At the same time that the 
chapter demystifies the widely disseminated notion that during the dictatorship there was ‘true 
nationalization’, it also explains the conditions upon which the shifts in control occurred.  
 
In the 1970s, Ecuador’s relations with IOCs were contentious and, indeed, the state pursued 
greater control over their activities. I argue that the changes in the state’s treatment of foreign 
investment were largely influenced by broader changes in the oil price but also were a response 
to the Gulf Corporation’s maneuvers. Obsolescing bargain insights shed light on these shifts in 
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policy in the 1970s, as the previous decades of a concessionary system allowed the initial setting 
of exploratory and exploitation investments. The various legal reforms that increased state 
control over oil in the 1970, however, were partial and provoked disputes even within the 
military. Legal battles with the main oil companies, mostly Texaco-Gulf, often incited reactions 
from political elites and tended to divide the military. This partial nationalization was also a 
consequence of a strategic maneuver from Gulf Corporation, which wished to stop doing 
business in the country. Building on previous political science works on Ecuador’s oil industry 
history,463 I bring to light these internal ideational contestations that tend to be ignored in more 
recent scholarship. While the military government managed to increase state control over the oil 
industry and appropriate around 80% of companies’ profits, it only nationalized assets of the 
main exploiting consortium in the country rather than the entire industry. In terms of the 
ideational components of the 1970s resource nationalism, oil policy was understood in Ecuador 
in the context of dependent development of a small primary commodity exporting state. The 
military regime encouraged initiatives to link Ecuador to a larger group of peripheral countries 
that could stand together against the interests of consumer powers, where most foreign oil 
concessionaires came from. In this context, nationalist policies were articulated and espoused 
under the wider emerging views of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the third-
worldist movement.  
 
The chapter is structured in the following way. Firstly, it briefly overviews the state’s treatment 
of foreign investment before the 1970s, emphasizing the process through which a liberal 
regulatory regime began to be challenged mostly by the military. And secondly, it explains the 
main shifts in the state treatment of foreign investment during the 1970s. It focuses on four main 
policies and state ideas that advanced greater regulation, increased state appropriation of rents 
and endorsed multilateral efforts led by oil producing countries.  
 
6.2. From myth to reality: the preamble of managing oil in Oriente 
 
Since colonial times, Ecuador has been dependent on a series of single commodity exports. It has 
also been plagued with political instability that mirrored the ups and downs of the economy. The 
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country has faced military interventions, popular and populist revolts as well as nationalist 
sentiments that coincided with development aspirations and grassroots alternatives. As Rochlin 
notes: ‘the nation’s historically entrenched staple economy, combined with its lack of economic 
diversification, created an economic rollercoaster that has underpinned the state’s notorious 
record of weakness and the country’s penchant for political instability’.464 For centuries, Ecuador 
was connected to the world economy through its export of coffee, cacao and banana.465 For 
Ecuador, oil is indeed a relatively recent phenomenon. In its roughly forty-five years as an oil 
exporter, Ecuador has gone through tremendous change. During this time, the country’s 
dependence on oil extraction has rendered a closely linked relationship with foreign companies, 
usually marked by tensions at the grassroots level and suspicion—or cooperation—at the state 
level.   
 
Oil erupted in Ecuador’s history somewhat surprisingly. Minor participation from the Anglo 
Ecuadorian Oilfields and other companies occurred since the 1920s in the Peninsula de Santa 
Elena on the country’s coast. This remained a site of modest production throughout much of the 
century. The 1929 Constitution explicitly granted ‘inalienable and imprescriptible’ state 
ownership over mines and mineral wealth.466 With respect to ownership, Ecuador had explicitly 
claimed its subsoil resources as a national patrimony since 1929. However, since the inception of 
the republic, the ‘fruits’ of the earth had been considered property of the sovereign as keeping 
with Hispanic jurisprudence.467  
 
A concessionary system was set in place during the early 20th century for mines but also for oil 
exploration. The first concession for oil exploration was given in 1921 to the Leonard 
Exploration Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil.468 This concession was later revoked for its 
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failure to pay its debts to the state and because no significant deposits had been found. In 1937, 
president Federico Páez sanctioned a Law of Mines in order to regulate the concessionary 
regime, protect investment and welcome companies from the north. After years of attempts, 
president Galo Plaza Lasso stated in 1949 that ‘the Oriente is a myth’ (el Oriente es un mito), 
referring to the prospects of finding oil in the region.469  
 
In 1963, oil discoveries were made in the neighboring region of Putumayo in Colombia. Texas 
Petroleum and Gulf Corporation then attempted to sign a deal with the Ecuadorian government, 
which finally favored a consortium as Texaco-Gulf.470 In 1965, Texaco received over 1.6 million 
hectares more land from other companies that had received concessions in previous agreements, 
all of which was done without knowledge of the state. Lago Agrio, one of Ecuador’s currently 
mature yields in the Amazon, started producing over 2,640 barrels per day in 1967 at a well 
controlled by Texaco-Gulf. That same year, the consortium found a sizable amount of oil 
reserves that were commercially viable in other areas. Texaco-Gulf henceforth negotiated a 
contract with the state for 40 years to exploit over 1.4 million hectares more.471  
 
In 1960, José María Velasco Ibarra, a popular civilian caudillo was elected for a fourth term to 
the presidency. A year later, a military junta interrupted Velasco Ibarra’s constitutional 
government. The junta attempted an industrialization project, still relying on agricultural exports, 
while giving massive concessions to foreign oil companies in the Amazon region. Upon the 
return to democracy in 1966, a Constituent Assembly chose Otto Arosemena as President for a 
brief term that would end in 1968. Arosemena continued the trend of concessions and 
rapprochement to the United States.472 By 1968, soon after the important findings of Lago Agrio 
and others by Texaco-Gulf, there were over 6 million hectares conceded to foreign companies, 
which amounted to a fifth of Ecuador’s territory. Conditions were extraordinarily favorable to 
the companies: contracts were signed for around 57 years, the state reclaimed between 5 to 11% 
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of royalties473 and a payment of 5 sucres per year per hectare, while the state would provide up to 
200,000 sucres in compensation for investments (see table 6.1 below).474  
 
Common to the trajectory of capital-intensive industries that require large investments initially, 
the oil industry in Ecuador was largely controlled by foreign investors. Likewise, as the 
obsolescing bargaining literature argues, the Ecuadorian state set up a liberal framework that 
exercised little control over the oil business as the latter began to produce commercially viable 
outputs. The state granted rights to foreign companies that provided significant control over land 
in the Amazon region. For the first time in Ecuador’s history, the locus of economic power 
moved from the pacific coast to the oriente, from traditional landowning elites to foreign 
companies and a rather inexperienced state bureaucracy based in Quito. John Martz went as far 
as to argue that Texaco-Gulf actually exercised effective control over the oriente.475 This was a 
largely underdeveloped region with scant population, most of which was composed of 
Indigenous populations. In 1968, Arosemena called for elections. Velasco Ibarra won a fifth 
constitutional term that year facing the challenge of a transforming political economy. Velasco 
Ibarra represented a heterogeneous alliance that included liberals, a progressive strand of the 
military, a multi-class populist ‘velasquista’ base and some elements of the oligarchy.476 With 
such a complex domestic base of support, Velasco Ibarra sought to regulate contracts and make 
foreign companies subject to the rule of law. 
 
Velasco Ibarra, who was confronted with pressures from contradictory constituencies, declared 
himself dictator in June 1970 and dissolved the Parliament. In order to advance his attempt to 
regulate oil extraction and benefit from further rents, the government pushed for Texaco-Gulf to 
return all lands that exceeded the 400,000 hectares cap stipulated by Executive Decree 1464 
signed in 1965.477 The state received almost a million hectares from Texaco-Gulf. After intense 
negotiations, and despite pressure from the military to be more audacious, the government 
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accepted that Texaco-Gulf retained 500,000 hectares because it was a consortium.478 In these 
lands, Texaco-Gulf explored and started exploitation of the four main blocs of yields of the 
Amazon: Lago Agrio, Shushifindi, Sacha and Auca, among others. These four have been coined 
as the ‘jewels of the crown’ by the Ecuadorian state due to the large amount of reserves and 
decent quality of oil they possess. Moreover, new concessions were granted and by 1971 there 
were up to 9 million hectares conceded to foreign companies. This amounted to almost half of 
Ecuador’s territory.479   
 
Influenced by the emergence of other nationalist movements in the region, including in 
neighboring Peru and in Venezuela, the government decreed the creation of a NOC, the 
Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE). A new Law of Hydrocarbons was sanctioned 
in 1971, overruling that of 1937, also signed under dictatorship. This law, on the one hand, 
maintained the principle of state ownership over oil and it would enable increased state 
participation in the industry over time. On the other hand, it ratified all concessions agreed upon 
until 1971480, meaning that for the next forty years, the concessions remained legal. In the words 
of Jarrín Ampudia the Law ‘was born dead’ because the state had to wait until 2010 (when 
concessions expired) to apply any of its regulations to foreign companies.481 According to the 
Law, the concessionary system was no longer allowed and three new types of contracts were 
introduced: production sharing contracts, service contracts and joint-ventures.482 Since the Law 
stipulated that all concessionary contracts had to come to an end before they migrated to the new 
legal framework, they were valid for the next 40 to 58 years limiting any possibility for more 
radical transformations of hydrocarbon governance in the country. Despite his attempts to 
improve state regulation over the oil industry, Velasco Ibarra’s law demonstrated his flexibility 
toward investors.  
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In practice, the reforms were negligible and hence encountered resistance from the nationalist 
factions of the military and civil society. Although Ecuador only produced 4,100 barrels per day 
in 1971,483 there were growing expectations about the country’s entrance onto the stage as an 
exporter. These expectations increased hostility from both the military and civil society toward 
the regime and its inability to put foreign corporations under further state control. Even the 
creation of CEPE was largely symbolic, as it did not have any capacity to bring to fruition the 
mandate of exploring, exploiting, industrializing and commercializing Ecuador’s oil.484  
 
In February 1972, the armed forces sent Velasco Ibarra into exile in Panama and assumed control 
in a bloodless coup under the leadership of General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara. With a ‘clear 
plan of action’, the military made the oil question front and center of their program. This was 
focused on retaining sovereign control of subsoil resources and the rents derived from them. 
Despite some divisions within the military between reformist-nationalists and traditional-
oligarchs,485 the idea of nation building was seen as central and the reformist-nationalist camp 
headed the natural resources area for much of the dictatorship. 
 
Table 6.1 Evolution of the contractual relationship between state and extractive companies 
in Ecuador (1970s) 
 
Period Most prevalent type of 
contract 
Regulatory features Financial features 
Pre-1972 
 
Concessionary period o Large land extensions. 
o 40-57 year concessions. 
o Lack of state regulatory 
capacity. 
o Royalties varied from 5% 
to 11% 
o Investment compensation 
to companies.  
o Land right payments up to 
200 sucres. 
1972-1982 Association contracts o Contracts were restricted to 
20 years. 
o The state determined areas 
for exploration and 
exploitation and recuperated 
land from previous 
concessions. 
o 16% royalties. 
o 44% income tax. 
o 15% export tax. 
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6.3. The military and oil nationalism in Ecuador: the story of control and the 80-20 
 
As the Nationalist Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces took power in 1972 and 
developed its ‘plan of action and philosophy’, it considered energy resources a fundamental 
source of national sovereignty.486 The notion of natural resource ownership as a source of 
sovereignty was clearly articulated during the period of the military regime of Rodríguez Lara 
and the triumvirate. In that period, the idea of development began to be enunciated in relation to 
oil as Ecuador began to export oil and transit from an agricultural-based economy to an oil-
dependent one. Governing oil became crucial for the military to exert actual power and constitute 
a national project. The idea of modernization via industrialization was a central desire that, 
thanks to oil revenues, finally seemed possible.487 This was not an easy task, however, and it 
entailed executing bold measures, increasing knowledge and technical know-how as well as an 
international strategy that would link Ecuador with other similar primary producing states.  
 
The military elite that took power in 1972 under the leadership of Rodríguez Lara was divided 
between a reformist and a traditionalist stream. In contrast with other armed forces in South 
America, the military in Ecuador had a heterogeneous composition in terms of class and place of 
origin and many officers followed liberal-progressive ideas in the tradition of Eloy Alfaro. 
Despite the split in the military currents that came to power in 1972, there was a basic consensus 
translated into a five-year plan of development that spelled out three important objectives: ‘the 
achievement of national integration, an improvement in living conditions, and a strengthening of 
economic output through greater rationality in the use of natural resources’.488 The military 
government assumed that state intervention was inevitable to achieve these goals and control 
over oil resources seemed particularly important. Hence, the reformist and nationalist wing of the 
regime headed the natural resource sector since the beginning.  
 
Jarrín Ampudia, then Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, pointed out in 1974 that 
‘natural resources constitute elements upon which the state ought to exercise national 
sovereignty’. Although the law had granted state ownership over oil since colonial times, control 
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over the oil industry had only been loosely exercised during the initial process of hydrocarbon 
extraction. For military ideologues, many of whom were cabinet members and others were 
nationalist civilians from the Universidad Central del Ecuador, the basic statement of state 
ownership over oil ‘was not enough’ and now it was time to make of its ‘extraction, 
transformation and output part of the social and economic development of the country’. It was 
clear from the military standpoint that ‘national interest’ was not equivalent to the interests of the 
‘privileged economic sectors’ alone and that a process of societal inclusion into a ‘dignified 
principle of human existence’ had to follow for the majority of the population as well.489 Jarrín 
Ampudia was a nationalist who had been largely influenced by the creation of Petrobras in Brazil 
and had been watching other resource nationalist movements in the region.490 He was considered 
an early ‘conservationist’, as he was an advocate of rationalizing the exploitation of oil, 
considering its non-renewable character, and the possibility that oil would increase its value over 
time. 
 
The military regime’s goal of gaining control over the oil industry meant increasing the state’s 
knowledge of the sector. In a process that was advanced decades before in the Venezuelan case 
(see Chapter 3), the Ecuadorian regime sought to simultaneously learn about and effectively 
regulate and govern the resource, and with it, the companies that extracted it. It is expected in 
theory that through these means the state would gain confidence over time and the initial 
advantage of the foreign corporation would shift to the host state. For a country with weak 
institutions and little knowledge of the oil industry, a fundamental step was to create a technical 
team that could actually gather information and advise policy directions. Jarrín Ampudia was 
successful at building this team under his leadership and most of its members went on to perform 
significant roles in Ecuador’s oil policy in the future. This group of political advisers ‘was the 
only source of independent knowledge about the domestic oil industry; the only alternative was 
the Texas-Gulf consortium’.491 Coincidentally, in a complex balance between the desire for 
control and the need for foreign capital and technology, the 1970s proved to be a formidable time 
for rising nationalist policies. As Philip notes, following insights from the obsolescing bargain 
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model, this decade was a good time for oil nationalism to emerge, as ‘foreign investment had 
already been committed so […] the bargaining power lay with the host government’.492  
 
Further, the wave of nationalist movements was on the rise world-wide, and as we have seen 
with the case of Venezuela, a coordinated multilateral move from third world countries 
reclaimed national ownership over natural resources. The nationalist ideals of the military have 
been shown in Jarrín Ampudia’s discourse, and those ideals were also accompanied by a sense of 
opportunity from international trends. The case of Jarrín Ampudia, similar to that of Pérez 
Alfonzo in Venezuela, shows the confluence of both strong ideational motivations to pursue 
nationalist policies and also to improve the capacity of the state to increase its bargaining power. 
The unprecedented and unexpected increase in Ecuador’s national income stemming from oil 
was a positive surprise not only for the country at large but also for a military regime that was 
able to perform ambitious national projects, use inclusive rhetoric and allow relative openness in 
a context of dictatorship.493 The nationalist position of the military was also reflected in a wider 
environment of public debate around the issue of oil. Petroleum policy became part of public 
opinion through the dissemination of specialized publications but also significant media attention 
on the topic.494  
 
The military regime increased control over the industry and developed mechanisms to better 
appropriate rents via four main policy actions. The main one was the Decree 430, which made 
Velasco Ibarra’s Hydrocarbons Law applicable immediately, and redefined the association of the 
state with foreign companies through new contracts with a more stringent regulatory framework. 
After signing Decree 430, the government advanced both regulatory legal mechanisms aiming at 
increasing control and increasing rent appropriation. These shifts were framed as part of a larger 
international appeal to third-worldism as a fundamental ideational component of Ecuador’s 
nationalism of the 1970s. Lastly, the state’s acquisition of Gulf’s assets was in fact an 
uncomfortable turn of events that reflected the strength of the company rather than a unified 
nationalist position from the military regime.  
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6.3.1. Decree 430: regulating foreign companies and oil extraction  
 
On June 6, 1972 the regime ruled Decree Nº 430, which addressed the main concerns of the 
military upon arriving to power, and sought to remedy the legal inconsistencies that reigned until 
then between the state and foreign companies. This executive decree simply enforced Velasco’s 
Law of Hydrocarbons approved in 1971 (instead of waiting for concessions to expire). Colonel 
René Vargas Pazzos, long time manager of CEPE during Rodríguez Lara’s regime, remembers 
the application of the law as a central objective of the nationalist government. Vargas Pazzos 
represented the nationalist strand of the military and thought that the state had to control the oil 
business through its national oil company. He reckons: ‘oil is a national resource that belongs to 
the people and has to be managed by the people’s company’.495  
 
The dispositions of the decree were clearly geared toward enhancing the state’s regulatory 
capacity over the industry and, simultaneously, increasing its participation in the business and 
appropriation of rents. With regards to control, the Decree Nº 430 forced all concessionaires to 
negotiate new contracts with the state under the 1971 legal framework. Furthermore, it 
delineated surface and subsoil areas for extracting wells, in which concessionaires were ‘required 
to drill one or more wells of at least 3,500 meters in depth for each 100,000 hectares or fraction 
over 50,000’496 (at least 3,500 meters per well per 100,000 hectares). Exploitation areas deemed 
of ‘excessive quantity’ according to the law had to revert to the state before December 1972. The 
Decree established 200,000 hectares as the maximum area for exploration and 80,000 hectares 
for exploitation, while it set up a maximum of 160,000 hectares for concessions, including for 
consortiums. The Decree also stipulated a period of 2 years for companies to choose the areas 
they wished to retain.497  
 
This Decree not only delineated some basic mechanisms for oil extraction governance but also 
strengthened the regulatory role of the state. It granted state authority to renegotiate the contracts 
and gave CEPE a legitimate legal basis (together with Decree Nº 522), which was lacking under 
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Velasco Ibarra’s legal framework. Also, CEPE gained the reverted areas from concessionaires, 
acquiring the capacity to effectively become a national oil company with extractive power.498   
 
Most importantly, Decree 430 was also instrumental in increasing state participation in rents 
appropriation. It established a 15% tax on exports (the first tax on exports ever in the country’s 
history) and royalties increased from 11.5% to 16%. On top of this, a 44% corporate tax was 
introduced as well as a levy for social programs (see table 6.1 above).499 Minister Jarrín Ampudia 
stated proudly, ‘in sum, the country receives near 80% of companies’ profits’.500 In retrospect, 
Carlos Larrea, a development expert in Ecuador, characterizes this period as one marked by two 
intertwined processes ‘first, high prices, because after the war of Yom Kippur in 1973, prices 
skyrocketed […] and, secondly, a very strong participation of the state in the oil business’. 
Larrea agrees that in this particular period ‘a key figure is Jarrín Ampudia’, it is this minister 
who was in charge of ‘negotiating contracts and increasing state participation to up to 80 percent 
of the rent’ acquired from oil exploitation.501  
 
The state also ensured that Ecuador’s central bank would receive all foreign exchange earnings 
from oil exports. This was a fundamental decision in the interest of both controlling the activities 
and revenues of foreign companies and, consequently, managing rents. The central bank would 
retain royalties, the export tax and even the income tax directly as foreign currency coming from 
export revenues and it reimbursed the remainder to the companies.502 The central bank’s 
appropriation of foreign earnings was seen as threatening by the companies and it generated 
controversy in the oil business internationally. Domestically, however, this measure gave 
Ecuador’s central bank the ability to centralize the country’s foreign earnings.  
 
The notion of the 80-20 split in revenues remains in Ecuador’s historical memory as a central 
piece of the 1970s dictatorship. But this was only possible after new contracts were negotiated 
and signed with foreign companies. Once Decree 430 was in place, subsequent Decrees were 
declared to adjust the contracts to the new legal framework and also to regulate the use of the 
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pipeline that transported Ecuador’s oil from the Amazon to the Pacific ports. Relatively quickly, 
new contracts were signed in 1973 in a process led by Jarrín Ampudia and Vargas Pazzos.  
 
6.3.2. New contracts: assuring control through association  
 
Despite resistance from companies and even within the government, Jarrín Ampudia led a 
successful negotiation of new contracts beginning in January 1973 and lasting much of that year. 
Association contracts were the preferred mode that the new law stipulated. According to these 
contracts,  the state gave the right to explore and exploit the yields it owned to a private 
contractor, whose contribution was a set capital investment. The private firm was to pay all 
taxes, royalties, wages, superficial land rights and any other payment stipulated by law.503 In 
total, there were seven large contracts signed and several other minor ones, all of which had a 
lifespan of 20 years. Regulation over the area coverage of contracts was fundamental from the 
Ministry’s point of view, as irregularities had been so glaring with the massive concessions given 
in the past.  
  
The negotiation with Texaco-Gulf was by far the most significant one of all. The consortium was 
keen on expanding production in Ecuador but this offer met with no enthusiasm from the 
Ministry. Jarrín Ampudia’s conservationist views influenced his negotiation strategy, which was 
geared toward ensuring as much control as possible, even at risk of decreasing production. The 
new contract left the option for CEPE to purchase 25% of the consortium no later than June 
1977. Jarrín Ampudia continued his strategy of denying Texaco-Gulf permission to increase 
production, eventually even forcing it to reduce output from 250,000 bpd to 210,000 bpd in May 
1974.504 This was seen as a damaging move to the relationship and it garnered the company’s 
hostility toward the minister, who as a result was forced to leave his post before the end of the 
year. Nevertheless, he secured the purchase of the 25% assets of the consortium already by June 
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1974.505 It is estimated that the state paid slightly over US$42 million for the transaction and the 
other two companies kept equal asset shares for 37.5%.506  
 
As has been discussed, the Ecuadorian regime was not isolated in its attempts at progressively 
nationalizing its oil industry. In fact, far more radical steps had been taken in Mexico, as well as 
other countries in the Middle East, while a full nationalization was on its way in Venezuela as 
the reversion law had been approved a year before (see chapter 3). Jarrín Ampudia’s eyes were 
placed on the wider nationalist phenomenon and his rush to purchase Texaco-Gulf’s 25% was 
geared toward obtaining his other policy goal: Ecuador’s membership in OPEC. Right before his 
dismissal, Jarrín Ampudia drafted a bill to the presidency for the purchase of 51% of the 
consortium’s assets, as it had been the objective of the nationalist strand in the military from the 
outset of the regime.507 The proposal was quickly dropped. Tensions within the military stopped 
this possibility, on the belief that Ecuador could not risk Texaco-Gulf’s complete withdrawal 
from the country due to the country’s continued need for technical expertise and capital.508  
 
Apart from the new Texaco-Gulf contract and subsequent establishment of a CEPE-Texaco-Gulf 
consortium, other major contracts were signed with Anglo Oriente, Sun Oil, Anglo Península, 
Cautivo, Cayman and OKC under the association regime. With the negotiation of these contracts, 
major land reversals to the state took place, and a 16% royalty was imposed, exploration rights 
were awarded at a rate of 100 sucres per hectare and a 44.4% corporate tax was put in place.509  
 
6.3.3. A small country in a hostile world: Ecuador’s nationalism and multilateralism  
 
Until now, it has been noted that the military regime built upon an increasing nationalist 
sentiment that had materialized in a law approved by Velasco Ibarra. The Rodríguez Lara regime 
accelerated the timeline for enforcement of the law, taking advantage of foreign companies’ sunk 
costs. These policies also responded to important ideational drivers. The idea of Ecuador being a 
                                                            
505 Gerlach, Indians, Oil, and Politics. 
506 Gordillo, ¿El Oro Del Diablo? Ecuador: Historia Del Petróleo, 161. 
507 Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America. 





‘small country’ permeates its identity. This notion was present in the 1970s and it encouraged 
policymakers to welcome multilateralism as a good way to seek wider support for the country’s 
own nationalist policies. Membership in OPEC was identified as a central goal early on during 
Jarrín Ampudia’s tenure in the ministry. Phillip noted that ‘membership in OPEC would help 
Ecuadorean nationalists ideologically and would therefore provide the backing to permit the 
gradual takeover of the consortium [referring to Texaco-Gulf] by CEPE’.510 By being more 
‘closely linked to the world’s petroleum-producing nations’, the military sought international 
support in its dealings with multinational corporations.511  
 
Despite setbacks during this time in the ministry, Jarrín Ampudia, was able to satisfy his 
objective to acquire OPEC membership. Jarrín Ampudia managed to receive an invitation for 
Ecuador to be an observer state at the annual OPEC meeting in Lagos at the end of 1972. Later, 
Ecuador would become an associate member in 1973 during a meeting in Vienna, where Jarrín 
Ampudia stated the goals of the nationalist government as well as his third-worldist views. In 
this case, the military shared the widely accepted view at the time that ‘underdevelopment’ was a 
result of long-lasting colonial and post-colonial relations then illustrated in unequal terms of 
trade. Thus, ‘the struggle for oil is but one episode of the battle waged by the underdeveloped 
peoples to establish the control and sovereignty that is vested upon them toward the exploitation 
of natural resources’, so that such exploitation is ‘turned into an effective instrument of 
transformation and development that generates better life conditions for its peoples’.512 The 
military government’s claims show how the dominant meaning of development at the time 
influenced their motivations for national control over oil but also to join multilateral efforts with 
other landlord states. Jarrín Ampudia hoped to receive support from his OPEC partners in what 
would become a more decisive plan to nationalize oil in subsequent years.  
  
The nationalist strand of the Armed Forces set a plan to ‘partially and gradually’ nationalize the 
oil industry in Ecuador. The intention was to reach at least 51% control over exploitation and 
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exploration activities.513 Such goals were legitimized not only under the banner of national 
sovereignty but also in a larger process of international awakening of oil producers and the 
recognition of United Nations bodies of their right to exert control over their natural resources. 
Jarrín Ampudia gathered enough support to bring the annual OPEC meeting to Quito in 1974 as 
it joined the organization with full membership that year, becoming its President for a year. This 
was a significant source of pride for the military, including for Rodríguez Lara, who gave an 
exciting welcoming speech to OPEC member representatives. René Ortíz, then a young 
Ecuadorian technocrat who would later become an ambassador to OPEC and eventually 
Secretary General (the only Ecuadorian to ever hold this post), explained the importance of 
OPEC for his country. The significance of OPEC was focused on its ability to raise the problem 
of unequal terms of trade in a multilateral forum and thus engage in a north-south dialogue, and 
‘OPEC was an inherent part of the south because it was its only organization that actually had 
teeth’. 514  As discussed, the diffusion of development ideas and the multilateral action of 
organizations such as OPEC served as inspiration to countries such as Ecuador. 
 
Ecuador’s nationalization ambitions were carefully played out by both Jarrín Ampudia and 
Colonel René Vargas Pazzos (head of CEPE since 1972) and, in the case of the former, were 
accompanied by a pervasive sense of resource conservationism. Similar to Pérez Alfonzo in 
Venezuela, Jarrín Ampudia believed that oil prices were going to increase continuously and that 
by leaving untapped oil reserves, the country was actually appreciating its resources for future 
development plans.515 Furthermore, as Philip noted, Jarrín Ampudia’s conservationism also 
stemmed out of his concern over potential dramatic consequences a windfall of rents would have 
on the national economy. These views were clearly parallel to Pérez Alfonso’s ideas developed 
in the Venezuelan context and most certainly were the result of his influence.516 But it also had an 
important international dimension that turned Ecuador’s presence in multilateral forums a 
priority.  While Venezuela was prominent in the creation of OPEC as a major exporter at the 
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time, Ecuador played a key role in the creation of regional associations that sought similar unity 
among producers. That was the case of the Latin American Organization of Energy (OLADE, for 
its acronym in Spanish) based in Quito, and the ARPEL, the Organization for Latin American 
Petroleum Mutual Assistance centered on national oil companies. 
6.3.4. A nationalization forced upon us: Ecuador’s purchase of Gulf 
 
The fast advance of nationalist policies from the outset of Ecuador’s export activities quickly 
came to a halt when oil prices began a downward turn in 1974 and 1975 and investments started 
dwindling. The bargaining dynamics quickly impacted the state’s position. Foreign companies, 
particularly the largest ones, exerted various forms of political pressure to ease the financial 
burdens placed on them under Rodríguez Lara’s tenure. One main point of contention was the 
fixed tax levels per barrel automatically collected by the central bank. Companies fiercely 
pressured the regime to lower the price of the barrel for export and the subsequent tax level. 
Although the regime lowered the tax reference by US$0.43 per barrel, the companies kept 
pressuring for a further price change.517 This became a serious contention once OPEC decided on 
a 10% increase in the price of the Arabian peninsula light crude in September 1975 as a response 
to an increasing overflow of crude into the market.518  
 
At the end of 1975, the regime was increasingly weak, as conservative civilian opposition found 
an echo within sectors of the military. An expected coup d’état took place in January 1976 that 
replaced Rodríguez Lara with a triumvirate, which was seen as a move giving more influence to 
the more conservative strand of the military. Yet, Jarrín Ampudia’s nationalist group that had 
been in charge of natural resources remained influential and the triunviros promoted Vargas 
Pazzos as minister after he had served at CEPE for several years.519   
 
In 1976, Gulf Corporation was determined to force its own nationalization, seeking financial 
compensation. This desire was based on its disagreements with the government’s policies aimed 
at capturing greater profits. The company had been operating with low profits for some time in 
several countries and the situation in Ecuador worsened during the military regime. The 
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company was generally seeking a restructuring of its international operations and the Ecuadorian 
market was of little interest.520 According to Martz:  
The multinational felt that the quantity of Ecuadorian output, the aggravations 
of endless negotiations, and the broader need to streamline its international 
operations required an unyielding position. When this was unproductive, 
officials determined to force nationalization. From the government 
perspective, nationalists were predictably pleased, while conservatives were 
left with little choice.521 
Meanwhile, Texaco preferred to remain in the country. Texaco was able to export to its own 
subsidiaries abroad so it could cushion export costs more easily, but Gulf was selling directly to 
the international market and was less interested in continuing business in Ecuador. Furthermore, 
Texaco had friendlier relations with government officials. On top of this, it is important to 
highlight that the government remained largely dependent on company knowledge of oil reserves 
and other considerations key to the economic health of the industry. Some officials ‘seemed to 
derive their full knowledge of the industry from what they were told by the companies’.522 Gulf’s 
position reveals that when the conditions of the bargain shift in favor of host states, sometimes 
nationalization with state compensation may in fact be in the interest of foreign companies. 
Similarly, in the case of Venezuela, when foreign companies anticipated confiscation as per the 
1971 reversion law, they were no longer opposed to a faster nationalization process that included 
compensation (see chapter 3).  
 
René Vargas Pazzos presented a document to the cabinet early in 1976 entitled Petróleo: 
desarrollo y seguridad (Petroleum: development and security), rejecting Gulf’s request for a 1.05 
US dollar discount in prices. It assured that such discounts would simply increase the company’s 
profits with the excuse of requiring funds for further investments. Vargas argued that the 
previous year’s discount should have been geared toward investments to keep exports at the 
200,000 bpd levels, a figure that was already beginning to drop substantially. In this document 
Vargas concluded the need to assure ‘absolute state control over the industry’ not only in the 
production sector but also in ‘transport, commercialization and industrialization of 
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hydrocarbons’.523 While the cabinet had moved toward a more traditional current, the Ministry of 
Natural Resources remained in control of the nationalist strand. For this reason, Vargas Pazzos’ 
proposal was not received with enthusiasm by the rest of the cabinet. 
 
In 1976, the final dispute between Gulf and the government came about. Gulf sued Atlantic 
Richfield for receiving oil that apparently belonged to the CEPE-Texaco-Gulf consortium. CEPE 
was enforcing a decree that gave the national corporation rights over 25% of the exports. The 
25% was calculated under the 210,000 bpd assigned production instead of the actual 
production.524 Gulf insisted the oil belonged to the corporation because it had produced it. 
Meanwhile, CEPE demanded payment to the central bank of Gulf’s deposits for its exports, 
which had been lagging. The corporation, determined to force its nationalization, refused to 
deposit the funds. Gulf’s refusal led Vargas Pazzos to threaten confiscation if the debt was not 
paid. In September 1976, Vargas Pazzos announced the Ministry’s decision to move forward 
with the purchase of the Gulf’s 37.5% of the consortium once the payment had been received.  
 
It is unsurprising that Vargas Pazzos, who remains a nationalist advocate to this day, remembers 
this episode as an ‘expulsion’ of Gulf Corporation. For him: ‘Gulf did not abide by the law’, by 
refusing to deposit the value of its exports in the central bank according to OPEC prices. Thus—
he insists—‘I had to expel them’. And he continues: ‘I had frictions with the President, under the 
triunviros, and I eventually had to leave the ministry; they wanted me to back down on my 
decision but as a judge I did not backtrack and I expelled Gulf’.525 This provoked diplomatic 
reactions and the military itself was uncomfortable with the position into which it had been 
forced. The military leadership decided to go down a path of discreet negotiations with Gulf, 
something that César Robalino—then Minister of Finance and only civilian in the cabinet—
remembers clearly: ‘there were colonels [clear reference to Vargas] who wanted to be dictators 
themselves, they assumed that the three generals were not smart enough… at that point, the 
military put me in charge of the negotiations, and Vargas was left behind’.526 
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According to José Luis Fuentes, oil expert and university professor, ‘the state had to buy the 
corporation’; that is, it was forced into nationalization as Gulf was uninterested in continuing 
business in Ecuador. For Fuentes, ‘the state absorbed Gulf, but despite having majority shares, it 
was Texaco who really managed the consortium’.527 Rochlin agrees with this view and argues 
that this was largely due to Texaco’s ‘knowledge, technical capacity and capital’.528 This has led 
some to suggest that Texaco’s apparently neutral position vis-á-vis the dispute between Gulf and 
the state was intentional in order to end up controlling the most important wells of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon with a counterpart, CEPE, which was weak and largely dependent on 
Texaco’s own knowledge and capital. In the case of Gulf’s nationalization, the context in which 
it took places showed increasing state confidence and a general shift in the bargain that 
benefitted the host state. Nevertheless, foreign companies maintained considerable power and 
gained some benefits from the new arrangement as well. Gulf Corporation was uninterested in 
continuing business in the country, and its daring behaviour led the military to takeover its 
assets. Nationalization in this case was beneficial for both actors (the company and the 
nationalist strand of the military). The more moderate strand of the military, however, did not 
agree with nationalization. Meanwhile, Texaco remained in control of the industry as the most 
powerful stakeholder vis-á-vis the state. Being an effective duopoly, the Ecuadorian industry was 
highly concentrated, giving significant strength to Texaco and relative weakness to a nascent 
CEPE. 
 
In much of 1970s, the state treatment of foreign investment became considerably stringent. 
Toward the end the decade, the military took a more pragmatic stance with regards to foreign 
companies. Concessions were made in terms of the basket reference price and tax levels, while 
the regime favored an environment that promoted private investments. This accompanied a 
process of gradual normalization of political life that would end with elections in 1979, putting 
an end to nine years of dictatorship and the first decade of significant oil production and oil 
exports. Even at the peak of its nationalism, Ecuador was never able to nationalize the upstream 
of its oil industry like Mexico or Venezuela did, and its capacity to control the largest operating 
consortium was questionable. This limitation was due mainly to conflicting ideological positions 
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within the military regimes, as part of the armed forces opposed full-fledged nationalization. 
This opposition was partly a result of fears that the state and CEPE lacked the knowledge and 
technical capacity to carry out extraction on their own. Nationalist ideals and notions of 
development influenced state behavior during this period, but the dynamics of the oil price 
allowed carrying out some of these policies, especially between 1972 and 1974. At this point, the 
state reached a remarkable 80% appropriation of profits. However, due to the dynamics of state-
foreign company bargaining, the decline in oil prices meant that these nationalist tendencies 





The oriente seemed to be a myth for much of Ecuador’s history. Once oil was found in the 
Amazon, however, more than the resource itself, control of the industry was really the elusive 
goal of the Ecuadorian state. In this chapter, I analyzed the relationship of the state and foreign 
companies, especially in the 1970s. The state’s treatment of foreign investment changed 
considerably with the rise of a nationalist military regime. The military was able to change the 
conditions of the industry, taking advantage of high prices to seize a larger proportion of the rent 
price, which eventually rose to 80%.   
 
In the 1970s, pressures stemming from nationalist sectors of the military pushed a nationalist 
agenda. This agenda was characterized by a desire to obtain at least 51% of assets from the main 
oil extractive consortium in the country. It was also infused with notions of development 
strongly associated with the sovereign use of natural resources. Ecuador embraced an identity of 
small primary producer and, as such, acted decisively to join other exporter nations in various 
multilateral initiatives, mainly OPEC, in order to give strength to its claims and voice 
internationally. Ecuador’s integration to the world economy was central to its own oil 
nationalism, joining to and forging multilateral organizations that advanced primary exporters’ 
interests. Subjectively, the military elite was identified with broader nationalist processes in the 
region and saw itself as part of the larger third-worldist movement. The military therefore 
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instrumentalized its own nationalist policies with a broader desire to join multilateral efforts 
around the use of natural resources for development purposes. 
 
The military did not fully nationalize Texaco-Gulf, but it took over the Gulf Corporation assets, 
reaching majority shares in a consortium with Texaco. The actual appropriation of Gulf assets by 
the triumvirate was the result of long standing disputes with the company, and the expropriation 
was partly prompted by Gulf itself as a result of intra-firm maneuvers. Consistent with 
obsolescing bargain insights, the position of the Ecuadorian state improved as the price of oil 
increased.529The Ecuadorian state’s increased confidence and attitude toward foreign companies 
led Gulf Corporation to re-consider its presence in the country, demonstrating the shift in the 
bargaining power that gradually benefited the state. As I have mentioned, however, state-foreign 
companies’ relations are also significantly affected by internal ideational contestations. Even in 
the context of a military dictatorship, the state did not operate as a unitary actor. In fact, for the 
entire decade there were different factions within the military government that disagreed on the 
extent of the nationalist reach the state should take over the oil industry. During times of strong 
nationalist attitudes, the state was still unable to build a NOC that was strong enough to exercise 
the control it was normatively entitled to, maintaining dependence on Texaco. In this case, the 
highly concentrated nature of the industry affected the bargaining position of the host state.  
  
                                                            





The politics of give away: 




With the end of the military government in Ecuador, a system of party democracy was 
established in the early 1980s. Democratic governance came in tandem with a deep economic 
crisis and the collapse of state-led development. In the context of a highly indebted economy, the 
multi-party liberal democracy established in Ecuador was associated with neoliberal reforms. 
These reforms followed a decade of relative prosperity and even social inclusion, despite the 
authoritarian nature of the military regimes. A dual process of formal democratization with 
economic liberalization took place during more than two decades. This dual process provoked a 
drastic opening to foreign investment, especially in the oil sector. This opening was intended for 
the purpose of expanding exploration and extraction in new areas of the Amazon, as a way to 
boost production. One of the fundamental aims of the government in this period was to fulfill its 
debt obligations.   
 
In the Ecuadorian case, I argue, the political elite embraced neoliberalism, mostly as a result of 
the country’s economic situation but also due to an ideological commitment to liberal ideas and a 
tacit alliance with foreign capital interests. Opening the oil industry to foreign investment 
became a fundamental tool to attract foreign currency, and increase oil output. The conditions of 
the bargain were clearly beneficial for investors. While Ecuador’s position in the global energy 
market is marginal and the low levels of oil prices also weakened its position, state officials 
willingly offered better conditions to companies, even at times when such conditions were not 
granted by the preconceived arrangements.530 The consensus around neoliberal reforms was 
therefore a prime motivation for changes in the oil policy, as state officials often made bolder 
moves to the benefit of IOCs than the material conditions of the bargain would have favored. In 
the 1990s, for example, the government changed contracts on sunk assets to improve the 
conditions for IOCs even further than what the already welcoming framework offered.  
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For these reasons, the 1990s is cast in the literature as an era of entreguismo or ‘give away’ of 
the nation’s resources to foreign capital.531 The government implemented policy mechanisms and 
pursued infrastructure projects precisely designed to channel the proceeds from oil extraction to 
service foreign debt. New areas of the country became targets for investment and extraction, 
including the exploration and exploitation of marginal fields and unconventional crudes. At this 
time, popular resistance to neoliberal reforms and to resource extraction began to articulate an 
alternative social alliance that would later rise to power in the mid-2000s. This type of resistance 
was found outside of the state, although oil workers from the country’s NOC were important 
allies in the struggles against neoliberalism.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it discusses the service contracts signed in the 1980s 
as the initial attempts to welcome foreign investments. Second, it analyzes the era of more 
radical neoliberal embrace by conservative governments and the start of social unrest and protest 
against these policies. Third, it explores the more advanced policies that at the beginning of the 
2000s were implemented to lock in neoliberal reforms. Infrastructure projects and financial 
instruments such as funds from oil revenues were designed expressly to fund foreign debt and, 
together with dollarization, limited state action in the economy. 
 
7.2. Adjustment after an oil feast: trading oil control for stability 
 
The expansive policy of the military during the 1970s was characterized by its attempt to 
advance a state-led development project based on oil revenues. In short, ‘the military 
government[s] used oil revenues to finance tax breaks, offer credit, subsidize energy and food, 
and embark on an ambitious project to build Ecuador’s infrastructure and social services’.532 This 
included the oil sector itself as massive investments were made to develop the Esmeraldas 
refinery and to build the Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline (SOTE) as well as other important energy 
infrastructure. Yet an important caveat is that ‘when oil did not cover the costs, the military used 
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future oil production as leverage for obtaining international credit’.533 This is the sometimes-
ignored reality that went hand in hand with nationalist policies of the 1970s; debt represented the 
remedy for capital shortages in a context of large investments and increasing inflow of 
petrodollars.534 Foreign debt had risen from US$260.8 million in 1971 to over US$5.8 billion in 
1981.535  
 
The plans for industrialization and increased diversification of the economy fell short of the 
original aspirations of the military, as they did for much of the developing world at the time. 
Larrea and North’s findings on this issue are worth noting in detail: 
Manufacturing industry was highly dependent on imported inputs and capital 
goods (especially so among the largest enterprises), thus contributing to the 
indebtedness of the country; lacked vertical integration; focused on the production 
of non-essential goods for high income urban groups; displayed a high degree of 
inter-sectoral and regional concentration; and was capital intensive, generating 
little direct or indirect employment.536 
The system of protection to the industrial sector was largely inefficient, as most enterprises never 
managed to become internationally competitive. Meanwhile, a significant portion of the 
indebtedness in the previous decade had been acquired by private enterprises once the more 
conservative wing of the military had assumed power in 1976.537   
 
After 1980, it was clear to democratically elected governments, generally infused with the 
growing ideas of neoliberalism, that the state had to commit to broad reforms geared toward 
increasing oil production. This was not possible without opening up to more foreign investments 
under a more friendly framework because CEPE, and the state in general, lacked the capacity to 
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do so on its own. Virtually all administrations from 1980 onward signed agreements with the 
IMF and other multilateral agencies to adjust Ecuador’s economy and attempt to make it 
competitive according to international standards. In the remainder of this chapter, I will detail the 
different transformations of the regulatory framework of the oil industry in relation to foreign 
investment and will highlight the importance of wider neoliberal reforms in as much as they 
relate directly to the oil industry.538  
 
The first democratically elected President, Jaime Roldós (1979-1981) from the Concentración de 
Fuerzas Populares (Concentration of Popular Forces, CFP), a left-leaning reformist promised to 
bring about social justice with respect for property rights. The Roldós administration published 
its twenty-one programmatic points, having oil policy at the center. One major concern was the 
need for investment for exploration in order to increase reserves. The increased rates of domestic 
energy consumption threatened the expansion of oil revenues to the state as exploration and 
development had drastically stagnated since the late 1970s. Roldós died in a plane crash in 1981, 
which forced his Vice-President, Osvaldo Hurtado, to become President for the remainder of the 
tenure and to implement the first round of reforms after the dictatorship. 
 
7.2.1. Service contracts: seeking investments while trying not to lose control 
  
In 1982, president Hurtado introduced the first major reform to the Law of Hydrocarbons by 
allowing service contracts to be enacted.539 These service contracts were designed for exploration 
and exploitation in ‘risk areas’ or places where there may be finds that are not commercially 
viable.540 Under this arrangement, the state preserved strict ownership over the resource and 
foreign companies were ‘hired to offer technical, administrative or financial services’.541 If they 
found oil ‘the Ecuadorian state reimbursed all exploration costs and paid multinationals for their 
services rendered’.542 This model was known also as ‘risk-service contracts’. The state reserved 
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for itself a margin of 15% profits regardless of the production, transport and administrative costs 
foreign companies incurred. Technical calculations determined that the companies had to find at 
least 60 million barrels of crude in order for a well to be considered commercially viable (see 
Table 7.1 below). 543  Ideally, CEPE—later Petroecuador—would monitor companies’ 
expenditures in order to fairly assess reimbursements. In this way, the new democratic 
government attempted to open the country for the much-needed investment without—at least in 
theory—losing state control over the industry.  
 
Under this contractual mechanism, the government opened up six rounds of negotiations and 
from 1985 onward signed 13 contracts with foreign companies that started exploration in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. All of these contracts were signed under the presidency of León Febres 
Cordero (1984-1988), from the Partido Social Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PSC), 
which involved over 3 million hectares, 46 exploratory wells and around US$380 million in 
projected investments.544 While six exploratory wells were deemed not commercially viable, six 
companies were allowed to start extraction later on. Among those service contracts was that of 
Occidental in block 15 and AGIP in block 10.545 
 
After the liberal administration of Febres Cordero, a center left government was elected under 
the leadership of Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992), from Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left,  
ID). Borja found it difficult to resist the influence of the IMF, and he negotiated a basic IMF-
backed loan but refused to further liberalize the oil sector by not opening new rounds of 
negotiations for service contracts.546 During his tenure, Texaco’s concession expired and was not 
renewed. At the end of the 1980s, Ecuador’s foreign debt, which consistently reached over 100% 
debt to GDP ratio from 1986 until 1992, had become increasingly unmanageable.547 Still, Borja 
resisted attempts at privatizing CEPE and turned it into Petroecuador—a modern NOC ideally 
intended to increase state investments in the sector. At that point, it possessed all the yields 
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formerly owned by Texaco-Gulf and CEPE-Texaco, ‘the jewels of the crown’, having the 
capacity to extract and export the lightest crude of the Amazon. Acquiring possession of the 
jewels of the crown was an important cleavage point for Ecuador’s politics of resources.  
 
Yet, as debt became an asphyxiating reality, neoliberal policies of adjustment emerged as the 
alternative for the government. These same policies reinforced certain structural conditions such 
as soaring inequality, giving the possibility for the rise of an unexpected political force through 
indigenous peoples. For Sawyer, ‘economic reforms undermined the very conditions that lent 
legitimacy and authority to the state’s political system—its purported concern for its national 
subjects—and gave rise to new political subjects who disrupted the confines and exposed the 
hypocrisy of the neoliberal dream’.548 Oil was precisely at the center both of rising opposition 
movements and of the hegemonic political system that sought to stabilize the economy and repay 
foreign creditors. 
 
Table 7.1 Evolution of the contractual relationship between state and extractive companies 
in Ecuador (1980s-1990s) 
 
Period Most prevalent type of 
contract 
Regulatory features Financial features 
1982-1993 Service contracts o Risk-service contracts 
geared toward receiving 
fresh investments for new 
exploration and 
exploitation.  
o The state ought to 
oversee companies’ costs 
and reimburse them granted 
that commercial viable 
yields were found. 
o The state reserved for 
itself 15% of revenues for 
exploitation, regardless of 
transport and 
commercialization costs.  
 
1993-2007 Production sharing 
agreements 
o All service contracts 
were transferred to 
production sharing.  
o State and companies 
divided the output on pre-
arranged terms block by 
block.  
o Roughly 80% of 
production went to 
foreign companies and 
20% went to the state. 
o Income tax was 
reduced and no royalties 
or primes were charged. 
                                                            




7.3 Embracing liberalism: production-sharing contracts and oil policy U-turn  
 
Under the government of conservative president Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996) from the PSC, 
the most dramatic transformations of oil policies began. First, an assessment committee was set 
up to evaluate the oil contracts giving commercial viability to wells that did not satisfy the basic 
requirements established by law. Because of this, companies were compensated even when they 
were not entitled to such reimbursement. Moreover, critical studies suggest that the intended 
oversight did not happen and companies were always reimbursed in full or even at inflated rates 
once they started exploitation.549  
 
Second, Durán Ballén made Ecuador withdraw from OPEC as early as 1992 in order to allow 
companies to produce above the imposed quota of 275,000 bpd.550 This decision meant a 
significant turn in Ecuador’s long-lasting stance on articulating an international platform in 
defense of producers’ interests. The government also abandoned its commitment to conservation 
as promoted by Jarrín Ampudia. Increased production could only be guaranteed under a more 
flexible environment and was geared toward paying off international debt. In contrast to 
Venezuela, where increasing production was the result of a strategic decision by PDVSA, in 
Ecuador, increasing output was inherent to the neoliberal paradigm that was implemented to 
service foreign debt. 
 
Third, the government requested that Congress amend the Hydrocarbons Law in 1993 to include 
a new type of contract known as ‘production sharing contracts’ and contracts of ‘marginal fields’ 
under Law 44. With this new flexible policy and unrestricted by OPEC quotas, the state was 
determined to increase production. Increasing production made it necessary to build a new 
pipeline in addition to increasing SOTE’s capacity to transport oil. Under production sharing 
contracts, corporate tax rates for foreign companies was lowered to 36.25%. Companies were 
exempt from paying royalties and surface taxes. Most importantly, the regulatory mechanism to 
adjudicate a contract was relaxed in order for the government to sign them without congressional 
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approval.551 These contracts consisted of foreign concessionaires’ participation with the state in 
the production of crude oil. Based on a reference price and market price of the barrel, the 
contracts determined what portion of the extracted crude belonged to the state and what portion 
belonged to the company.552  
 
As part of the adjustment plans pursued by the government in 1994, Durán Ballén’s 
administration signed the ‘most aggressive letter of intention with the IMF’ that had been 
approved to date in the country.553 This agreement pushed forward second-generation adjustment 
reforms that impacted several social and economic provisions. César Robalino, then Minister of 
Finance, argues that Ecuador had to offer a series of guarantees to the lenders because previous 
governments had eroded the country’s credibility. In an interview he stated: ‘we had to adjust the 
economy, so we first made a short-term program. First item on our list was freeing the gasoline 
prices’. Later, he said, the government had to face social resistance: ‘we faced all sorts of street 
protests, the youth, university students, transport workers. But it went well. And thanks to those 
adjustments we were able to sign a deal with the IMF. From then on, Ecuador was more reliable, 
we started paying the debt’.554  
 
The IMF-backed set of reforms was geared toward a comprehensive market-led change in the 
governance of the country. Accordingly, government approved a law of state modernization and 
privatization that included downstream resource activities such as commercialization, transport 
and storage. Public utilities such as electricity generation, telecommunications and water 
production and distribution were also privatized.555 As Pablo Dávalos argues, these reforms 
included different forms of social intervention by multilateral agents, most notably the World 
Bank, IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank but also bilateral development agents 
from northern countries.556 The comprehensive market reforms were geared toward servicing 
foreign debt, but were also in the interest of national elites and financial sectors, many of whom 
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held Ecuador’s foreign-denominated bonds. This kind of reform falls in line with what 
Hochstetler and Montero label as ‘pro-business’, 557  but unlike what happened in strong 
developmentalist states such as Brazil and other emerging powers, in the case of Ecuador, the 
reforms did not simultaneously strengthen state sectoral policies. Instead, these reforms favored 
market governance mechanisms that benefited foreign and local business to the detriment of state 
regulation. 
 
In terms of the oil policy, the state’s participation in production of crude would vary depending 
on the volumes extracted and the investments procured. The minimum state participation was set 
at 12.5%.558 From 1995, the government signed consecutive contracts under the framework of 
production sharing. Tarapoa was the first one signed with City Investing, migrating three years 
before its expiry from an association contract agreed to in the 1970s under Rodríguez Lara. 
Negotiations on Blocks 21 and 27 reached agreements later on with Oryx and City Oriente and 
other minor investors. In 1996, the interim government of Abdalá Bucaram signed a production-
sharing contract with Maxus for block 16.559 This block had been under operation through a 
service contract signed by Hurtado’s administration. After this point, the presidencies of Abdalá 
Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad would migrate all but one of the service contracts signed under 
Hurtado and Febres Cordero to production-sharing contracts.560  
 
In general, the ‘participation’ of the state varied from just below 20% to around 40% in rare 
cases, but most production-sharing contracts ended up benefitting the operating private firm.561 
According to Esperanza Martínez, a leading activist from non-governmental organization Acción 
Ecológica, the era of entreguismo (give away) was characterized by the change of contracts 
expressly to benefit companies to the detriment of the state. She observes that ‘there were service 
contracts while companies were making large investments and were being compensated 
entirely’, yet as soon as extraction began ‘they switched to production-sharing where the state 
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kept only 20% of profits’. Clearly, this shift illustrated ‘an inversed relationship from the times 
of the military regime’.562 Although the proportions vary on a block-by-block case, on average 
the state retained less than 30% of profits from oil extraction under production-sharing contracts 
(see Table 7.1 above).563  
 
In other words, the evolution of oil policy during the 1980s and 1990s showed a stark shift in the 
balance of bargaining power toward IOCs. In the early 1980s, as the Hurtado government sought 
new investments, service contracts were agreed upon, which assured reimbursements to investors 
once commercially viable deposits were found. Later, as it was found, all investors were 
reimbursed regardless of the viability of their discoveries, demonstrating the commitment of 
state officials to serve the interest of foreign capital. Once the investments were made and 
production began in the 1990s, contracts were changed again. Here, instead of taking advantage 
of sunk investments as the obsolescing bargaining insights would suggest, the state proceeded to 
sign production-sharing agreements, which improved the conditions for foreign companies even 
further. This was testament of the government’s commitment to policies of liberalization. Oil 
policy was framed in a wider wave of comprehensive policies that tended to privatize public 
enterprises. Ecuador’s political elite’s commitment to neoliberal ideology went much deeper than 
it ever did within the Venezuelan political apparatus, which was still in the early 1990s strongly 
divided on this matter. Similarly, the forces of the left in Ecuador were found mostly in social 
movements and civil society organizations and were much less represented in political parties 
and Congress. At this point, alternative forces were weaker in Ecuador than in Venezuela, where 
the left remained represented in Congress throughout the 1990s. 
 
Petroecuador and the office of the Comptroller General found major irregularities in the 
management, adjudication and assessment of both types of contracts.564 For instance, in 1995, 
Texaco-Chevron was released from liability in important cases of oil spills documented by 
activists and local communities of the Amazon during its time in the region since the mid-
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twentieth century until the end of the 1980s. It was recorded that Chevron paid US$40 million 
for the purpose of ‘cleaning up’ its damage, and freeing itself from any liability.565 Local 
communities and activists managed to bring forward a lawsuit against Texaco-Chevron, which 
meant an important mobilization that reached transnational levels and helped activate Indigenous 
organizations as political actors with significant influence in the country.566  
 
Interestingly, during the neoliberal period—generally marked by liberal adjustments and 
openness—Petroecuador suffered from an important financial intervention by the state.567 The 
most liberal period of Ecuador’s oil policy decreased rather than augmented Petroecuador’s 
autonomy. The company’s profits were all captured by the central bank, including the 10% that 
was formerly destined to the Fund of Petroleum Investments. These funds were now channeled 
directly to honor foreign debt.568 There was a progressive decline in the capacity of Petroecuador 
to execute extractive operations, which led to a slowdown in production in the fields of highest 
quality (those formerly owned by Texaco-Gulf).569 The state seemed to deliberately undermine its 
own NOC’s technical capacity. There was at this time a significant loss in output coming from 
the jewels of the crown, which coincidentally, were the camps with lighter and more profitable 
crude. Conservative governments such as those headed by Durán Ballén and Febres Cordero, 
preferred to leave the bulk of the oil business to foreign companies rather than also strengthening 
the state’s capacity in that realm, even if it meant decreasing output. As explained in chapter 4, 
the Venezuelan case was precisely the opposite, because since the 1970s and especially during 
the 1990s, PDVSA managed to decrease the company’s fiscal burden, augmenting its 
autonomy.570  
 
Political instability and economic hardships marked the 1990s as Ecuador faced important belt-
tightening policies and its political elite was stained with corruption scandals that led three 
consecutive elected presidents to cut short their term in office. By the end of the decade, new 
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contracts began to be negotiated as ‘contracts of marginal fields’. These contracts were assigned 
for distant and difficult to extract areas, places where Petroecuador lacked infrastructure and 
projects that required costly investments. Beginning in the year 1999 under the government of 
Jamil Mahuad, marginal fields contracts were signed.571 This decisively pushed the frontier of 
Ecuador’s extraction to sensitive areas where environmental impact has been reported to be of 
great damage, affecting not only the Amazon’s biodiversity but also the livelihood of Indigenous 
nations, including some in voluntary isolation.572 Under these contracts, the state set a baseline of 
extraction, it reimbursed the production costs to the company and once production has exceeded 
the base goal, the rest of the oil is divided between state and company in pre-arranged terms.573  
 
The Ecuadorian economy was struck by a deep economic recession at the end of the 1990s. In 
1999 alone, the sucre was devalued by 216% and inflation rose to over 90%.574 The price of 
Ecuadorian oil was as low as US$7, and the economy had the most dramatic contraction in its 
contemporary history. Per capital GDP shrunk around 32% with a consequent increase in poverty 
and inequality.575 There were signs of critical conditions in the banking sector that provoked the 
bankruptcy of several banks and a process of onerous bail-outs from the state provoked 
indignation and opposition from civil society.576 In a context of deep recession and high inflation 
(not yet hyperinflation), the government of Mahuad proceeded to implement a controversial and 
drastic measure of dollarization set to start in March of the year 2000 to impede further capital 
flight. The promise of dollarization was to bring inflation to international rates and increase 
Ecuador’s competitiveness by providing stability to economic actors. Critical authors pointed out 
the inconvenience of this measure, labeling it a ‘jump to the precipice’ that was not sufficiently 
debated and apparently based on faulty assumptions about the state of the economy and the 
promise of stability.577 Dollarization may have been a policy borne out of emergency, but it also 
served to lock in neoliberal reforms that had been underway. As it will become evident, 
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dollarization has significantly hampered the Ecuadorian state’s capacity to advance alternative 
policy routes in the midst of the post-neoliberal turn.  
 
Social movements and Petroecuador workers—who feared its privatization—staunchly opposed 
the Mahuad government and its neoliberal policies. Petroecuador’s trade union held an important 
strike against the government that affected oil production.578 A popular rebellion led by the most 
important Indigenous organization, the CONAIE, and middle-to-low ranks of the military forced 
the ousting of Mahuad’s government in the early weeks of the year 2000. The then Vice-
President, Gustavo Noboa, assumed the presidency on January 22, after a short-lived military 
junta was dissolved.579 This rebellion brought lieutenant Lucio Gutiérrez to the fore as a visible 
leader from the military to rise against the government.    
 
7.4. Channeling heavy crude and heavy funds: from the subsoil to global markets 
 
Nearing the turn of the century, Ecuador had managed to increase production, in part at the 
expense of Petroecuador’s technical capacity and thanks to the increase in foreign investment. 
An initial implication of this increased production was the saturation of SOTE pipeline to near its 
full capacity. Moreover, the influx of crudes with varying quality into the SOTE system 
produced the Oriente blend that was ‘penalized’ in the international oil market for its heavier 
character.580 The oil initially produced in the northern part of the Amazon has properties of 
around 29º API, making it a good quality, relatively light crude.581 As Ecuadorian production 
rose with the reforms initiated in 1993, crude from other parts of the Amazon began to flow 
through the pipeline, turning it denser and less attractive. Most importantly, the lighter crude was 
being used to dilute the heavier oil produced by foreign companies.  
 
In order to attract more investments and increase the value of the Oriente blend, the presidency 
of Gustavo Noboa approved the construction of the heavy crude pipeline (OCP, for its name in 
Spanish). The OCP was completely built and maintained by a foreign consortium to transport 
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around 400,000 barrels per day. A consortium of AGIP Oil, EnCana, Occidental Petroleum, 
Perenco and Petrobras built this 500km long project, for US$ 1.1 billion in a period of two years, 
ending in 2003.582 It was intended to transport crude produced in fields operated by foreign 
corporations, leaving SOTE for Petroecuador’s fields exclusively. The construction of the OCP 
was highly criticized by different groups. Petroecuador workers argued against the construction 
of OCP because of the threat it posed to the localities it went through, but also due to the social 
and environmental implications it would have for depleting reserves.583 Local communities 
joined their protest opposing it for its environmental consequences and the increasing power of 
foreign companies.584  
 
Valdivia argues that OCP became a ‘technology of rule and discipline through which state 
officials rationalized the participation of private companies in petroleum extraction as beneficial 
for the Ecuadorian people’.585 Most importantly, the OCP was also part of a larger architecture 
for channeling oil rents to global (and domestic) markets through other, seemingly apolitical, 
tools of government. Both the construction of new infrastructure and oil funds were key in 
feeding rents to bond holders. These infrastructure and monetary policies were geared toward 
enhancing the state’s ability to service foreign debt, illustrating the government’s commitment to 
structural adjustment plans. 
 
Despite being elected in 2003 on a populist platform labeled Sociedad Patriótica (Patriotic 
Society) with the support of Pachakutik after leading the rebellion against Mahuad, Lucio 
Gutiérrez quickly shifted his anti-establishment rhetoric to deepen market-driven reforms. 
Gutiérrez’s government, expecting the initial operation of the OCP, decided to create a sovereign 
wealth fund named the Stabilization, Social and Productive Investment, and Reduction of Public 
Indebtedness Fund (FEIREP, for its name in Spanish). FEIREP integrated a previously created 
fund, the Fund of Petroleum Stabilization (FEP, for its name in Spanish) that was fed with rents 
that exceeded the budgeted oil basket. The FEP was created to finance a Trans Amazonian 
expressway, various development projects and police, but a significant portion (45%) would be 
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used to finance the debt.586 FEIREP, in turn, integrated the FEP’s 45% geared to pay the debt, 
and the resources coming from the state use of OCP and heavy crude exports. This measure 
increased significantly the value of Ecuadorian sovereign bonds and meant an important transfer 
of funds to bondholders, many of whom were Ecuadorian nationals from elite sectors of society.  
 
The Gutiérrez administration produced technical changes that would back the channeling of 
more funds to FEIREP. First, since oil produced by Petroecuador never exceeded SOTE’s 
capacity and the company did not need to use OCP, the government changed the way ‘heavy 
crude’ was determined. By law, heavy crude was to be considered any crude of 23º API or less, 
as opposed to previous standard of 18º API.587 This way, all proceeds coming from heavy crudes 
would be channeled to FEIREP regardless of the pipeline used. Second, the government 
consistently budgeted conservatively so that the FEP would always be funded. As an example, in 
2005 the national budget calculated the oil basket at US$25, but the annual average was 
US$40.588 In order to lock in neoliberal reforms, the government also promoted a law that put a 
cap on public spending at 3.5% of the GDP. Acosta argues that by limiting public spending, the 
government would incur deficits that would force its acquisition of more foreign financing.589  
 
The use of techno-political artifices to cement structural adjustments was intrinsically linked 
with oil governance and the expansion of foreign investment and foreign companies’ production. 
Interestingly, the Venezuelan government would later implement similar measures for 
completely opposite purposes. Instead of creating oil funds to pay off bondholders, it would 
conservatively budget its oil proceeds to feed funds for discretionary use and wealth 
redistribution (see chapter 5). In both cases—one in principle neoliberal and the other rentier 
socialist—oil funds were political in nature.  
 
Gutiérrez’s government was the last committed to the neoliberal model and open treatment of 
foreign investment. As Larrea succinctly puts it, this phase was characterized by ‘low prices, 
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neoliberal policies and opening to foreign investments’.590 For Larrea, Ecuador’s indebtedness 
became a ‘chronic problem’; the country was so indebted that ‘the capacity to productively 
reinvest oil rents was insignificant and all resources coming from oil income went to pay the 
debt, which kept on increasing’.591 Even though Gutiérrez signed more marginal contracts and 
created new contractual agreements for specific projects and services, there was resistance from 
society that impeded further transformations. One major initiative in his administration was to 
open Petroecuador’s mature yields for foreign investment under strategic associations or joint 
ventures. Giving up the crown jewels to foreign corporations was deemed high treason by 
various critical observers, including Rafael Correa, an economics professor at the time, who was 
outspoken about the government policies through the media.592 Social movements strongly 
resisted Gutiérrez’s neoliberal policies and allegedly corrupted government. For the third time in 
a row, a President was ousted due to popular pressure in 2005. Alfredo Palacio, then Vice-
President, took on the reins of government with the intention to start a reformist agenda that 
included acquiescing to long-lasting social demands to better regulate the oil industry, especially 
in relation to its socio-environmental implications. The new cabinet included Rafael Correa, who 
would become the leading voice of an alternative popular movement galvanizing indigenous 
groups, urban working classes, critical intellectuals and environmental organizations.  
 
By the mid-2000s, the matrix of oil extraction in Ecuador had been dramatically transformed 
from the years of the military regime. Foreign companies extracted more oil than Petroecuador 
(formerly CEPE) did and the state accrued around 20% of oil benefits. In contrast, during the 
1970s, most of the oil extracted came from the wells of CEPE-Texaco, and before 1975, CEPE-
Texaco-Gulf. As discussed, during that time, around 80% of profits went to state coffers. In the 
22-year period between 1982 and 2004 the mechanisms of association between the state and 
foreign companies changed dramatically (see table 7.1 above). They went from association 
contracts (1970s), to service contracts (1980s), to production-sharing and marginal contracts 
(1990s). Association contracts included high levels of government intervention through tax and 
non-tax burdens. Service contracts were characterized by attracting new investments, with state 
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commitments to reimburse exploration and extraction costs. These contracts signified the 
changing conditions of the bargain as the state needed to attract new investments for new 
exploratory projects. Finally, production-sharing and marginal contracts shifted the balance in 
favor of the foreign companies even further, once those explorations had been successful. 
Production-sharing agreements were contracts on which only minimal tax burdens were 
imposed. These contracts split production a priori, giving roughly 80% of volume to companies 
and 20% to the state. 
 
In relation to the 1970s, the main shift in the 1990s in Ecuador occurred in the ideational realm. 
These production-sharing contracts were signed at times of low prices but, most importantly, a 
larger process of economic adjustment and neoliberal restructuring influenced them. This 
ideational shift was especially stark possibly due to the change of political regime, from a 
national-developmentalist military regime to a more traditional elite-led party democracy.   
 
The geography of extraction was also transformed in this period as the extractive frontier moved 
south and east from the traditional north Amazon area where Texaco-Gulf originally discovered 
oil. Heavier and unconventional crude became the object of extraction. Further, this 
transformation meant increasing tensions with marginal populations of the Amazon and the 
gradual germination of new political actors. Indigenous peoples were politically active, resisting 
extractive activities that were considered harmful to their communities for much of the 1990s. 
This activism, in association with local NGOs, transcended national borders in the case against 
Texaco.593 Moreover, indigenous activists as well as oil workers were pivotal in the political 
transformations that led to the ousting of several presidents from office. During this time, these 
social actors did not operate from within the state apparatus but consistently resisted state action 
from the outside. Notwithstanding, the neoliberal process empowered new actors that would also 
shift and coalesce around a new ‘post-neoliberal’ consensus between environmentalists, technic-
political agents in NGOs and social movements.  
 
                                                            






The transition from military rule to party democracy in Ecuador took place in unison with the 
collapse of a state-led developmental model. Since the 1980s, the adjustment policies 
implemented in Ecuador were associated with the possibility of increasing oil output. A new 
model of state-IOC relations was enhanced, wherein the priority focused on welcoming 
investments to expand extractive activities. In fact, new oil contracts were signed to welcome 
investments in new areas of the Amazon, which had remained untapped. Government efforts 
went primarily to expand foreign companies’ production. New contracts were signed in the 
1990s and infrastructure projects were built in order to channel this increasing output. The legal 
and contractual framework that governed oil extraction was systematically modified to benefit 
foreign companies. 
 
This chapter argued that the terms of the bargain systematically improved for foreign companies. 
I have further argued that this shift, beyond the objective conditions of the bargain, was the result 
of a wide ideational consensus around market-led governance mechanisms. Rather than merely 
an outcome of deteriorating bargaining conditions, demonstrated by a new investment cycle and 
a context of low oil price, the open period of the 1980s and 1990s in Ecuador responded 
primarily to the agreement of the governing elites with liberal policies. These governance 
mechanisms meant adopting IMF-imposed policies and gradually transforming state action to let 
economic and non-state agents operate more freely. The ultimate goal of oil-related reforms was 
to service foreign debt, benefitting national and international bondholders. During the more 
liberal phases of low oil prices and high debt service, Petroecuador was weakened and used as a 
tool for servicing foreign debt.594 At the beginning of 2000, dollarization became another policy 
tool to entrench neoliberalism by constraining the state’s monetary policy.  
 
The changes in the legal and political arrangements of the country that configured these new 
associations provoked the expansion of extractive activities to new frontiers, with social and 
environmental consequences that would later activate new political actors. Two interlinked 
processes took place: on the one hand, new nationalist sentiments emerged due to what some 
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considered the ‘give away’ of the nation’s wealth; and, on the other, environmentalist and 
Indigenous groups rose against the negative impacts of resource extraction. For a short period, an 
alliance between these sectors became crucial in the construction of a political alternative that 
has continued implications today. The evolution of that alliance in relation to foreign investment 





‘We can’t be beggars sitting on a sack of gold’: 




In the previous chapter, I analyzed the shift in the state treatment of foreign investment to an 
open regime that invited and benefited investors. I argued that despite the underlying material 
conditions, which strongly favored foreign companies, the ideational consensus around 
neoliberalism played a primary role in this shift. A testament of the influence neoliberalism had 
on the changes in government behavior was the fact that throughout the 1990s, the state chose to 
transform the legal arrangements of oil extraction to further benefit foreign corporations even 
after the initial investment cycle had been committed. Beyond the change in contractual 
arrangements with foreign companies, other structural transformations during this period 
significantly constrained the state’s ability to engage in meaningful sovereign policy-making. 
Undoubtedly, the most important one of these was dollarization. Moreover, the expansion of the 
extractive frontier and the increase in oil exploitation provoked the eruption of political activism 
against extractivism, while also questioning the legality of foreign companies’ investments.  
 
Building upon this history, in this chapter I trace the reemergence of resource nationalism in 
Ecuador in the 2000s. The model that has prevailed from the mid-2000s is a hybrid one where 
the state pursued association with foreign companies while trying to obtain a greater portion of 
the industry’s profit. In this model, the government was motivated by the fact that higher oil 
prices meant surrendering potential windfall rents, which under the production-sharing 
agreements went entirely to IOCs. In the context of a commodity price boom, the state was 
encouraged to change the terms of association to increase its share in the industry’s profits. 
Investments from the 1990s had been largely sunk in the Amazon region at the time of Correa’s 
arrival to power.  
 
The ideas that shaped this shift centered on state officials’ understanding of national sovereignty 
over natural resources, which conflicted with the terms of the existing contracts. Therefore, for 
the government, production-sharing agreements betrayed the national interest. Correa’s 
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government thus forced a complete contractual shift to service contracts, arguing that this shift 
best preserved national sovereignty. Nevertheless, due to Ecuador’s continued inability to build a 
strong NOC and its relatively marginal role in the global oil market (with unattractive reserve 
levels), service contracts continue to benefit foreign corporations, despite the nationalist 
sentiments that provided their impetus. Finally, Ecuador’s renewed developmentalism 
encouraged the expansion of its extractive frontier, relying on the support of foreign technology 
and capital to do so. In contrast with the 1970s, when the military regime aimed at taking over 
assets from IOCs, the government was mostly concerned in the 2000s with changing the 
conditions of extraction to appropriate more rents. 
 
The direction of the government’s developmental policy was for some time subject to intense 
disputes. First elected in 2006, Rafael Correa held together a heterogeneous alliance. 
Environmentalists, critical scholars, disenfranchised urban dwellers and Indigenous 
confederations supported both his election and the subsequent writing of a new constitution in 
2007. With the new constitution, the state gained a more active role in regulating and executing 
resource extraction. Also, following intense social activism, new provisions granted rights to 
nature and brought Indigenous views of ‘living well’—sumak kawsay or its Spanish translation, 
buen vivir—as guiding principles for state and society. Both principles illuminated tensions 
within the alliance, which eventually disintegrated with the imposition of a developmentalist 
agenda based on emerging industrial policies and technological innovation.  
  
As part of my larger argument, I uncover the changing government treatment of foreign 
investment; in this chapter, I depict the confluence of ideational motivations and underlying 
bargaining conditions that contributed to the emergence of this hybrid model. I contend that the 
Ecuadorian state sought to take a protagonist role in extraction and lead an ambitious state-led 
developmental project labeled as transforming the country’s ‘productive matrix’, rather than 
taking a mere subservient part in a wider capitalist restructuring as neo-extractivism critics point 





This chapter unfolds as follows. I first analyze the Palacio administration’s initial attempts to 
exercise more control over foreign companies’ revenues. I then turn to the constitution of the 
heterogeneous alliance that Correa brought with him, focusing on how environmentalist actors 
temporarily affected energy policy. Thirdly, based on in-depth interviews with privileged state 
informants, I explain the transformation of the contractual arrangements under Correa. Lastly, 
the chapter explores the most important strategic alliances the state has crafted, especially with 
China, and its role in transforming Ecuador’s energy and productive matrix.  
 
8.2. Interlude between neoliberalism and revolution: Palacio’s first nationalist attempts 
 
Despite several revolts and popular uprisings during the late 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s, Ecuador did not manage to achieve political stability around an alternative project until 
2005. Progressive voices commonly recall the previous decades as ‘the long neoliberal night’, 
which reportedly ended with the ousting of Lucio Gutiérrez. Alfredo Palacio’s arrival to office 
prompted an initial wave of reforms, including ending Occidental Petroleum’s contract on the 
grounds of its illegally handling of its production-sharing agreement.  
 
National prosecutors first investigated the case in 2004 and found that in 2000 Occidental had 
sold around 40% of its assets to City Investing Company, later Encana, without Petroecuador’s 
formal approval. According to the law and contract, the state, through its national company, 
should approve any such changes before they are executed. In 2005, Carlos Pareja Yannuzzelli, 
president of Petroecuador, ordered an internal commission composed of officials with ‘the 
longest and most pristine trajectory in the company’ to prepare a report that would recommend 
state action to address Occidental’s violation of its contract.595 This report suggested that a 
cancellation of the contract was the proper legal route to pursue. Pareja Yannuzzelli found 
support for the cancellation cause in the Minister of Finance, Rafael Correa. However, Palacio 
was initially reluctant to expel the company, fearing that this move would scare investments 
away and trigger a costly arbitration process. 
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Correa was also strongly opposed to keeping FEIREP in place and supported an immediate 
rechanneling of those funds for social development projects.596 Correa and Pareja Yannuzelli left 
their posts at the end of 2005, and, together with activists, developed a public campaign to 
pressure the government to expel Occidental Petroleum. According to Pareja Yannuzelli, the 
fuera Oxy (Out Oxy) campaign ‘finally succeeded in making the President accept Petroecuador’s 
decision’.597 But it was also crucial in contributing to the electoral campaign that was unfolding 
and made Correa its frontrunner. The activism around Occidental’s case was framed as a choice 
between ‘sovereignty’ versus ‘submission’ and the need for the state to prevail over foreign 
interests.598 Nationalist intellectuals and grassroots activists framed this as a crusade of the nation 
against foreign powers. After cancelling the contract in May 2006, president Palacio decided to 
nationalize Block 15, the most productive block amongst the Amazon marginal yields. Instead of 
opening a new round of negotiations with foreign companies, the government decided to create 
an affiliate of Petroecuador, named Petroamazonas, to be in charge of extraction.599 For Larrea, 
‘this was the first most radical change that occurred in the new phase of relationships between 
state and foreign companies’.600 In terms of governing oil extraction, the Ecuadorian state for the 
first time controlled and directly exercised extractive activities in at least one marginal yield area 
since these yields were opened for exploration in 1993.  
 
The international effects of this measure cannot be overstated. First, the United States 
unilaterally cancelled the Free Trade Agreement negotiations that had been going on with 
Ecuador at the time.601 Such a cancellation was actually one of the goals of the Ecuadorean civil 
society campaigners as well. Secondly, Occidental Petroleum initiated an arbitration process for 
unjust confiscation before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
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Disputes (ICSID).602These two results of Occidental’s expulsions have fuelled strong nationalist 
rhetoric by president Correa to this day. 
  
A point of contention during the Palacio administration was the extent of transformation of its 
energy policies in association with alternative powers. At the end of 2005, Correa and Pareja 
Yannuzelli began contacts with the Venezuelan government seeking to reach an agreement with 
PDVSA in order to refine Ecuadorian crude for domestic consumption in Venezuelan refineries. 
An emissary in these contacts was René Vargas Pazzos who managed to start conversations 
between the two sides.603 Ecuador would save resources spent in intermediaries to import 
derivatives for domestic consumption.604 The exchange of crude-for-derivatives deal failed in the 
midst of distrust from Palacio’s inner team toward the Venezuelan government.605  
 
The Palacio administration also faced pressure to change the terms of the contracts inherited 
from previous governments, which were deemed contrary to the interests of the nation. As most 
production-sharing contracts were signed in the 1990s, their reference price of oil was much 
lower than what the international price had reached between 2003 and 2006. As explained in 
chapter 6, the production-sharing conditions gave the state and concessionaires a split 
arrangement in terms of volume of barrels produced that generally favored companies in an 80-
to-20 ratio. However, all rents exceeding the reference price agreed to in the production-sharing 
agreement were reserved for the company. Law 42-2006 approved in 2006, transformed this by 
forcing a 50% percent tax on the ‘windfall profits’ of foreign companies.606 
 
8.3. The rise of Rafael Correa and the Citizen’s Revolution: from conservationism to 
developmentalism and control  
 
After the rise to power of other left leaning presidents in South America, such as in Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Brazil, Correa managed to bring together different social actors around an alternative 
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political project. A previously strong Indigenous movement had been somewhat discredited and 
divided after some of its factions joined forces with the Gutiérrez administration.607 Later, the 
most prominent members of the Indigenous leadership represented by its left-wing party 
Pachakutik, allied with urban intellectuals and environmentalist groups. According to Andrade 
and Zenteno Hopp, this gave the environmental urban leadership an upper hand in a leftist 
coalition that included Indigenous organizations. This alliance was fundamental in giving 
strength to the electoral movement that supported Correa’s bid, Patria Altiva I Soberana, or 
Alianza PAIS.608 The team that accompanied Correa was a mix between old-guard leftists, young 
technical educated professionals, and the urban intellectual greens.  
 
At the time of the electoral campaign, the proposals put forward by Correa had three distinct 
elements: 1) the need to change the ‘productive matrix’ of the country from heavy commodity 
dependence to a more diversified economy; 2) protect the natural environment, particularly in the 
Amazon, and respect the diversity of nations and ethnicities that derive their livelihoods from it; 
and 3) reinforce state sovereignty in the economy by exercising its right to control its natural 
resources and by rejecting policy mechanisms geared toward exclusively servicing foreign 
debt.609  
 
8.3.1. The last butterfly or the child in need: early dilemma of the conservationist agenda 
  
The most prominent of Correa’s political allies was, undoubtedly, Alberto Acosta, a well-known 
environmentalist. Upon his election, Correa appointed Acosta as Minister of Energy and Mines, 
giving a strong sign of his commitment to the environmental cause. Acosta was instrumental in 
building a team of experts both in energy and environmental policy that designed the Agenda 
Energética 2007-2011 (Energy Agenda 2007-2011) and put forward initiatives to evaluate the 
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activities and contracts of foreign companies operating in the country.610 The idea of putting a 
moratorium on expanding oil extraction became a formal proposal during the first months of this 
government, even though it had been only roughly articulated during the campaign. The 
moratorium was initially considered for the Yasuní national park territories of Ishpingo-
Tambococha-Tiputini, commonly known as ITT-Yasuní, but some advocates lobbied to also 
include the blocks already in operation in the park (such as block 15, already then in the hands of 
Petroamazonas).611 Acosta promoted this proposal within the government and national allies but 
simultaneously brought international activists and intellectuals to help build transnational support 
around it.   
 
For the first time since Jarrín Ampudia had been minister under Rodríguez Lara between 1972 
and 1975, a conservationist agenda was enshrined at the highest level of the Ecuadorian 
government. This time, conservationism was associated directly with the social and 
environmental costs of extraction, mainly to the diversity of the Amazon and the livelihoods of 
Indigenous peoples in the area.  
 
The conservationist agenda, however, was not fully supported by the governmental alliance. The 
President himself showed resistance and other members of government clearly opposed it612. 
Acosta remembers that he had to ‘wage a battle with the president of Petroecuador who wanted 
to exploit the Amazon oil immediately’.613 As minister, he headed the board of directors of 
Petroecuador and thus an internal conflict ensued. Correa had appointed Pareja Yannuzzelli head 
of the company when he became President. Pareja Yannuzzelli describes the extractive 
imperative in terms of the need for (social) development. He argued in an interview: ‘I never 
understood Acosta’s position’, and went on: ‘it is impossible that the last butterfly, the last turtle, 
the last species has heavier weight than human life, as long as there is a child in need, it is him 
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who we have to work for, at all costs’.614 Acosta confirms that it was a complicated context for 
the new government and Correa decided to opt for a ‘Solomonic formula’ of leaving open the 
two options: a) to declare a temporary moratorium on further extractive projects while a 
reasonable alternative is crafted; and, b) to keep exploiting current blocks and possibly expand 
the frontier in a few years. Keeping both options open was politically useful for the government 
to maintain relative unity within its coalition but this compromise exuded a sense of incoherence 
that permeated much of Correa’s oil policy, with important consequences for foreign investment 
as well.  
 
Beyond the issue of conservationism, the oil policy that the government advocated for in its early 
years pointed to a holistic renegotiation of contracts. In the Energy Agenda 2007-2011, it was 
clear that government officials sought a transparent negotiation environment with support both 
from activists and expert circles. As a major goal, the state ought to regain most of the benefits 
from rent appropriation and Petroecuador had to be strengthened both in its regulatory and 
operational capacities.615 For Arturo Villavicencio (a member of Acosta’s team who developed 
the Energy Agenda), the idea was to channel investments in mature fields and technological 
niches around exiting energy clusters without the need to expand the extractive frontier. Also, the 
use of oil funds—such as FEIREP—that were progressively transformed into investment and 
spending funds had to be invested in enhancing recovery of mature fields and in exploration at 
surrounding areas, leaving marginal and prospect camps untapped.616 In international terms, in 
2007 the government asked to rejoin OPEC, in an effort to link back to its tradition of 
multilateralism associated with Ecuador as an oil producer and defender of oil prices.617 
 
At least in the first year of government, the Alianza PAIS project aimed at increasing state 
control over the oil industry at the upstream level but also at the downstream by enhancing 
various investment initiatives to diversify the energy matrix. Simultaneously, it aimed at 
decreasing the volume of extraction, thus reducing its dependence on foreign investment. This 
relative short moment is quite unique for the purpose of this research because state sovereignty 
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was articulated to a wider notion of environmental protection that actually discouraged 
extraction. In fact, the possibilities of radically altering the conditions of state policy toward 
foreign investment were considered seriously and they pointed at a drastic reduction in oil 
extraction.618 The way resource nationalism would be articulated in 2007 is hence tied to 
environmentalism and anti-extractivism. These notions had a clear impact in the drafting of the 
new constitution.  
 
8.3.2. Buen vivir: a constitutional principle relegated to the realm of wishful thinking  
 
In February 2007, Correa called a national referendum to consult the population on whether to 
draft a new constitution. Infused with anti-party and anti-liberal democracy sentiments, Correa’s 
movement was organized and unified around the proposal. Acosta decided to leave the Ministry 
at this point to run as head of the government-backed list for the Assembly. Over 80% of the 
elected Constituent Assembly deputies were part of the larger movement Alianza PAIS.619  
 
There was considerable input coming from Indigenous associations and grassroots movements. 
Not exempt from controversy, this allowed an agreement on a pluri-national definition for the 
state, the recognition of Quechua and other Indigenous languages as official languages, and the 
self-determination of Indigenous nations. A ‘third generation’ type of fundamental rights was 
enshrined and the natural environment became a subject of rights.620 The new constitution 
obliged the state to award reparation for environmental damage and to protect the rights of 
Indigenous peoples to determine the fate of their territories. The endorsement of buen vivir ended 
up crystalizing an aspiration to reach a complementary and respectful relationship between state, 
nature and society. This was to be achieved mostly through different democratic principles, 
grounded on participatory mechanisms and based on pluri-nationality.621 According to Radcliffe, 
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this project of buen vivir can be characterized as ‘a form of development that re-founds 
development around rights and deeper and more politicized forms of participation’.622  
 
The constitution also elevated the role of the President as well as the technical and specialized 
entities of the state in social life.623 Already within the Constituent Assembly, the two leaders of 
the constituent process (Correa and Acosta) clashed. The President was focused on the end result 
sought a fast realization of the final product that ought to be ready within six months.624 Acosta, 
in turn, hoped to extend negotiations and consultations as wide, thorough and exhaustive as 
possible in order to reach the highest levels of consensus. The conflict was not resolved and 
Acosta resigned as President of the Assembly before the constitutional draft was finished, 
although he remained deputy and rallied for its approval during the national referendum in 
September 2008. 
 
The most important implication of the constitutional enshrinement of buen vivir principles was 
the ITT-Yasuní oil moratorium proposal. President Correa launched the formal proposal in June 
2007 to leave around 920 million barrels of oil underground in the ITT block in exchange for 
international compensation for Ecuador’s environmental services.625 Yasuní National Park is one 
of the world’s most bio diverse places. It was created in 1979 and it has been managed since then 
as a protected area, with substantive governance transformations. In the year 1989, it was 
declared a biosphere reserve and an ‘Intangible Zone’ was delineated in 1999. This zone is home 
to the Tagaeri-Taromenane people, who live in voluntary isolation. The Intangible Zone was 
delineated as a commitment by the state to not engage in any commercial or productive activity 
in the area, in respect for the Tagaeri-Taromenane (see map 8.1 below). Nonetheless, other areas 
of the park have been marked as oil camps. Since 1986, they have been explored and several 
                                                            
622 Radcliffe, “Development for a Postneoliberal Era?,” 241. 
623 Andrade, “El Reinio (de Lo) Imaginario: Los Intelectuales Políticos Ecuatorianos En La Construcción de La 
Constitución de 2008.” 
624 Andrade and Zenteno Hopp, “Ecuador: Changing Biosafety Frames and New Political Forces in Correa’s 
Government.” 
625 Laura Rival, “Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative: The Old and New Values of Petroleum,” Ecological Economics, 
Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70, no. 2 (December 15, 2010): 358–65, 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.007; Karen Andrade Mendoza, “El Parque Nacional Yasuní Y La Iniciativa Yasuní-
ITT Frente a La Explotación Petrolera. ¿Conservación O Explotación?,” in Retos Y Amenazas En Yasuní, ed. Anita 
Krainer and María Fernanda Mora (Quito-Ecuador: FLACSO, WCS, 2011); Guillaume Fontaine, “ITT: Un 
Problema de Gobernanza Para El Ecuador,” in La Guerra Del Fuego Políticas Petroleras Y Crisis Energética En 
América Latina, ed. Guillaume Fontaine and Alicia Puyana (FLACSO, Ministerio de Cultura, 2008). 
195 
 
blocks (14, 16, 17 and 31) entered in operation from the 1990s onward. The most affected group 
by these incursions has been the Waorani, who have been in recent contact with oil companies, 
the Ecuadorian state and missionaries.626 The Waorani have been affected by oil expansion as 
subjects of modernization and civilization strategies from Christian missionaries usually allied 
with oil corporations. Also, they are in fact the linkage between those peoples in voluntary 
isolation and the mestizo state. Around 60% of the Yasuní park is in the confines of an oil 
camp.627 The ITT block is the last untapped oil camp in the region, bordering north of the 
Intangible Zone.  
 
The ITT-Yasuní proposal was a complex one. There were several problems with it that were 
technical in nature. The most important ones related to what was actually being calculated. 
Various arguments emerged from the advocates of the proposal, ranging from the revenue 
forgone by the state in terms of barrels of oil to the amount of carbon sequestered by not 
exploiting it.628 There were, however, other important calculations around the investments 
required to actually process and export the oil that was especially heavy.  
 
Moreover, the complexity of the proposal went further in its political implications. First, the 
Ecuadorian state’s energy policy has historically driven its economic policy and changing course 
in this dynamic proved difficult at best. Second, the goal of transforming the country’s 
productive matrix was likely to be dependent on its entire repertoire of oil reserves, despite 
attempts by the environmentalists to act as though ITT was untouchable. Third, this proposal put 
Ecuador in a position of negotiating its sovereignty with other powers and International 
Organizations (IOs). The management of the trust fund for its ecological services implied intense 
bargaining with United Nations agencies and foreign governments that sought to be certain of 
Ecuador’s commitment to leave the oil underground. 
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Figure 8.1. Oil map of Ecuador, ITT-Yasuní and other blocks 
 
Source: Ministry of Hydrocarbons Mapa petrolero del Ecuador, modified by author 
 
According to Fontaine, the ideological contradictions derived from and technical complexities 
inherent in the ITT-Yasuní proposal have accompanied the Ecuadorian state since it has 
expanded its extractive frontier to the Amazon.629 The declaration of Yasuní as an ecological 
reserve has occurred alongside further expansions of oil exploration and extraction. Even the 
Intangible Zone has been violated. 630 Various alternative proposals, this time in favor of 
extraction, emerged simultaneously with the moratorium. For instance, one was the idea of 
bringing off-shore technology to the inland in Yasuní, a proposal that hoped to make oil 
extraction viable while aspiring to minimize environmental damages.631   
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The declaration of pluri-nationality added to the different legal instruments Ecuador has put in 
place to defend Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.632 Yet, none of these ideals were 
easy to materialize in a country largely defined by its ability to procure rents from oil extraction. 
The conservationist and pluri-democratic agenda reached important symbolic power at the outset 
of the Correa administration as long as it accompanied the Citizen’s Revolution in its process to 
take hold of state power. This agenda certainly put a temporary hold on the advancement of the 
state’s extractive drive and it impacted the way it related with foreign companies but it did not 
achieve its long term goals.  
 
Ultimately, the achievements of the conservationist agenda and its constitutional provisions 
relied on the capacity for organized citizens to claim the exercise of rights. However, as Andrade 
explains, ‘currently, the exercise of these rights is not viable’. In order for such claims to be 
viable ‘they put the capture of more rents at risk’ and the ITT-Yasuní did exactly that, ‘it put the 
capture of more ground rents at risk, and thus it was destined to fail. Its success was only 
possible in an ideal scenario, only imaginable in a world relegated to the realm of wishful 
thinking’.633 Unsurprisingly, Correa announced in August 2013 the end of the proposal due to 
failure to raise enough funds to compensate for Ecuador’s ecological services.634 Ecuador seemed 
unwilling to give up its right to control funds coming from the trust fund, thus complicating the 
prospects of donations. As a top official explains ‘the state had to have autonomous control over 
this fund, no foreign government or international organization can condition the use of these 
resources’.635 Assuring state sovereignty over the outcome of this proposal was of upmost 
centrality for the Ecuadorian government, which planned to execute broad industrial policies to 
diversify the economy. Thus, the national-developmentalist view that the government endorsed 
clearly contradicted the conservationist agenda it had supported originally. In a commonly anti-
imperialist tone, Correa blamed international powers for this, stating ‘the world has failed us’.636 
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During the first year of the Correa government, the main factor that dominated the direction of 
the government’s treatment of foreign investment related to ideological disagreements. These 
internal contestations illustrated the plan A and plan B of extraction that momentarily paused the 
policies of expanding the extractive frontier and increasing investments. The government was 
committed, as had been the case under Palacio, to increase state revenues in the midst of the oil 
price boom. 
 
8.4. Correa’s new oil policy: new legislation for new contracts  
 
In 2008, Correa launched a wide campaign to denounce the terms of Ecuador’s foreign debt by 
setting up a special tribunal to deal with the issue. The tribunal agreed that the mechanisms 
through which previous officials had negotiated foreign bonds countered state interests.637 This 
led to a partial default to bondholders, consisting on 35 cents per dollar. The partial default 
would later have consequences for Ecuador’s finances that would, in turn, affect the way 
Ecuador related with foreign companies and especially with China. By the end of the year, 
Correa went on to pursue further transformations that would regain state control over the oil 
industry. He was eventually reelected in 2009 as new elections were called after the acceptance 
of the new constitution. 
 
After the implementation of Law 42-2006, Correa decided to impose a more dramatic 
appropriation of windfall profits geared toward forcing foreign companies to renegotiate all 
contracts by imposing a 99% windfall tax in September of 2007. It had been justified as a fair 
decision since companies had been receiving rents in excess of the contractually stipulated 
reference prices for at least four years prior and because the government offered to lower the tax 
to 70% to those who agreed to enter into new contract negotiations.638 Galo Chiriboga, Minister 
of Oil and Mines after Acosta, states ‘with the sustained increase in oil prices from 2003, it was 
necessary to renegotiate petroleum contracts because the modality of production-sharing was 
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detrimental to the state’. The inability for the state to control windfall profits was seen as harmful 
to the owner of the resource, in his words, ‘the Ecuadorian people’.639 
 
Apart from the increase in oil prices as a motivating factor to pursue service contracts, the 
Ecuadorian government considered that this modality of association was the one that best 
preserved the interests of the nation. It argued that the state ‘simply hired a company to render a 
service to the state who still owns the resource’.640 Companies had no right over a specific 
volume of oil, which had been one major point of critique to the production sharing agreements 
by nationalists. In this case, the government maintained a specific understanding of ownership 
over hydrocarbons that assumed it was infringed upon by production sharing contracts. Thus, 
government officials now assert with confidence that ‘the oil is 100% property of the state’.641  
 
Correa was driven both by the desire to capture as much rent as possible—while keeping 
companies’ investments—and also with promoting the idea that his government guaranteed and 
protected the rights of the nation as the owner of its oil like no other administration had done in 
the past. The idea of control over the oil industry was an important motivation for the change of 
contracts. According to a top ministerial official ‘the idea was always to strengthen the role of 
the state in the management of its natural resources. That was the driving force of the new legal 
framework and change in contracts’.642 It is important to highlight that the material motivations to 
enhance state control over the industry were clearly defined by a context of high oil prices 
similar to the 1970s, as traditional bargaining theories suggest. Yet, in a wider sense, the way this 
increased control was materialized had to do with ideational factors related to how policy makers 
interpreted state sovereignty over natural resources and to the historical relationships embodied 
in production sharing agreements that dated back to the period of ‘give away’ (discussed in 
chapter 7). In ideational terms, Correa’s government’s concerns resembled the ideas of national 
sovereignty that the military shared in the 1970s. Nevertheless, unlike the military’s strand of 
resource nationalism, Correa’s goals did not translate into a desire to acquire companies’ assets, 
but rather to change the terms of the contracts that regulated them. 
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A reform to the law of hydrocarbons was pushed through the National Assembly in June 2010.643 
The government requested that the Parliament approve the law 30 days after it was drafted. Due 
to this urgency, the amendments received little debate.644 The reform was finally approved on 
July 27 2010 and it stipulated a transitory period of 120 days to migrate all production-sharing 
agreements to service contracts.645 The opportunity to produce deep reforms to the oil policy of 
the country was abandoned with the intention to speed up a contractual change. Hence many of 
the proposals that were drafted in the Energy Agenda 2007-2011, such as promoting 
enhancement technology in mature fields rather than expanding the oil frontier, were ignored. It 
was clear that ‘the main goal was to improve state appropriation of oil rents’.646  
 
A critical point of the early energy policy makers in Correa’s administration was to pursue a 
deep legal and environmental assessment of the associations already in place. According to most 
observers, such assessments would have rendered similar results to the ones that prompted 
Occidental’s expulsion.647 Yet, no such assessments were carried out and the government 
privileged negotiating with the companies that were already operating in the country.  
 
The changes in the law included the creation of the Hydrocarbon Secretariat (Secretaría de 
Hidrocarburos) as an administrative entity. This Secretariat has financial autonomy but is part of 
the Ministry of Non-renewable Resources and it takes from Petroecuador the responsibility of 
overseeing the execution of contracts with third parties. The oil industry was declared a sector of 
‘public interest’ and thus subject to expropriation. The reform contemplated new terms for the 
existing figure of service contracts, but it also kept other contractual models available, such as 
production sharing and joint-ventures.648 In this context, a mechanism of direct adjudication by 
the presidency without parliamentary approval of fields under joint-ventures was allowed in the 
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follow-up regulation to the reform, if they included SOEs. This move actually legalized what the 
Gutiérrez administration attempted a decade earlier and critics—including Rafael Correa—
ferociously protested, arguing it meant selling out the national patrimony.  
 
In fact, this reform came to legalize a mechanism that had already been used in 2008 when 
Correa ‘gave away Sacha camp to the Venezuelan company PDVSA’.649 Under the framework of 
a joint-venture with majority shares for Petroecuador, an association with PDVSA was created in 
this mature yield, considered one of the crown jewels. The model of association clearly reflected 
the framework used in Venezuela after the 2007 ‘full oil sovereignty campaign’, signaling a 
potential export of the Venezuelan model to the Ecuadorian context. Nationalist critiques were 
voiced against this move, but the administration defended it in the name of regional integration 
and solidarity. The consortium, named Rio Napo, has had mixed results, with decreased 
production in its early years.650 However, production spiked up subsequently, finally reaching 
75,000 bpd at the end of 2014.651 According to a senior manager of the company, Rio Napo does 
not depend on public funding and it has invested over US$500 million in enhanced recovery 
from its own utilities. Despite the left-leaning political rhetoric of counter-hegemony that 
surrounds the Ecuador-Venezuela partnership, for this manager Rio Napo’s success has been due 
to the fact that ‘it is driven by the logic of a private enterprise’.652  
 
8.4.1 Service contracts: a policy designed in times of high prices, with high stakes 
  
The new contracts were quickly negotiated soon after the reforms to the law were sanctioned. 
Concessions were negotiated individually with foreign companies under a flat service fee.653 This 
meant that the state would pay the concessionary company a fixed rate per barrel extracted 
during the entire time of the contract, lasting 15 to 20 years.654  
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According to official informants, the Ecuadorian state and individual companies negotiated 
based on the consideration of how mature the yields were (amount of reserves left at the time of 
signing) and the prospects of investments needed to improve returns or minimize the decline in 
productivity of the yield. Extraction costs therefore varied greatly for each case; they oscillated 
between less than US$ 7 per barrel to over US$12. The prospects of future profits also played a 
role as most mature yields had been estimated to have a short life-span left, although they tended 
to be the ones where lighter crude is found, whereas ‘marginal’ yields have heavier oil. The 
lowest fees were US$16.72 per barrel while the most expensive one was as high as US$58 for a 
marginal field, although most were close to US$30  (see table 8.1 below).655 Foreign companies 
were to subtract their operating costs per barrel extracted, and transportation and 
commercializing costs were to be paid by the state. The Ministry pays the flat service fee to the 
company and it is obliged by law to reserve for the state a 25% ‘national sovereignty rate’ on 
each barrel.656 The remainder of the oil basket would also be patrimony of the nation.  
 
As the amendments were approved, the government hoped to sign 33 contracts. Nonetheless, 
only 14 contracts were signed in total with 8 firms or consortiums. Seven of those were signed in 
November 2010, as the government expected. The rest were signed in early 2011.657 The 
government negotiated first with the highest producing firm in the country at the time, the 
Spanish-Argentine Repsol-YPF and with the Chilean SOE Enap. 658  Andes Petroleum and 
Petroriental, operated by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China 
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Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC),659 also signed new contracts in their blocks, although no 
agreement was reached in block 11 operated by CNPC, which some argue was never 
commercially viable. 660  All the existing modalities—production-sharing contracts, service 
contracts, operational alliances and contracts of marginal camps—migrated to the newly crafted 
service contract under a flat service fee.  
 
Several companies, however, rejected the change. The most controversial of all was Petrobras, 
for legal and political reasons.661 Petrobras had been operating in the Palo Azul unified camp 
(block 18, north of the Yasuní Park) after dubious transfers from other minor companies had 
taken place. Several reports from Petroecuador and its former trade union pointed to reasons for 
cancelling the contract, similar to those that were used against Occidental Petroleum. After 
initiating a case to declare the expiration of the contract at the prosecutor general’s office, the 
company rejected the transfer to service contract and the government agreed to reimburse the 
company for its investments.662 No further litigation was pursued, arguably due to political 
pressure from Brazil. Petroamazonas later took control of Palo Azul.  
 
The government launched the 10th round of concessions for exploration and later exploitation in 
April 2012. Three new contracts were signed for exploration and extraction in the north-eastern 
area of the Amazon region. The service fees ranged from US$ 32.90 and US$ 36.60.663 Later, the 
state has attempted to launch the 11th oil round to offer exploration and extraction contracts in 
the south Amazon, in blocks that are currently unexploited. Several attempts in 2013 and 2014 
were made with no success, as foreign and private domestic companies were not interested and 
the decrease in the oil price halted the government’s strategy. 
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Table 8.1 New service contracts and service fees in Ecuador 
Oil Firm Block Service fee (US$ p/b) 










Repsol-YPF and others Block 16 35.95 
Tivacuno 27.25 
Petrooriental (Sinopec) and 
Overseas Petroleum 
Investment Corporation 
Block 17 41.00 
Petrooriental (Sinopec) Block 14 41.00 
AGIP oil Block 10 35.00 
Petrobell Tigüino 29.60 
Gustavo Galindo 58.00 
Pegaso PUMA 21.10 
Tecpecuador Bermejo 34.00 
Petrosud Palanda 31.90 
Pindo 28.50 
Source: information from service contracts, Hydrocarbon Secretariat. 
 
Most observers have noted that this negotiating scheme was clearly the product of a ‘high price 
context’ wherein the state considered that ‘a remainder’ of the basket would always be present.664 
Instead, the international price of oil has fluctuated, as it always does. International companies 
have secured for themselves a safe, fixed rate that comfortably exceeds their extraction costs 
even at times of low prices. With the radical change of contracts, foreign companies have 
secured a margin of utility that in the worst-case scenario means a similar profit to the situation 
ex ante.665 The state, on the other hand, has secured ‘control’ over the business by changing 
contractual terms to its preferred option, but it did not protect itself from market fluctuations.  
 
The terms of the contracts were less favorable to the state than it had hoped for. A member of the 
negotiating team explained in an interview that this was due to various constraining factors. The 
first was the fact that ‘the legal framework and contracts were changing simultaneously’ and 
‘very quickly’, as the government forced them to do. There was insufficient time to develop in-
depth studies around the conditions of the yields, and there was no willingness from the 
government to open a wide debate around the different modalities of association. Second, ‘the 
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companies in fact set the terms of the negotiations’ because they had ‘the knowledge of the 
conditions in the different camps’ and were able to negotiate based on levels of reserves and 
requirements for investments that ‘only they knew about’.666 This speaks to the continued 
fragility in the Ecuadorian state’s institutional capacity to effectively acquire fundamental 
knowledge about the industry and regulate it vis-á-vis foreign companies. The state sought to 
secure risk investments coming from foreign companies while benefitting from high rents, but 
instead it gave a price safeguard for companies.  
 
The contracts’ conditions stipulate that in case the state is unable to pay the full rate of the 
service fee due to lower prices, it acquires a debt that accumulates in the form of a carry-
forward, which is discounted as prices revamp. In the post October-2014 period, the Ecuadorian 
basket has reached record low depths levels for the last decade. This means that the state has 
only been able to secure a quarter of the basket under the ‘national-interest rate’ and is still 
forced to pay a fixed service fee that at times has been higher than the actual international price. 
Once more in Ecuador’s history, debt has been mounting in direct relation to its capacity to 
extract oil. In fact, according to a top official in the Ministry of Finance, since December 2014, 
‘Ecuador’s oil production has generated only losses’.667 For him, the service contracts are no 
longer beneficial for the state, although ‘they were good when prices remained high’.668 
 
In fact, speaking with senior officials about the already counting carry-forward turned out to be 
challenging and uncomfortable.669 One top official of the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources 
said that this is still a beneficial arrangement because if, at the end of the contract, the state owes 
an outstanding amount to the concessionary, ‘it has no obligation to pay’.670 However, companies 
will discount the outstanding balance as the contract is in place and oil prices increase relative to 
the time prior. A former member of the team that renegotiated the contracts said that this was 
such an unexpected development that the ‘regulating institutions are still trying to get their heads 
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around’ the practicality of calculating repayment.671 According to Cesar Robalino, twice Minister 
of Finance in previous governments and former President of CEPE, the government ‘has not 
dared to reject the contracts’ but it has simply said that ‘it cannot pay’. The companies, on the 
other hand, see no incentive in investing or even ‘pumping the state’s oil’ if they are not 
receiving their flat fee.672 Robalino states that the debt already accounted for 600 million US 
dollars in spring of 2015—and it keeps going up.  
 
Fernando Villavicencio, a former Petroecuador trade union leader and journalist, has shown that 
the difference in payments to the companies from the state under service contracts versus the 
production sharing arrangement was marginal. According to his calculations, in average, the 
state saved US$0.35 per barrel under the new contracts.673 But this is ignoring fluctuations in the 
international price of oil. Under production sharing contracts, the companies sold their part of the 
oil at the international price, whereas with the flat fee, they receive a fixed compensation for 
their service regardless of the price of the Ecuadorian basket.  
 
The international media originally pointed out that ‘the substitution of service contracts 
follow[ed] a model pioneered in other parts of Latin America, notably Venezuela and Bolivia. 
These have been presented to local opinion as re-nationalizations of strategic assets and 
reaffirmation of state control’.674 Indeed, while it has been quite an important rhetorical resource 
for Correa’s administration, the alleged increased control may be an overstatement. In fact—as I 
have discussed—companies’ actual control over operations on the ground has allowed them to 
secure beneficial terms even within the framework of new contracts.  
 
With respect to increasing investments, the change of contracts arguably brought about more 
investments in volume but not in the same way the government had anticipated. At the time of 
signing the contracts, the government expected to receive over US$1 billion in new 
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investments.675 It also expected to increase oil production substantially. According to former 
Petroecuador president and oil expert, Jorge Pareja Cucalón, ‘much of those so-called 
investments were in fact maintenance costs’.676 Despite dissenting voices, high oil prices during 
part of the service contract period allowed the Hydrocarbon Secretariat to pursue investments, 
again, through contractor firms such as Halliburton and Schlumberger, particularly in mature 
yields, which helped increase Petroecuador’s production.  
 
These investments, mostly in enhancement oil recovery, have allowed Ecuador to keep oil 
production over the 500,000 bpd margin. But there is little to no new investment in marginal 
camps.677 In spite of the government’s policies, the Ecuadorian production declined from 2008 
until 2010, and even if it started to pick up in 2011, only in 2014 did it surpass pre-2007 levels. 
Also, in the year 2007, for the first time since the 1990s, Ecuador’s NOCs produced more than 
private companies (see Figure 8.2 below).678  
 
Figure 8.2 Total oil production, public and private firms (million of barrels) 
 
Source: made by author with data from BCE, 2015. 
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The change in the trends of production between public and private firms was mostly due to the 
expropriation of Occidental’s assets, but also to the increased production of mature fields. 
Moreover, all the camps from companies that resisted a change to service contracts were 
transferred to Petroamazonas, which increased the production of the public sector significantly. 
As was expected, however, in 2015 the production started to decline sharply due to the drop in 
price. As Figure 8.3 below shows, once production peaked in 2014 above 560,000 bpd, it 
dropped throughout 2015, reaching 536,000 bpd at the end of that year.679 Paulino Washima, 
executive member of strategic state enterprises from the National Secretariat of Planning and 
Development (SENPLADES), stated that once the price started to fall to the point where it 
became unprofitable to extract, ‘the decision was to cut production’. He admitted that ‘in the 
yields where the international price was lower than the service fee’, the government was willing 
to ‘stop operations’ or ‘not pay’.680  
 
There are other reasons for the stagnation of investments in new oil fields. The rather erratic 
energy policy pursued by the Correa administration generated little incentive for international 
companies to come into the country. As I discussed earlier, this erratic attitude responded largely 
to internal disputes within the government alliance. The government did not fulfill its 
expectations in the 10th oil round and completely failed to achieve any meaningful result to open 
an 11th round. As Larrea points out ‘middle-range companies are the only ones with potential 
interest’ and only those ‘like Repsol, which are already in the country, would see benefit in 
pursuing more business’.681 The reason for this is the relatively marginal place Ecuador’s 
reserves have in the global energy market. The potential social disputes around extraction 
together with the changing regulatory conditions made it less attractive than other liberal or even 
nationalist countries of the region. Guilleaume Fontaine, energy policy expert, explains that 
‘however large the investment levels are in Ecuador, due to the size of its reservoir, it would be 
less profitable than in Venezuela’ even if it were comparatively ‘less open for investments’.682 In 
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this context, Chinese companies appear as the ones with more interest in the country because of 
China’s own ‘strategic policy to secure energy provision’.683  
 
Figure 8.3 Total production 2014-2015 (average barrels per day) 
 
 
Source: made by author with data from BCE, 2015. 
 
The administration of Rafael Correa managed to transform the legal arrangements that determine 
state-foreign company relations. It did so in the context of high oil prices, with a desire to 
increase state rent appropriation and control over the industry. Again, following the cycle of 
investments, these changes were made once investors had incurred significant sunk costs. In 
addition to the material incentives for the state, there was an important ideational component to 
the change in contracts: whereas before, part of the extracted crude was directly appropriated by 
companies, now the state pays a ‘service fee’ to extractive firms, which according to state 
officials, reaffirms the notion of ownership over the resource. In practice, however, the ultimate 
material benefit was not as significant as expected due to the country’s position in the energy 
market (low reserves) and its continued institutional fragility in regulating the industry. The 
government still assured its position, even if through a narrow interpretation of ownership and 
management of natural resources. The goal of resource extraction for Ecuador is to advance in a 
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developmental program to modernize the country’s economy. Thus, association with foreign 
investment is vital, as Ecuador’s structural constraints impede it to advance such program on its 
own. As discussed in chapter 7, Ecuador’s traditional NOC, Petroecuador remains weak. Further, 
as a dollarized economy, it is unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies and is thus more 
vulnerable to external shocks and dependent on foreign capital. 
 
Even in the context of vulnerability that I have discussed, Ecuador used the changes in the global 
energy market to build an alliance with China that could earn the country the foreign capital that 
traditional investors are not willing to provide. As it was the case in Venezuela, this attitude is 
testament to important novel behaviors by foreign investors backed by large financial state 
institutions. In the next subsection, I explore the importance of Ecuador’s alliance with China 
and, to a lesser degree, with Venezuela. I do so by putting these alliances in the broader context 
of Ecuador’s political economy and understanding the structural constraints that affect its pursuit 
of sovereign policy-making.  
8.5. Extractive imperatives and strategic alliances 
 
‘You’d have to be blind not to see the public works the government has done. There are roads, 
hydroelectric damns, fuel storage terminals, and of course social investment’. 
Paulino Washima, Director at SENPLADES and board member of SOEs 
 
After discussing the new terms of association with foreign companies, and the ideas, material 
and institutional constraints that shaped this association, the wider purpose of association 
becomes the matter of attention. Rent appropriation has been a cornerstone of a new 
developmental paradigm in Ecuador. Since 2010, Correa has pushed his neo-developmentalist 
agenda, and it has served to overcome the apparent contradictions that emerged with the 
divergent signals from his own government. Rochlin described these contradictions in the 
following way: ‘the era of the Correa presidency has featured an odd admixture of neoliberalism 
and leftist populism on the part of the government, as well as elements of post-development 
pursued by grass roots social movements that struggle to incorporate ecological concerns into 
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national developmental schemes’.684 With the contractual reforms the government’s expectation 
was ‘to give the state more capacity to implement a rent-driven policy and to finance the growing 
public spending’.685 In this way, argues Escribano, ‘Ecuador has found a solution that seems to 
overcome these contradictions by signaling a clear commitment to developmentalism’.686 Once 
Correa had emerged as the single leader of his own coalition and his party had positioned itself 
strongly within the state apparatus, it was possible to marginalize or purge the environmentalist 
and other social movement elements of the coalition to pursue a more clearly productivist and 
developmentalist project.  
 
The government made oil extraction the most direct mechanism to finance its income 
redistribution policies. Moreover, extraction was also made central to the larger project of 
technification and diversification of the economy, which has been labeled as the change in the 
‘productive matrix’. Two important axioms became pillars of the government discourse. Correa 
and his close officials repeatedly argue that Ecuadorians ‘can’t be beggars sitting on a sack of 
gold’—as way to justify further extraction in face of their environmentalist critics. 687 
Furthermore, they stress that ‘more extractivism’ is the ‘only way out of extractivism’.688 
Through increased oil revenues, the government seeks to invest in new technologies and expand 
the productive base of the economy. If increasing oil extraction became a prerequisite to service 
foreign debt during the neoliberal period, in the current period, it is a sine qua non of 
development.  
 
8.5.1. China: a lifesaver  
 
The transformation of Ecuador’s ‘productive matrix’ to a diversified economy remains a central 
proposition of the Correa administration since the crafting of the original goals of the citizens’ 
revolution between 2006 and 2007. This means nothing other than an industrial development 
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policy under a ‘pompous name’.689 Constrained by important structural factors, such as being a 
dollarized economy with no monetary independence, Ecuador faces important limitations on how 
to promote industrial diversification policy. In addition to this limitation, the partial default on its 
debt left Ecuador virtually closed from international financial markets for development lending.  
 
In this context, China emerged as a pivotal ally to help Ecuador pursue its broader industrial 
policy. As Alberto Acosta states: ‘Ecuador’s turn to China is not necessarily a strategic political 
maneuver but decision for survival’.690 As has been documented, China’s motivations in its 
pursuit of south-south cooperation are driven by its quest for energy resources. 691 While 
Venezuela is South America’s highest debtor to China, Ecuador ranks third in the region together 
with Argentina. Ecuador’s debt to China, which totals approximately US$15.2, billion is a 
considerable portion of its total foreign debt (around one third). Debt to China has prompted a 
rapid change in the trends of Ecuador’s exports to China, although the absolute numbers are still 
small. Much of Ecuador’s oil exports have gone historically to the United States, Peru and Chile. 
In 2014, Ecuador exported only 1 million barrels to China in total. In 2015 that volume had more 
than tripled, reaching 3.6 million barrels. 692  Ecuador recently agreed with China to sell 
approximately 181 million barrels in the next 8 years until 2024 as part of their cooperation and 
development agreements.693  
 
The details of the problems and goals of Ecuador’s industrial policy are beyond the scope of this 
research but key relationships between oil extraction, foreign investment and industrial policies 
need to be highlighted. Ecuador is a prime example of a crude producer, which has been unable 
to develop significant downstream linkages in the oil industry. Acosta argues that Ecuador has 
been unable ‘to overcome one of country’s worst aberrations: it extracts oil, exports oil, and 
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imports oil derivatives’.694 A senior official explains that this has to do with Ecuador’s neoliberal 
restructuring which ‘took away its capacity to control its oil industry and enhance its 
industrialization’.695 A distorted internal market characterized by inefficient subsidies adds to the 
problem of refining.696 Since his arrival into government, Correa has been concerned with this 
issue and has attempted to construct a meaningful alliance with Venezuela to overcome problems 
at the downstream level of the industry.  
 
This is how the Pacific Refinery project was conceived. The Refinería del Pacífico Eloy Alfaro 
was a project constituted as a joint-venture between Petroecuador and PDVSA with majority 
shares for the former and a 49% for the latter. The project was geared to a refining capacity of 
around 300,000 bpd, which meant an ambitious plan to supply the entire domestic market for 
derivatives and export the surplus, thus increasing the value added of Ecuadorian exports. But 
this project implies complex financial and technical issues. First, its projected cost surpassed 
US$10 billion. It was soon clear that PDVSA could not offer the funding required. But Chinese 
enterprises, namely CNPC, showed its interest to partner with both NOCs and find fresh Chinese 
funding for the project.697 Second, it required massive transport of heavy oil that was originally 
intended to come from Venezuela’s Orinoco belt. The difficulties of transporting heavy and extra 
heavy crude from a far away oil field to that refinery meant it was an impossible task. According 
to Fontaine, this was proposed merely as a ‘rhetorical recourse’ because in 2008 the Yasuní-ITT 
proposal was still in place. Fontaine argues that ‘in fact, this project is a petrochemical complex 
and it could not be de-linked from the exploitation prospects of ITT’.698  
 
In this context, the lack of financing has left the project at a 12% completion and with few 
prospects of progress. Various commentators have pointed at possible corruption schemes 
stemming from the refinery since over US$1 billion have been committed from PDVSA and 
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Petroecuador to simply ‘level the field’ where the refinery will be constructed.699 Adding to this, 
the decline in oil prices made expansion of block 31 and start of operations at the ITT block 
unprofitable due to the level of upfront investments required. Pareja Cucalón commented that, 
ironically, ‘the market is so far saving the Yasuní from exploitation’.700   
 
Beyond the Pacific Refinery, China has committed millions of dollars to other important 
infrastructure projects (adding a total of US$ 15.2 billion).701 According to sources at the 
Ministry of Finance, some of those funds are project-specific, others are loans-for-oil, while 
there is a third type of lending that is generally offered for public investment to the government. 
Most loans were negotiated at a rate of 7.5% but some have come in at a somewhat lower range, 
with the lowest at 6%.702 Although most informants from the government stated that Ecuador 
does not privilege one type of investment over others, they also agree that Chinese investments 
offer other benefits that make them attractive, such as macroeconomic independence and the 
explicit interest from Chinese lenders in infrastructure and industrial projects. According to 
many informants, the conditions agreed are also clear. First, Chinese lending is given when 
contracts can be assured to Chinese contractors. Second, contractors have the right to employ 
Chinese workers. Nevertheless, authors such as Bräutigam and Gallagher argue that, while the 
use of Chinese contractors is a common practice, there is no evidence of the imposition of 
conditions requiring the use of Chinese workers in Chinese commodity-backed loans.703 And 
third, they will potentially receive the control of specific blocks in the Amazon once the 11th oil 
round is re-opened. In fact, Andes Petroleum and Petrooriental, subsidiaries of CNPC and 
SINOPEC have already made offers to explore two blocks south of the Intangible Zone. In this 
case, it is possible that the government may adjudicate these blocks separately and award 
contracts directly to Chinese companies, without going through a competitive bidding process 
sanctioned by the Parliament, because the hydrocarbon law contemplates such special treatment 
when dealing with SOEs. 
                                                            
699 Interviews with Carlos Pareja Cucalón, Fernando Villavicencio and other informants that wished to remain 
anonymous. 
700 Interview with author, Quito May 2015. 
701 China-Latin America financial database, Inter-American Dialogue and Global Economic Governance Initiative. 
702 Escribano, “Ecuador’s Energy Policy Mix: Development versus Conservation and Nationalism with Chinese 
Loans.” 
703 Deborah Bräutigam and Kevin P. Gallagher, “Bartering Globalization: China’s Commodity‐backed Finance in 




Perhaps the most important of all of the ongoing projects is the construction of the hydroelectric 
dam Coda Codo Sinclair by Chinese contractors with funding from China Exim for over 
US$1.68 billion.704 With this hydroelectric mega project, Ecuador expects to generate 1,500 MW 
and together with other medium and small projects it hopes to satisfy local markets and also 
export electricity to neighboring Colombia and Peru. Moreover, the government hopes to carry 
out a massive transfer of gas stoves to induction stoves, also sold by Chinese firms, in 2016. 
Later on, these stoves and their parts are supposed to be produced in Ecuador after Chinese 
manufacturers have set up plants in the country.705 The idea is to save around US$1 billion a year 
in imported and subsidized gas, which has been recognized as a major distortion in the local 
energy market, and simultaneously produce US$1.2 billion from new energy generation.706  
 
This plan has so far been criticized for its authoritarian and ambitious nature: imposing a 
technological change in the entire consumer base of home stoves. Yet, government officials 
insist that such bold measures are required to save resources and advance the country’s 
industrialization. Washima is adamant about this: ‘we are in a dollarized economy, which should 
not be forgotten, so if there are new technologies, domestic industry will flourish and for that we 
can’t use our limited funds, we need foreign development lending’. In a nutshell, government 
officials like Washima have crafted a policy apparatus committed to industrial policy from the 
top-down, but that is constrained by lack of monetary sovereignty. This, in turn, conditions 
industrial policies back to foreign financing.  
 
In this context, officials restate that despite the fall in oil prices, the renegotiation of contracts 
brought about an initial inflow of capital that allowed the government to kick-start this ambitious 
plan. Therefore, there is a clear link between asserting control over oil rents through the new 
contracts and the increase in foreign lending to pursue industrial policy. Washima stresses that 
‘all the impressive infrastructure and energy investment we have achieved is thanks to the 
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renegotiation of oil contracts and leveraging international financing’.707 Meanwhile, China has 
stepped in as the single most important foreign ally in providing finance to Ecuador, revealing 
the centrality of this emerging power in the configuration of neo-developmentalist agendas in the 
global south. 
 
8.5.2. New development: a tale of seduction or how further extraction was always plan A  
 
In Ecuador, plans of achieving diversification and development have been tied to oil extraction 
since the country became an oil exporter in 1972. In its current form, Ecuadorian 
developmentalism has the state as the central actor that regulates market players, executes policy 
and engages in the actual carrying out of industrial and social projects. The Oriente is a 
fundamental part of this strategy. The government has therefore developed spectacular social 
programs that seek to bring communities in Oriente on board with this plan. This is what 
Esperanza Martínez, head of Oil Watch and Acción Ecológica, calls ‘the strategy of seduction’.708 
Schools and entire villages have been built by the state with oil funds in consonance with a 
vision that de la Torre calls ‘a hypermodern Ecuador’.709 The ciudades and escuelas del milenio 
are showcase projects that seek to, in the words of Pablo Andrade, ‘compensate for the social and 
environmental costs of extraction’; they are ‘high-tech type projects that also serve as 
legitimizing vehicles for extraction’. But for Martínez, they also mask the more violent 
mechanisms of coercion that the state is also willing to carry out in case it faces resistance. As I 
have already mentioned, the expansion of the mestizo state and oil companies in the Amazon is a 
relatively recent phenomenon that has sparked contentions with recently contacted indigenous 
populations and threatens the livelihoods and habitat of others still in voluntary isolation. 
 
In our conversation, Martínez explained in detail the repressive tactics of the government in 
places like the town of Dayuma where Indigenous peoples have been persecuted by military 
forces for protesting and stopping an oil platform in 2008.710 This episode started a long process 
of criminalization of critics of extraction, which the government has called ‘terrorists’ and has 
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persecuted consistently.711 In a binary logic of ‘us versus them’, the Correa administration has 
called for unity against ecological terrorists who seek to halt the nation’s development.712 This 
attitude goes in line with various analyses that argue that there is more convergence than 
divergence in the extractive models that both left and right wing governments in South America 
advance.713  
 
In line with the theses of neo-extractivism, radical scholar Pablo Dávalos argues that the Alianza 
PAIS project is in fact a tool for global capital to assert its hold on natural resources. Dávalos 
argues that this political project seeks to ‘assure the “third generation” structural reforms that 
allow the privatization of territory in benefit of transnational capital’. The state does so through 
mechanisms of ‘discipline and social criminalization that is legitimized in a discourse of struggle 
against poverty and justifies exploitation of natural resources’.714 Indeed, as I highlighted earlier, 
social development and the fight against poverty represented the central legitimizing point for 
expanding extraction. 
 
Notwithstanding the mix of coercive and redistributive mechanisms through which the state 
asserts its developmentalist project, the ultimate purpose rests on the long lasting goal of nation-
building and state affirmation. This process requires an important ingredient of association with 
foreign capital, and it is to a large extent a result of changing international dynamics that 
include—not least—the emergence of China as a global power. But it is not carried out 
exclusively for the benefit of transnational capital, nor is it procuring territorial privatization, or 
land commodification alone. On the contrary, I contend that it seeks to, in a modern state-like 
manner, make the Amazon region a public and above all a ‘national resource’, even if at the 
expense of ancestral communities and the environment. The assertion of oil policy and expansion 
of the extractive frontier responds to the dominant meaning that the Ecuadorian government has 
attributed to development. This dominant view of development focuses on transforming the 
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country’s productive matrix through pursuing industrial policies and vanguard technological 
innovation.715  
 
High-level officials from both planning, oil and energy institutions confirmed the state’s aim to 
assert its authority and advance development in Ecuador, but particularly in areas such as 
Oriente, where it had been relatively absent before. Much like in the case of Rio Napo, which 
purportedly functions with the profit-seeking logic of a private enterprise, Petroamazonas 
‘inherited Oxy’s logics [referring to Occidental Petroleum]’.716 An executive from the NOC 
Petroamazonas argues that the company’s community development arm has become the state’s 
vehicle to bring social and economic projects to far away communities. He asserts: ‘we have 
built the ciudades del milenio… We are trying to transform the logic that private enterprises left 
in the Amazon, which basically spoiled Indigenous communities’. 717  For decades, foreign 
companies negotiated handouts and different payments with communities in order to access their 
territories ‘they would give some thousand dollars to communities while taking millions out’. 
The state was basically absent in this process, but now, ‘Petroamazonas is trying to change this 
logic’.718 And it has set productive and social projects that are decided from the central 
government and negotiated with local authorities and other stakeholders. As Pablo Andrade 
explains, ‘this is a network that is highly centralized in the government, it is where a 
compensatory governance sphere operates, it includes local representatives of Alianza PAIS, 
decentralized authorities and communities themselves’.719  
 
For the Petroamazonas executive, Indigenous demands for monetary compensation in areas of 
exploitation ‘are absurd’, as they fall outside the designated Amazon fund for social investment. 
The spectacular social projects Petroamazonas executes have been part of the so-called plan B 
that I recalled at the beginning of this chapter when Alberto Acosta became Minister of Energy 
and advocated for an extraction moratorium in the Amazon. The Petroamazonas executive 
explained in an interview: ‘the ciudades del milenio are part of the plan B that president Correa 
offered in case the ITT-Yasuní failed’. Since 2011, the government started to work on building 
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these communities and schools, and ‘then in 2013, the President inaugurated many of them as he 
announced the failure of the Yasuní proposal: it was a way to show the good things that can be 
done with oil money; plan B started with these projects and extraction will follow’.720 Indeed, 
plan B had started even before plan A had been officially declared dead. 
 
The policies of seduction not only mean mechanisms for legitimation and compensation. They 
are also part of a larger project of state affirmation that includes the Amazon region. In current 
times, state affirmation and nation building are embodied in modernization and development. Oil 
extraction is the backbone of this plan and it can only be carried out in association with foreign 
investment due to the lack of technical capacity in Ecuador’s NOCs as well as the policy 
limitations the country faces regarding foreign financing and lack of monetary sovereignty. 
While state affirmation and Correa’s developmentalism include important ingredients of 
coercion, they also require the inclusion of the masses, particularly Indigenous peoples, through 
extensive social policies. In this context, I caution skepticism toward the contentions of radical 
globalization scholars, who see forces of global capital mobilizing the coercive apparatus of the 
state to support the enclosure of territory through violence and dispossession.  
 
As it has been noted in the Venezuelan case, the Bolivarian project was mostly geared toward a 
rentier form of socialism. In Ecuador, the model has been based on a state-led industrialism, 
which has been labeled as the transformation of the country’s productive matrix. The dominant 
idea of development today centers on using oil rents to protect niches of existing industry and 
invest in new technologies and innovative sectors.721 The alliance with China has been important 
in this regard, as a provider of financing and investment. China’s behavior also demonstrates that 
foreign investors do not all display the same logics when dealing with home states. In Ecuador, 
the state is an active actor that carries out projects of control, territorialization, modernization 
and development. Far from being mere agents of global capital, the state in Ecuador and 
Venezuela is also an actor that, combined with foreign forces, seeks to claim and exercise control 
over its natural/national resources and territories.  
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At the outset of the Correa government, two broad ideals associated with resource nationalism 
emerged in Ecuador. One, characterized as nationalist-conservationist, largely reflected in the 
original Energy Agenda 2007-2011 and parts of the constitution, sought to radically transform 
the state-companies relationships by increasing state control and taking away concessions that 
were deemed illegal. This increased state control in extraction would be coupled with a strong 
commitment to conservationism and a moratorium on further extraction. The nationalist-
conservationist agenda, similar to the nationalist views espoused in the 1970s by Jarín Ampudia, 
also encouraged a sense of multilateralism around issues of environmental protection and the 
fight against climate change. The second vision, labeled as nationalist-developmentalist, sought 
to strengthen the role of the state in the oil industry by increasing rent appropriation and control 
through changing the contractual arrangement with foreign companies. This vision was 
illustrated in the amendments to the hydrocarbons law made in 2010. It planned to use resource 
extraction to launch an ambitious developmentalist project as well as redistribute wealth geared 
toward reducing poverty. The coexistence of these conflicting visions was symbolized in the plan 
A and B of oil extraction. The coexistence of these agendas shows the importance of divergent 
ideological perspectives in the fate of oil policy in general and, the state treatment of foreign 
investment, in particular.  
 
The tension between these two visions was resolved in favor of the nationalist-developmentalist 
view. The approach to natural resource management that was eventually taken up is one that 
associates industry control with the pursuit of a developmentalist agenda for the benefit of 
society as a whole. It rejected the multilateral ambitions of the nationalist-conservationist 
perspective and the pretensions of IOs to condition their support of Ecuador’s oil moratorium, 
while it supported the type of multilateralism espoused in the 1970s by the military, which 
inspired Ecuador to join primary producers in multilateral efforts such as OPEC. The 
developmentalist approach views the state as the appropriate interlocutor of national interests and 
its legitimate authority to command the modernizing path of the nation. A fusion of technocratic 
knowledge and revolutionary discourse illustrate the type of societal transformations under 
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Correa that de la Torre describes as a ‘modernizing revolution from above’.722 The Ecuadorian 
government has been successful at conflating national sovereignty, rents appropriation and social 
development into one single discourse and project that has been labeled as transforming the 
country’s ‘productive matrix’.  
 
As I have argued, Ecuador’s current hybrid model consists in welcoming foreign investment as a 
component of this development agenda. Ecuador cannot increase oil extraction and pursue 
innovative industrial policies without external support, due to the lack of external funding and 
other constraints such as being a dollarized economy. As the conventional bargaining models 
would have predicted, increased oil prices meant an incentive to increase state control. But this 
chapter goes further to shed new light on how this process took place. The government chose to 
replace production-sharing agreements with service contracts, hoping to take advantage of high 
oil prices. Rather than returning to the kinds of arrangements established in the 1970—high rents 
appropriation through royalties and taxes—the government chose to sign service contracts, as 
was done by the Hurtado government in the early 1980s. The material motivation—increased 
price factor—was coupled with substantive ideational ones: this shift was also the result of a 
narrow interpretation of state sovereignty over natural resources. In this light, service contracts 
were interpreted as the best way to preserve state ownership of the resource and enhance control 
over the industry.  
 
The impacts of these changes, nonetheless, have been limited by the contours of structural 
constraints Correa inherited from previous years of neoliberal governance, mainly its lack of 
access to foreign finance and its loss of monetary sovereignty (see chapter 7). Unlike Venezuela, 
Ecuador’s unattractive reserves and the state’s long-lasting incapacity to regulate the sector 
complicated the country’s bargaining position with IOCs. While major private IOCs remain 
uninterested in pursuing more investments in the country, largely due to political risk but also as 
a result of the changes in the contractual framework, Ecuador has found important allies in 
China’s SOEs and financial institutions. China’s desire to increase its energy reserves and the 
state backing of its NOCs makes them better positioned to do business in a relatively risky and 
marginal producer such as Ecuador. China’s entrance into both Ecuador and Venezuela 
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contributes to understanding diversity in foreign investors’ behavior, something that has not yet 
been analyzed in detail in the bargaining literature. It further reveals the rise of globalized forms 






The evolution from stringent to hybrid treatment of foreign investment: 
consolidating arguments and contributions 
 
9.1. Revisiting main arguments 
 
Before proceeding to highlight the main arguments and contributions advanced throughout this 
work, let us first start with a reminder of the main research questions guiding the thesis: (1) 
“How have the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean governments’ treatment of foreign investment in 
their oil sectors changed since the 1970s?” and (2) “What explains the approaches they have 
taken?” This research offers, in a distinct empirical contribution, an analysis of three eras in state 
treatment of foreign investment through careful case study analysis of both Venezuela and 
Ecuador’s oil industries’ historical trajectory in relation to foreign investors. In response to the 
first question, I have argued that state treatment of foreign investment has fluctuated since the 
1970s from stringency to an open attitude in the 1980s-1990s, to a hybrid model in the 2000s. 
While separate analyses of these two countries’ association with foreign capital in oil have been 
developed by other authors, most are dated and focus either on the 1970s and the previous era of 
concessions or on the 1990s opening. This is the first integrated analysis of both Venezuela and 
Ecuador’s treatment of foreign investment in the oil sector, up until the recent collapse of oil 
prices. In empirical terms, this dissertation offers a novel study of the evolution of state treatment 
of foreign investment in countries associated today with revolutionary resource nationalism. It 
does so from an historical perspective, which sheds light on the main continuities and ruptures of 
these countries’ approach to foreign investment in oil. 
 
Put into a wider context, the contributions of this study help explain the apparently deviant 
behavior of revolutionary resource nationalists in Venezuela and Ecuador. Their desire for 
control over the oil industry has been coupled with the continued welcoming of foreign 
investors. In fact, contemporary governments remain associated with foreign investment in ways 
that promote their own political economic agendas. Moreover, they are more closely linked with 
foreign investment than their resource nationalist counterparts were in the 1970s. These 
governments have taken advantage of improved bargaining conditions vis-á-vis foreign 
224 
 
companies, while at the same time promoting a hybrid model of association that enhances ideas 
of national sovereignty, national development and socialism.  
 
As a response to my second question, I proposed to bridge different approaches in a framework 
that seeks to explain these overall changes. In this context, I highlight the usefulness of a 
longstanding literature on state-IOC relations, the OBM literature, while also showing some of 
its most important limitations. Various crucial material variables, both exogenous to the domestic 
industry and endogenous to it, have been shown to be relevant. Investment cycle/industry 
maturity, oil prices, concentration of the industry and quality/quantity of a country’s crude 
endowments are variables that proved to be important throughout the history of state treatment of 
foreign investment. As this research illustrates, the rational actor model assumes two 
preconceived unitary actors, a host state and a foreign multinational that bargain based on 
material incentives. These assumptions, however, fail to recognize the internal heterogeneity of 
these actors. My analysis demonstrates the need to include how host state behavior can be 
influenced in new ways by distinct kinds of IOCs—state-owned IOCs, or SOEs—which have 
become prevalent in recent years due to the changes in the global economy and the global energy 
market. In my framework, I go further to suggest the need to examine how diverse social groups 
use ideas to impact state behavior and its treatment of foreign investment. State behavior can 
even be contradictory because of internal ideological contestations. Building on these ideological 
contestations, I argue that states do not always respond to exclusively material incentives but are 
also endowed with ideational motivations, which are subject to change and are often the result of 
domestic and transnational disputes. In the case of oil, the social purpose of natural resource 
wealth is an important component of national identities, having strong implications for state and 
societal attitudes toward capital and natural resource governance. Distinct ideas around 
socialism, development, and liberalism often work in favor of different forms of association with 
foreign capital.  
 
In sum, the main arguments that this thesis makes are the following. In the 1970s, both 
Venezuela and Ecuador managed to significantly change the terms of rents appropriation. In the 
Venezuelan case, it was the result of a long process of learning. Since 1948, the Venezuelan state 
had appropriated at least 50% of the industry’s profit through high royalties and corporate taxes. 
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Moreover, both countries aimed at taking over IOCs’ assets. In Venezuela, this translated into 
full nationalization in 1976 and in Ecuador it meant acquiring at least 51% of the main producing 
consortium’s assets. In this period, the variables stemming from OBM can largely explain the 
shift in Venezuela’s bargaining power: large sunk costs, high oil prices, increased state technical 
capacity, and a concentrated industry. These variables were important in Ecuador, but the shift in 
the bargaining power, demonstrated in the state’s increasing regulatory capacity, prompted Gulf 
Corporation to seek its own expropriation, aiming at state compensation. The shift toward the 
state’s stringent treatment of foreign investment was also motivated in both cases by the 
consolidation of a set of ideas and norms that had international repercussions (the creation of 
OPEC, for example), and fed from transnational sources (ECLAC’s structuralism and the NIEO 
movement). These ideas were an important source of inspiration for the Ecuadorian military in 
their dealing with Texaco-Gulf. Internal ideological contestations shaped arrangements in both 
countries and showed important cleavages that tend to be overlooked. In Ecuador, for example, 
the military was less unified around nationalization of the Gulf Corporation than existing 
scholarship has suggested. In Venezuela, a split among nationalist factions emerged in the 1940s 
and had crucial implications in the development of oil policy in the 1970s and thereafter. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, both countries became increasingly open to foreign investment. In 
the Venezuelan case, oil opening was the result of a largely unrecognized agent in the OBM 
literature: NOCs. As analyzed in chapter 4, after nationalization, state-firm bargaining was 
basically internalized and a new bargaining dynamic emerged between the state and its NOC, 
PDVSA. The oil opening was largely a consequence of PDVSA’s plans borne out of and aimed 
at expanding its own autonomy. The main ideational driver of the opening in Venezuela was not 
necessarily the pursuit of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology imposed by state institutions, but 
rather the subjective identity of PDVSA’s managers who saw the company mainly as an oil 
producer, with a distinct set of interests, that differed from those of the state. In Ecuador, on the 
other hand, neoliberalism was endorsed by a political elite in strained economic circumstances. 
Opening to oil investment was considered an integral component of neoliberal restructuring, as it 
provided much-needed foreign exchange for debt repayment. Internal ideological contestations 
and resistance grew in Ecuador, but remained mostly outside the institutional realm, in the form 
of social activism. Meanwhile, in Venezuela, those tensions were present in state structures 
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through different party interests. In both countries, the content of the new contracts of association 
was affected by the fact that they initiated a new investment cycle in the context of a low oil 
price, further benefitting investors. Similarly, the expansion of the resource frontier to marginal 
camps and unconventional crudes increased states’ dependence on foreign companies’ 
technology and capital. 
 
In the 2000s, the governments of the new left in Venezuela and Ecuador tried to redress the 
opening of their oil sector. But their policies did not mirror those of the 1970s. Unlike the 1970s, 
when resource nationalism was equated with the nationalization or state takeover of the oil 
industry in many producing countries, resource nationalism was seen as still compatible with 
foreign investment in the 2000s. State agents changed the terms of the contracts with foreign 
companies, pursuing a hybrid model consisting of more control and continued reliance on 
investments. In this period, state officials had the incentive to shift the bargain as many 
investors’ costs had been sunk from the 1990s openings and as oil prices skyrocketed. The terms 
of the shifts were largely determined by the contours of internal contestations, as in the case of 
Venezuela between the government and PDVSA, where contrasting ideas mobilized different 
factions of the state until the government assured control over the company. Bold political 
agendas of social transformation inspired these governments to seek these changes. In the case of 
Venezuela, a new form of socialism, based on oil rents distribution was upheld. In Ecuador, 
state-led developmentalism was advanced. In both cases, reliance on foreign investment was 
crucial for the procurement of these agendas. Yet, the continued exploitation of unconventional 
crudes and the rise of new market actors contributed to the hybrid nature of state treatment of 
investments. In this case, Chinese companies became important sources of investment for both 
countries. Moreover, Chinese financial institutions such as the CDB became major providers of 
development cooperation and lending, which other market and multilateral agencies were not 
similarly willing to offer. The decisions of Venezuela and Ecuador to pursue drastic changes in 
their form of association, when faced with resistance from traditional IOCs, found willing new 
investors from the Chinese SOEs.723 Many of these SOEs increased their presence in Venezuela 
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and Ecuador, taking over assets from companies that rejected the new deals the governments 
imposed.  
 
Taken together, the contributions of this dissertation demonstrate that even in the presence of 
similar material motivations and bargaining conditions, different ideological disputes can impact 
states differently in their treatment of foreign companies. The ideological contestations between 
the Venezuelan state and its NOC carry a much heavier weight in the government’s 
considerations of its treatment of foreign investments. Meanwhile, for Correa’s Ecuador, the 
history of ‘give away’ conditioned its crafting of new oil contracts. Moreover, important 
differences in the material variables affecting the bargaining conditions of each country produce 
varied impacts in a new arrangement. Venezuela’s significantly larger crude reserve endowments 
represent an advantage in comparison with Ecuador, which gives the Bolivarian political elite the 
possibility to take bolder moves while paying a relatively lower cost. Even despite Ecuador’s 
radical changes of contracts, the burdens and costs of companies were not dramatically altered in 
the current era, as they were in Venezuela. Similarly, each set of state officials interpreted 
material conditions in different ways. For Ecuador, the context of high oil prices seemed to be 
constant after 2010, when they decided to negotiate service contracts with a fixed fee for the next 
15 years. In Venezuela, government officials’ desire to keep PDVSA under control contributed 
to their offering of assets under joint ventures to foreign companies, something that nationalists 
and important sectors of society vehemently opposed in the 1970s.  
 
9.2 Contributions to the advancement of knowledge: international politics and global 
governance 
 
This work is inscribed in the tradition of IPE, a multidisciplinary endeavor that sits at the 
intersection of politics, economics, international relations and other currents of knowledge.724 It 
embraces a wide range of methods and traditions that have been and continue to be a global 
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conversation.725 By focusing on the political economy evolution of two Latin American states’ 
treatment of foreign investment in the oil sector, it contributes to an enduring tradition of 
scholarship that seeks to place Latin American contributions to IPE and development thinking 
and practice front and center of these discussions.726 In fact, Latin America has been for long a 
region of the world where treatment of foreign investment has been the subject of intense 
experimentation.727 Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s debates about how to associate with foreign 
investors in their oil sector to reap higher benefits for the state are concomitant with intellectual 
and political discussions in the region that various historical figures have had about the need to 
enhance certain kinds of investment for the benefit of society. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, OBM has been used as the main approach to explain shifting state-
company relations. This work provides several contributions to the wealth of literature on this 
subject. It provides a political economy lens from which to expand on the state-foreign capital 
link beyond important material considerations affecting state-company bargaining, as current 
manifestations of the literature have stressed. Generally speaking, my framework contributes to 
incorporating new considerations in the OBM debates. Considering changes in the global energy 
market, this work suggests the need to expand the theory’s view of industry concentration to 
include new forms of IOCs. In addition, this work critiques the notion of unitary actors and 
rational behavior in OBM models. It demonstrates that, while most actors may seek to extract 
higher rents from the oil business, there may be different interpretations as to how to achieve this 
within the state. At times, different actors dispute the legitimate role to exercise regulation and 
extract benefits from the business. This was the case of PDVSA in Venezuela, which in the 
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1990s, sought ways to replace the Ministry of Energy and Mines as regulator of the industry and 
openly challenged the President’s oil policy goals. PDVSA went further to replace the long-
lasting state priority of rent maximization for the goal of increasing production. Inserting the role 
of NOCs in the bargaining discussions represents a critical contribution. Furthermore, in 
Ecuador, organized Indigenous groups and environmental activists impacted state policy to the 
extent that the constitution has granted rights to nature. These rights translated for some time in 
the current Ecuadorian government into a policy to curb further oil extraction. While this 
proposal was short-lived, its mere enunciation and actual temporary implementation radically 
questions the assumption that rational behavior necessarily translates into higher rent capture and 
therefore higher and more efficient extraction.  
 
By adopting and modifying the politics of bargaining insights, this research also offers a nuanced 
reading of natural resource governance that details different gradations of regulation. The image 
of the bargain has been useful to showcase different processes, choices and forms of association 
that can take place beyond nationalization and liberalization, often seen in the literature as 
exclusive, and irreconcilable extremes.728 For example, much of the contemporary literature on 
the 1970s in Ecuador assumes that the military ‘nationalized oil’. While state treatment of 
foreign investment was indeed stringent, my research shows the contentious nature of the 
reforms and the limits the government faced in attaining its ultimate goals. Likewise, 
revolutionary resource nationalism in the current era takes hybrid forms that respond to specific 
bargaining outcomes and do not necessarily conform to the nationalization versus liberalization 
pendulum.  
 
Constructivist scholarship in international relations and international political economy has 
become a reference point encompassing ideational approaches to international politics. The 
notion of economic nationalism as an ideational device that can in fact coexist with global forces 
and interests has been explored in constructivist IPE literature.729 Focusing on the state, I 
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integrated constructivist insights, giving prevalence to the meaning of ideas held by powerful 
actors and how these meanings affect their motivations in relation to oil investments. Dominant 
ideas may initiate from state officials or can travel from and to transnational sites based on 
widely held consensus on major paradigms such as development or liberalization.730 Moreover, I 
have shown how peripheral states can help shape international norms, as in the case of the 
Petroleum Pentagon and Venezuela’s thresholds of rent capture in other landlord states. 
Dominant ideas with respect to national development guided state action for much of the 
twentieth century. Notions such as ‘sowing the oil’ became a consensus around industrialization 
through rent capture in Venezuela. In Ecuador today transforming the country’s ‘productive 
matrix’ gives meaning to policies of industrialization and innovation that underpin state-led 
development.  
 
Similarly, political ecology and political geography literatures have for some time depicted the 
imaginaries and alternative forms of rationalities regarding resource governance as constitutive 
of the conflicts around extraction. 731  Uncovering the role of subjectivity is crucial for 
comprehending the position of certain social actors, as understood by post-structuralist 
constructivist scholars. I integrate insights from both constructivism and political ecology 
building on the struggles of different actors and their power relations in explaining state action. 
In this way, it is possible to conceive of ideological contestations between the state and its own 
company. PDVSA’s self-image corresponded for quite some time with that of a large oil 
producer rather than a national agent of a landlord state. As discussed in the case of Ecuador in 
particular, contestations around development and liberalism can be expressed through on-the-
ground disputes and identities that have for a long time remained at the margins. In sum, ideas 
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have played important roles in the shifting of state treatment of foreign investment. The way the 
state conceptualized sovereignty over natural resources in Ecuador during the Correa 
government translated into the signing of service contracts as opposed to other forms of 
association. In Venezuela, the ideal of socialism and how to achieve control over the main source 
of wealth in the country prompted state officials to ally with foreign investors to bypass national 
technocrats and keep PDVSA under strict control.  
 
Bridging together these approaches provides a critical contribution to broad discussions in 
political science and global governance about the tensions between rationalist and ideational 
approaches. In fact, as demonstrated herein, they can complement one another, as the tension 
between structure and agency are often intertwined and embedded in social mechanisms such as 
negotiations or bargains, mobilizations, and trans-border flows in the oil industry. The struggles 
waged between various set of actors necessarily include ideational and material considerations, 
and these considerations evolve through time. States and state officials represent the interests of 
diverse nations with different groups struggling to seize benefits, both material and symbolic, 
from state and market structures. States are also constrained by subsoil endowments, despite 
their ability and agency to change the arrangements with foreign investors.  
 
The bridging of material and ideational constraints and motivations further illuminates 
contributions in the global governance debates around the issue of diffusion of power. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, much discussion in global governance literature has centered on the 
questions of who governs in the global era and through what means do they do so.732 The notion 
that authority has been decentered away from the state to other mechanisms, networks and actors 
remains widely debated.733 Nevertheless, the coexistence of public and private authority has 
evolved in ways that need not be contradictory. My work shows that national and global interests 
can be enhanced through hybrid policies that seek to simultaneously assert control and welcome 
foreign actors. The state appears in this case as a global actor, both carving out spaces within its 
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territory to enhance global alliances and also as a market actor, through SOEs, that competes 
with traditional IOCs.  
  
The current hybrid models of state treatment of foreign investment show an emerging mode of 
energy governance attuned with the rise of a new form of state capitalism after the global 
financial crisis.734 The rise of new powers not only offered new life to state-led governance and 
development strategies but it also strengthened state forces in the international energy market.735 
Nevertheless, the coming of age of new technologies in oil drilling also shows the strength of 
market power and the centrality of technological innovation that has already affected many oil 
producers and oil dependent and ‘contender’ states.736 The shifting conditions of extraction 
display complex arrangements of winners and losers that change over time. National states, 
foreign companies and varied other constituencies will continue to struggle over access to the 
benefits and exposure to the impacts, however broadly defined, that emerge from the exploitation 
of this highly politicized resource in the context of volatile markets. 
 
This analysis shows important differences in the political economy agendas embedded in the 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian experiments, which tend to be grouped together as part of the same 
‘camp’ of the South American left, blurring their distinctiveness. While the neo-extractivism 
literature highlights the extractive imperative of the new left as a legitimizing mechanism, it 
obscures the different development and political projects that are at stake. Venezuela’s rentier 
model of socialism has been centered on exercising political control over various constituencies. 
It has established a set of command and control policies, while maintaining a hybrid model that 
controls and welcomes foreign investment. As this work demonstrates, however, a model 
characterized as rentier socialism is only possible in Venezuela due to the vast crude reserves it 
possesses. In Ecuador, on the other hand, precisely because of its political elite’s awareness of 
the country’s limited oil reserves, the political economy agenda is focused on a new form of 
developmentalism. This renewed developmentalism is concerned with the transformation of the 
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country’s ‘productive matrix’. In this case, the government hopes to transcend its dependence on 
oil by temporarily deepening its extractive activities, while investing in new technologies and 
advancing bold industrial policies.  
 
This research brings in an historical perspective that calls into question some of the novelties that 
are generally ascribed to these processes. When compared to the 1990s, Venezuela and Ecuador 
seem to follow a more nationalist stance in their treatment of foreign investment. But if we look 
at a broader historical horizon, it is clear that contemporary resource nationalists are less 
stringent than other resource nationalist governments were in the past, and specifically, in the 
1970s. In other words, both the governments of Chávez and Correa did not aim at full 
nationalization of their oil industry as their 1970s counterparts did.  
 
According to current narratives that explain the left turn in the region, these governments use 
resource extraction as a means to extract higher benefits from the export of commodities and use 
the funds derived from such exports to legitimize their political projects. The neo-extractivism 
theses highlight, however, that there are still pernicious consequences of resource extraction in 
the social and environmental makeup of South American countries.737 They suggest that the 
confluence of enhancing extraction and redistribution is a rather new process; hence they apply 
the ‘neo’ label to the extractivist character of these regimes. The historical perspective allows an 
understanding that reliance on resource extraction has been a common feature of the many South 
American countries’ political economy since colonial times. This is true of Venezuela and 
Ecuador, and in the case of oil, the new left certainly did not bring reliance on resource 
extraction for the first time to their countries’ political and economic structures. Similarly, 
attempts at extracting higher benefits from the industry for the purpose of redistribution have 
been state goals for a long time.  
 
By providing a detailed historical analysis, this research shows the continued reliance on 
resource extraction and the fluctuating linkages with foreign investment beyond a functionalist 
lens. The deepening of extractivism in the current juncture has also been influenced by higher 
commodity prices and the presence of new actors in the global economy, namely China, its 
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SOEs, and its financial institutions. Both Venezuela and Ecuador have taken advantage of these 
changes but they have incorporated these new actors into longstanding dynamics of extraction 
and association that date to the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
9.3. New research avenues 
 
The analysis advanced here proposed to examine the evolution of state policy toward foreign 
investment in two oil-exporting countries in South America. Despite their apparent similarities in 
terms of wider political views, they differ in terms of their history with oil, and in terms of their 
resource endowments as well as internal social makeup. The flexibility between the two cases 
studied here suggests the potential applicability of the framework to other countries in and 
beyond the region. Exploring new cases could help strengthen the explanatory potential of this 
framework and uncover country-specific as well as transnational dynamics. In Latin America, 
the cases of Mexico and Bolivia are particularly salient, since they are the first nationalizers of 
the region. Bolivia, on the one hand, has a long tradition of social activism around gas and 
mining together with contentions surrounding national imaginaries and foreign intervention. 
Mexico, on the other hand, has for a long time remained closed to foreign investment in its oil 
sector, despite having advanced some of the deepest neoliberal reforms in the region. Cross-
regional analyses and sub-national contexts, as in the case of federal states, can yield fruitful 
similarities and differences.738 
 
My prime interest has centered on the interface of states and foreign investment in oil extraction. 
A close look at the changes in the political economy of extraction in recent years shows the 
expansion of new frontiers in other underground minerals, which may pose different challenges 
to this interface. Venezuela and Ecuador are also examples where mining has taken root as an 
economic activity in which the state relies heavily on foreign investment and where social 
activism is increasingly opposed to grand scale mining operations.739 But the integration of 
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bargaining models and ideational approaches can potentially apply to other extractive resources 
and other regions of the world as well.  
 
In analyzing the expansion of resource frontiers, an important avenue of work for IPE scholars 
and political scientists more generally, is a holistic elaboration of China’s power in these 
developments. China’s growing foreign investments and its increasingly prominent role in global 
governance mechanisms have attracted much attention thus far. Yet, the study of the conditions 
and relations regarding Chinese investments and interests in the extractive sector world-wide 
may also render important contributions to understand how this rising power sees its global role. 
The links between extraction and development finance requires potentially new 
conceptualizations around dependency and imperialism but also bargaining models, hegemonic 




                                                                                                                                                                                               
Discourses in Azuay, Ecuador,” in Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil and Gas in Latin America 




Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons. Constructing the International Economy. Cornell 
University Press, 2015. 
Abdelal, Rawi. “Constructivism as an Approach to International Political Economy.” In 
Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global 
Conversation. Routledge, 2009. 
Acharya, Amitav. “‘Idea-Shift’: How Ideas from the Rest Are Reshaping Global Order.” Third 
World Quarterly 37, no. 7 (July 2, 2016): 1156–70. 
doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1154433. 
———. “Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the 
Evolution of Norms.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 405–17. doi:10.5555/1075-2846-20.3.405. 
Acosta, Alberto. Breve Historia Económica Del Ecuador. 3rd. Edition. Quito: Corporación 
Editora Nacional, 2012. 
———. La Maldición de La Abundancia. Quito-Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2009. 
———. “La Reforma a La Ley de Hidrocarburos Y La Renegociación de Los Contratos 
Petroleros.” La Tendencia: Revista de Análisis Político 11 (March 2011): 95–104. 
———. “Preparémonos Para Lo Que Se Avecina.” In El Oriente Es Un Mito, 1a. Edición. 
Quito-Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2003. 
Acosta, Alberto, and Arturo Villavicencio. “Agenda Energética 2007-2011: Hacia Un Sistema 
Energético Sustentable.” Government report. Quito: Ministry of Energy and Mines, June 
2007. 
Alba Ciudad. “Intervenciones Del Diálogo de Paz Entre El Gobierno Del Presidente Nicolás 
Maduro Y La MUD.” Caracas: Alba Cuidad, April 11, 2014. 
http://albaciudad.org/wp/index.php/2014/04/videos-completos-el-dialogo-de-paz-entre-
el-gobierno-del-presidente-nicolas-maduro-y-las-mud/. 
Andrade Mendoza, Karen. “El Parque Nacional Yasuní Y La Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT Frente a La 
Explotación Petrolera. ¿Conservación O Explotación?” In Retos Y Amenazas En Yasuní, 
edited by Anita Krainer and María Fernanda Mora. Quito-Ecuador: FLACSO, WCS, 
2011. 
Andrade, Pablo. “El Reinio (de Lo) Imaginario: Los Intelectuales Políticos Ecuatorianos En La 
Construcción de La Constitución de 2008.” Ecuador Debate 85 (April 2012): 35–48. 
Andrade, Pablo, and Joaquín Zenteno Hopp. “Ecuador: Changing Biosafety Frames and New 
Political Forces in Correa’s Government.” In Environmental Politics in Latin America: 
Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development, edited by Benedicte Bull and 
Mariel Aguilar-Støen. New York: Routledge, 2015. 
Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van, Naná de Graaff, and Henk Overbeek. “The Reconfiguration of the 




Araujo, Alberto. “Ecuador Comprometió Ventas de Crudo Con China Hasta El 2024.” June 16, 
2016. http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ecuador-petroleo-china-exportaciones-
venta.html. 
Aráuz, Luis Alberto. “Contratación Petrolera Ecuatoriana 1972-2003.” In Petróleo Y Desarrollo 
Sostenible En Ecuador, edited by Guillaume Fontaine. Quito: FLACSO, 2004. 
Arévalo Luna, Guillermo. “Ecuador: Economía Y Política de La Revolución Ciudadana, 
Evaluación Preliminar.” Apuntes Del CENES 33, no. 58 (December 2014): 109–34. 
Arias Chaves, Victor Hugo. “Lineamientos Económicos Para La Optimización de La 
Particpación Del Estado En Contratos de Explotación Petrolera.” Maestría en Economía y 
Gestión Empresarial, Facultad Latinoaericana de Ciencias Sociales, Ecuador, 2011. 
Arráiz Lucca, Rafael. El “Trienio Adeco” (1945-1948) Y Las Conquistas de La Ciudadanía. 
Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2011. 
Arsel, Murat, Carlos Mena, Lorenzo Pellegrini, and Isabella Radhuber. “Property Rights, 
Nationalisation and Extractive Industries in Bolivia and Ecuador.” In Conflicts over 
Natural Resources in the Global South: Conceptual Approaches, edited by Maarten 
Bavinck, Lorenzo Pellegrini, and Erik Mostert. Leiden, The Netherlands: CRC 
press/Balkema, 2014. 
Arsel, Murat, Barbara Hogenboom, and Lorenzo Pellegrini. “The Extractive Imperative in Latin 
America.” The Extractive Industries and Society 3, no. 4 (2016): 880–87. 
doi:10.1016/j.exis.2016.10.014. 
 
Associated Press. “Yasuni: Ecuador Abandons Plan to Stave off Amazon Drilling.” The 
Guardian, August 16, 2013, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-abandons-yasuni-amazon-
drilling. 
Avant, Deborah D., Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell. Who Governs the Globe? Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations  ; 114. Cambridge, UK  ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
Balza Guanipa, Ronald. “De La Planificación Centralizada a La Regulación de La Economía: 
Propuesta de Transición Gradual Para Venezuela.” In Venezuela 2015: Economía 
Política Y Sociedad, edited by Ronald Balza Guanipa. Caracas: Fundación Konrad 
Adenauer Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2015. 
Banco Central del Ecuador. “Reporte Del Sector Petrolero: II Trimestre de 2015.” Government 
report. Quito: BCE, 2015. 
———. “Reporte Del Sector Petrolero: IV Trimestre de 2015.” Government report. BCE, 
December 2015. 
Banco Central de Venezuela. “Indicadores Macroeconómicos.” Official statistics. Caracas: BCV, 
2015. http://www.bcv.org.ve/c2/indicadores.asp. 
Baptista, Asdrúbal. Teoría Económica Del Capitalismo Rentístico. 2nd Edition. Clásicos Del 




Barnett, Michael N and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World International Organizations in 
Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations.” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–732. 
Bautista Urbaneja, Diego. La Renta Y El Reclamo: Ensayo Sobre Petróleo Y Economía Política 
En Venezuela. Caracas: Alfa, 2013. 
Bebbington, Anthony, and Jeffrey Bury. Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, 
and Gas in Latin America. University of Texas Press, 2013. 
Bebbington, Anthony, and Denise Humphreys Bebbington. “An Andean Avatar: Post-Neoliberal 
and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the Unobtainable.” New Political Economy 16, no. 
1 (2011): 131–45. 
Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study 
Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 455–76. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104918. 
Berger, Mark T. “After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism.” 
Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2004): 9–39. 
Berrios, Ruben, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern. “Explaining Hydrocarbon 
Nationalization in Latin America: Economics and Political Ideology.” Review of 
International Political Economy 18, no. 5 (2011): 673–97. 
Betancourt, Rómulo. El Petróleo de Venezuela. 3ra Edición. Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Seix 
Barral, 1978. 
———. Venezuela, Política Y Petróleo. Vol. Tomo 1. Editorial Alfa, 2013. 
———. Venezuela, Política Y Petróleo (Tomo II). Vol. Tomo II. Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2013. 
Billo, Emily. “Sovereignty and Subterranean Resources: An Institutional Ethnography of 
Repsol’s Corporate Social Responsibility Programs in Ecuador.” Geoforum 59 (2015): 
268–77. 
Boué, Juan Carlos. “El Programa de Internacionalización de Pdvsa:?` Triunfo Estratégico O 
Desastre Fiscal?” Revista Venezolana de Economía Y Ciencias Sociales 8, no. 2 (2002): 
237–82. 
Brading, Ryan. “From Passive to Radical Revolution in Venezuela’s Populist Project.” Latin 
American Perspectives 41, no. 6 (2014): 48–64. doi:10.1177/0094582X14521991. 
Bräutigam, Deborah, and Kevin P. Gallagher. “Bartering Globalization: China’s Commodity‐
backed Finance in Africa and Latin America.” Global Policy 5, no. 3 (2014): 346–52. 
doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12138. 
Bremmer, Ian, and Robert Johnston. “The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism.” Survival 51, 
no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 149–58. doi:10.1080/00396330902860884. 
Burchardt, Hans-Jürgen, and Kristina Dietz. “(Neo-) Extractivism–a New Challenge for 




Burgos Cáceres, Sigfrido, and Sophal Ear. “The Geopolitics of China’s Global Resources 
Quest.” Geopolitics 17, no. 1 (2012): 47–79. 
Bustamante, Teodoro, and Oscar Zapata. “Características de Los Contratos Petroleros.” In 
Detrás de La Cortina de Humo: Dinámicas Sociales Y Petróleo En El Ecuador, by 
Teodoro Bustamante. Quito-Ecuador: FLACSO, 2007. 
Buxton, Julia. “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez.” Venezuelan Politics in the Era 
of Chávez: Class, Polarization and Conflict, 2003, 113–30. 
Caballero, Manuel. Latin America and the Comintern 1919-1943 / Manuel Caballero. 
Cambridge Latin American Studies  ; v. 60. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]  : Cambridge 
University Press, c1986, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]  ;New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986. 
Cabezas, Rodrigo. “Política Petrolera Ecuatoriana.” Revista Nueva Sociedad No14, 1974. 
http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/127_1.pdf. 
C.A, Editorial Notitarde. “Maduro Dice Que Financiamiento de China Es Sin Condiciones.” 
Notitarde.com, July 23, 2014. http://www.notitarde.com/Economia/Maduro-dice-que-
financiamiento-de-China-es-sin-condiciones--/2014/07/23/340966/. 
Cannon, Barry. “As Clear as MUD: Characteristics, Objectives, and Strategies of the Opposition 
in Bolivarian Venezuela.” Latin American Politics and Society 56, no. 4 (2014): 49–70. 
doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00248.x. 
Cardoso, Elsa. “Fondos Y Trasfondos de La Petrodiplomacia.” In Venezuela 2015: Economía, 
Política Y Sociedad, edited by Ronald Balza Guanipa. Caracas: Fundación Konrad 
Adenauer Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2015. 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependencia Y Desarrollo En América Latina: 
Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica. Siglo xxi, 1996. 
Carrión, Andrea. “Economic Nationalism and the Public Dominion of Mineral Resources in 
Ecuador, 1929–1941.” The Extractive Industries and Society 2, no. 1 (2015): 104–11. 
Castañeda, Jorge. “Latin America’s Left Turn.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 28. 
Cerny, Philip. “The Competition State Today: From Raison d’Etat to Raison Du Monde.” Policy 
Studies 31, no. 1 (2010): 5–21. doi:10.1080/01442870903052801. 
Cerny, Philip G. Rethinking World Politics a Theory of Transnational Neopluralism. Oxford 
Scholarship Online. New York  ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733699.001.0001. 
Chávez, Hugo. Pensamiento Petrolero Del Comandante Chávez. Caracas: Ministerio del Poder 
Popular para Petróleo y Minería/ PDVSA, 2013. 
Chiriboga Zambrano, Galo. Al Toro Negro Por Los Cuernos. Quito: Casa de la Cultura 
Ecuatoriana, 2014. 
Chodor, Tom. “A Different Kind of Magic? Oil, Development and the Bolivarian Revolution in 
Venezuela.” In Energy, Capitalism and World Order, edited by Tim Di Muzio and Jesse 
Salah Ovadia. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
240 
 
Ciccariello-Maher, George. “Constituent Moments, Constitutional Processes Social Movements 
and the New Latin American Left.” Latin American Perspectives 40, no. 3 (May 1, 
2013): 126–45. doi:10.1177/0094582X13476001. 
———. We Created Chávez a People’s History of the Venezuelan Revolution. E-Duke Books 
Scholarly Collection. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 
Clapp, Jennifer, and Eric Helleiner. “International Political Economy and the Environment: Back 
to the Basics?” International Affairs 88, no. 3 (May 1, 2012): 485–501. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01085.x. 
Click, Reid W., and Robert J. Weiner. “Resource Nationalism Meets the Market: Political Risk 
and the Value of Petroleum Reserves.” Journal of International Business Studies 41, no. 
5 (June 2010): 783–803. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.90. 
Cohen, Benjamin J. International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Colgan, Jeff D. “Oil, Domestic Politics, and International Conflict.” Energy Research & Social 
Science 1 (March 2014): 198–205. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.005. 
———. Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013. 
Colgan, Jeff D., Robert O. Keohane, and Thijs Van de Graaf. “Punctuated Equilibrium in the 
Energy Regime Complex.” The Review of International Organizations 7, no. 2 (2012): 
117–43. 
Congreso de la República. “Ley Orgánica Que Reserva Al Estado, La Industria Y El Comercio 
de Los Hidrocarburos.” Caracas: República de Venezuela, 1975. 
Coronil, Fernando. “State Reflections: The 2002 Coup against Hugo Chávez.” In T. Ponniah and 
J. Eastwood, Eds, 37–65, 2011. 
———. The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. University of Chicago 
Press, 1997. 
———. “Venezuela’s Wounded Bodies: Nation and Imagination During the 2002 Coup.” 
NACLA Report on the Americas, February 2011, 33–40. 
Corrales, Javier. “Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reform? Argentina and 
Venezuela in the 1990s.” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 4 (1997): 617–44. 
doi:10.2307/2657694. 
———. “A Setback for Chávez.” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 1 (2011): 122–36. 
———. “The Repeating Revolution.” Edited by Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy 
Hunter. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings, 2010, 28. 
Corrales, Javier, and Michael Penfold-Becerra. “Venezuela: Crowding out the Opposition.” 
Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 (2007): 99–113. 
Corrales, Javier, and Michael Penfold. Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political 
Economy of Revolution in Venezuela. Brookings Institution Press, 2011. 
241 
 
Correa, Rafael. “Otra Economía Es Posible.” In Asedios a Lo Imposible Propuestas Económicas 
En Construcción, edited by Alberto Acosta and Falconí Fander. Ecuador: FLACSO, 
ILDIS-FES, 2005. 
Cox, Robert. “The ‘British School’ in the Global Context.” New Political Economy 14, no. 3 
(2009): 315. 
———.  Approaches to World Order. Cambridge Studies in International Relations  ; 40. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
———. “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–162. 
———. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55. 
doi:10.1177/03058298810100020501. 
Crane, George T. “Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back in.” Millennium-Journal of 
International Studies 27, no. 1 (1998): 55–75. 
Darwich, Gregorio. “Petróleo En Venezuela: Experiencias Del Siglo XX.” Espacio Abierto 23, 
no. 1 (2014). http://200.74.222.178/index.php/espacio/article/view/2488. 
Darwich Osorio, Gregorio. “Petróleo En Venezuela En El Siglo XX. De La Inexperiencia 
Institucional a La Pericia.” Cuadernos Del CENDES 32, no. 88 (2015): 159–67. 
Dávalos, Pablo. Alianza PAIS O La Reinvención Del Poder: Siete Ensayos Sobre El 
Posneoliberalismo En El Ecuador. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones desde abajo, 2014. 
Davila, Luis Ricardo. “The Rise and Fall and Rise of Populism in Venezuela.” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 19, no. 2 (2000): 223–38. doi:10.1016/S0261-3050(99)00082-0. 
De Graaff, Nana. “A Global Energy Network? The Expansion and Integration of Non-Triad 
National Oil Companies.” Global Networks 11, no. 2 (2011): 262–83. 
———. “The Hybridization of the State-Capital Nexus in the Global Energy Order.” 
Globalizations 9, no. 4 (2012): 531–45. doi:10.1080/14747731.2012.699926. 
De la Torre, Carlos. “Technocratic Populism in Ecuador.” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 3 
(2013): 33–46. 
Di John, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science 
Politique 26, no. 1 (2005): 107–24. 
———. From Windfall to Curse?: Oil and Industrialization in Venezuela, 1920 to the Present. 
Penn State Press, 2009. 
———. “Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and Evidence.” Global 
Governance 17, no. 2 (2011): 167–84. 
Dunning, Thad. “Endogenous Oil Rents.” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 379–
410. 
“Ecuador: Government Re-Negotiates Oil Contracts.” Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 




Eden, Lorraine, and Maureen Appel Molot. “Insiders, Outsiders and Host Country Bargains.” 
Journal of International Management 8, no. 4 (2002): 359–88. doi:10.1016/S1075-
4253(02)00095-9. 
Eljuri, Elisabeth, and Victorino J Tejera Pérez. “21st-Century Transformation of the Venezuelan 
Oil Industry.” Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 26, no. 4 (November 2008): 
475–98. doi:10.1080/02646811.2008.11435196. 
Ellis, Robert Evan. China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores. Vol. 46. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Boulder, Colo, 2009. 
Ellner, Steve. “Latin America’s Radical Left in Power Complexities and Challenges in the 
Twenty-First Century.” Latin American Perspectives 40, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 5–25. 
doi:10.1177/0094582X13478398. 
Ellner, Steve, and Daniel Hellinger. Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era  : Class, Polarization, 
and Conflict. Boulder, Colo; London: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
El Mundo. “China Otorga Otros $5.691 Millones En Créditos Para Venezuela.” El Mundo 
Economía Y Negocios, July 21, 2014. 
http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/economia/politicas-publicas/china-otorga-otros--5-
691-millones-en-creditos-par.aspx. 
———. “Pdvsa Acuerda Crédito de $1.760 Millones Con Italiana ENI.” El Mundo Economía Y 
Negocios, May 5, 2009. http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/petroleo/pdvsa/pdvsa-
acuerda-credito-de-$1-760-millones-con-itali.aspx#ixzz3xnYqUEbF. 
El Universal. “Arreaza: Inversión Social Desde 1999 Es de 623.058 Millones de Dólares - 
Nacional Y Política,” February 25, 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/140225/arreaza-inversion-social-desde-1999-es-de-623058-millones-de-dolares. 
———. “Pdvsa Signs Agreements with Halliburton, Schlumberger and Weatherford,” May 21, 
2014. http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140521/pdvsa-signs-agreements-with-
halliburton-schlumberger-and-weatherford. 
———. “Sinopec and Pdvsa to Invest USD 14 Billion in the Junín 1 Oilfield - Daily News,” 
September 17, 2013. http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130917/sinopec-and-pdvsa-
to-invest-usd-14-billion-in-the-junin-1-oilfield. 
Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.31025. 
———. “Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or Post-
Development?” Cultural Studies 24, no. 1 (2010): 1–65. 
Escribano, Gonzalo. “Ecuador’s Energy Policy Mix: Development versus Conservation and 
Nationalism with Chinese Loans.” Energy Policy 57 (2013): 152–59. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.01.022. 
Escribano, G., and J. Valdés. “Oil Prices: Governance Failures and Geopolitical Consequences.” 
Geopolitics, 2016, 1–26. doi:10.1080/14650045.2016.1254621. 
243 
 
Espinasa, Ramon. “Commentary: Not Just a Distributional Matter.” The Natural Resources 
Trap: Private Investment Without Public Commitment, 2010, 467. 
Estados Unidos de Venezuela. “Ley de Hidrocarburos.” Law. Caracas: Ministerio de Minas e 
Hidrocarburos, March 13, 1943. 
Evans, Peter. “Recent Research on Multinational Corporations.” Annual Review of Sociology 7 
(1981): 199–223. 
Ferreira, Maira. “Pdvsa Informó de Acuerdo Con Rosneft Que Sumará Ingresos de $500 
Millones.” El Universal, February 22, 2016. 
http://www.eluniversal.com/noticias/economia/pdvsa-informo-acuerdo-con-rosneft-que-
sumara-ingresos-500-millones_10714. 
Figueroa, Ahiana. “China Ahora Exige Proyectos Y Es Más Cautelosa Con Venezuela.” El 
Mundo Economía Y Negocios, July 23, 2014. 
http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/economia/mercados/china-ahora-exige-proyectos-
y-es-mas-cautelosa-con.aspx. 
———. “Prevén Que Continúe El Incremento ‘abrupto’ de La Liquidez Monetaria.” El Mundo 
Economía Y Negocios, February 2, 2014. 
http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/noticias/preven-que-continue-el-
incremento--abrupto--de-la-.aspx. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
 International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. 
Fontaine, Guillaume. “ITT: Un Problema de Gobernanza Para El Ecuador.” In La Guerra Del 
Fuego Políticas Petroleras Y Crisis Energética En América Latina, edited by Guillaume 
Fontaine and Alicia Puyana. FLACSO, Ministerio de Cultura, 2008. 
———. Petropolítica: Una Teoría de La Gobernanza Energética. Quito-Ecuador: FLACSO, 
2010. 
———. “Sobre Bonanzas Y Dependencia: Petróleo Y Enfermedad Holandesa En El Ecuador.” 
Íconos, Revista de Ciencias Sociales 13 (March 2002): 102–6. 
———. “The Effects of Governance Modes on the Energy Matrix of Andean Countries.” Energy 
Policy 39 (2011): 2888–98. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836. 
Gallagher, Kevin P., Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski. “The New Banks in Town: Chinese 
Finance in Latin America,” 2012. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.357.3572. 
Garavini, Giuliano. “Completing Decolonization: The 1973 ‘Oil Shock’and the Struggle for 
Economic Rights.” The International History Review 33, no. 3 (2011): 473–87. 
García Banchs, Angel. “La Política Monetaria de Los Países Miembros de La OPEP.” Nueva 
Economía XVIII, no. 31 (July 2010): 61–82. 




Garzón, Paulina. “Una Cuestionable Alianza Sur-Sur: Las Inversiones Chinas En Ecuador Y La 
Región.” In La Restauración Conservadora Del Correísmo, 1a Edición. Montecristi Vive. 
Quito: Arcoiris Producción, 2014. 
Gereffi, Gary, and Peter Evans. “Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development, and State 
Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico.” Latin American 
Research Review 16, no. 3 (1981): 31–64. 
Gerlach, Allen. Indians, Oil, and Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador. Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003. 
González Casas, Lorenzo. “Nelson A. Rockefeller Y La Modernidad Venezolana: Intercambios, 
Empresas Y Lugares a Mediados Del Siglo XX.” In Petróleo Nuestro Y Ajeno: La Ilusión 
de Modernidad, edited by Juan José Martín Frechilla and Yolanda Texera Arnal. Caracas: 
Universidad Central de Venezuela, CDCH, 2005. 
Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben. “China’s Engagement in South America and Africa’s Extractive 
Sectors: New Perspectives for Resource Curse Theories.” The Pacific Review 24, no. 1 
(2011): 65–87. 
———. “The Limits to China’s Non-Interference Foreign Policy: Pro-State Interventionism and 
the Rescaling of Economic Governance.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, 
no. 2 (2015): 205–23. 
Gordillo, Ramiro. ¿El Oro Del Diablo? Ecuador: Historia Del Petróleo. Quito: Corporación 
Editora Nacional, 2005. 
Grugel, Jean, and Pía Riggirozzi. “Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and 
Reclaiming the State after Crisis.” Development and Change 43, no. 1 (2012): 1–21. 
Gudynas, Eduardo. “Diez Tesis Urgentes Sobre El Nuevo Extractivismo.” In Extractivismo, 
Política Y Sociedad, edited by CLAES. Quito: CAAP/CLAES, 2009. 
———. “Natural Resource Nationalisms and the Compensatory State in Progressive South 
America.” In The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From 
Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism, edited by Paul Haslam and Pablo Heidrich. New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2016. 
Guzzini, Stefano, and Iver B. Neumann. The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance: 
International Political Economy Meets Foucault. Palgrave Studies in International 
Relations. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire  ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A 
Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 
(2011): 1–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055410000584. 
Hancké, Bob. Intelligent Research Design: A Guide for Beginning Researchers in the Social 
Sciences. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Hart-Landsberg, Martin. “ALBA and the Promise of Cooperative Development.” Monthly 
Review 62, no. 7 (2010): 1–17. 
Harvey, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
245 
 
Haslam, Paul, and Pablo Heidrich. “From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism: States, Firms 
and Development.” In The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: 
From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism, 1–33. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. 
———. , eds. The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From 
Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. 
Haya De La Torre, Victor Raúl. “El Antimperialismo Y El APRA.” Santiago: Ercilla, 1936. 
Heidrich, Pablo. “The Regional Context of Latin American Resource Nationalism.” In The 
Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to 
Resource Nationalism, 89–102. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. 
Helleiner, Eric. “Conclusion: The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Economic 
Nationalism.” In Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World, edited by Eric Helleiner 
and Andreas Pickel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
———. “Division and Dialogue in Anglo-American IPE: A Reluctant Canadian View.” New 
Political Economy 14, no. 3 (2009): 377–83. doi:10.1080/13563460903087524. 
———. “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th 
Century.” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (2002): 307–29. 
———. Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of 
the Postwar Order. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014. 
———. “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought *.” Contexto Internacional 37, 
no. 3 (2015): 975–1010. 
Helleiner, Eric, and Andreas Pickel. Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. Cornell 
Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Hellinger, Daniel. “Oil and the Chavez Legacy.” Latin American Perspectives, June 3, 2016. 
doi:10.1177/0094582X16651236. 
———. “Resource Nationalism and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.” In The Political 
Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to Resource 
Nationalism, edited by Paul Haslam and Pablo Heidrich. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2016. 
Hidalgo López, Érika. “Plan Petrolero Local Exige Flexibilizar Acuerdos Y Ajustar Meta de 
Inversiones.” El Mundo Economía Y Negocios, June 1, 2015. 
http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/petroleo/pdvsa/plan-petrolero-local-exige-
flexibilizar-acuerdos-y.aspx. 
Hogenboom, Barbara. “Latin America and China’s Transnationalizing Oil Industry: A Political 
Economy Assessment of New Relations.” Perspectives on Global Development and 
Technology 13, no. 5–6 (2014): 626–47. 
Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Alfred Montero. “The Renewed Developmental State: The National 
Development Bank and the Brazil Model.” The Journal of Development Studies 49, no. 
11 (2013): 1484. 
Hults, David R. “Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA): From Independence to Subservience.” 
Victor et Al., Eds, Oil and Governance, 2012, 418–77. 
246 
 
Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Escaping the Resource Curse. 
Cambridge Univ Press, 2007. 
Isch L., Edgar. “El Extractivismo Como Negación de La Constitución de La República.” In El 
Correísmo Al Desnudo, 2a Edición. Montecristi Vive. Arcoiris Producción, 2013. 
Jaffe, Amy M. “Resource Nationalism and Oil Development: Profit or Peril?” In Beyond the 
Resource Curse, by Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov. University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2012. 
Jarrín Ampudia, Gustavo. “La Posición Del Ecuador En Materia de Política Energética (1974).” 
In Política Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 1972-1976, 11–60. Quito-Ecuador: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1976. 
Jenkins, Barbara. “Reexamining the ‘Obsolescing Bargain’: A Study of Canada’s National 
Energy Program.” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 139–65. 
Jijón, Victor Hugo. “Hacia Una Política Petrolera Ecuatoriana.” In Hacia Un Modelo Alternativo 
de Desarrollo Histórico, by Rafael Quintero López and Erika Silva Charvet. Quito: 
Ediciones La Tierra, 2005. 
Karl, Terry Lynn. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Vol. 26. Univ of 
California Press, 1997. 
Kauffman, Craig M., and Pamela L. Martin. “Scaling up Buen Vivir: Globalizing Local 
Environmental Governance from Ecuador.” Global Environmental Politics 14, no. 1 
(2014): 40–58. 
Keck, Margaret E. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. 
Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
Kluge, Janis Nikolaus. “Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and the Limited Access 
Order.” New Political Economy, July 2016, 1–19. doi:10.1080/13563467.2016.1201802. 
Kobrin, Stephen J. “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in  
Developing Countries,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 609–38, 
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027624. 
Kohl, Benjamin, and Linda Farthing. “Material Constraints to Popular Imaginaries: The 
Extractive Economy and Resource Nationalism in Bolivia.” Political Geography 31, no. 
4 (2012): 225–35. 
Koivumaeki, Riitta-Ilona. “Institutional Constraints on Economic Nationalism in Latin 
America.” Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Texas, 2015. 
Lander, Edgardo. “El Papel Del Gobierno de Los EE.UU. En El Golpe de Estado Contra El 
Presidente Chávez.  Una Exploración Preliminar.” OSAL: Observatorio Social de 
América Latina, June 2002, 5–9. 
———. La Colonialidad Del Saber: Eurocentrismo Y Ciencias Sociales: Perspectivas 
Latinoamericanas. Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, 1993. 
Lander, Luis E. “La Reforma Petrolera Del Gobierno de Chávez.” Revista Venezolana de 
Economía Y Ciencias Sociales 8, no. 2 (August 2002): 185–87. 
247 
 
Langley, Paul. “Power-Knowledge Estranged  : From Susan Strange to Poststructuralism in 
British IPE.” In Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a 
Global Conversation. Routledge, 2009. 
Larrea, Carlos. “Petróleo Y Estrategias de Desarrollo En El Ecuador: 1972-2005.” In Petróleo Y 
Desarrollo Sostenible En Ecuador, edited by Guillaume Fontaine. 3. Las Ganancias Y 
Pérdidas. Quito: FLACSO, ILDIS-FES, Petrobras, 2006. 
Larrea, Carlos, and Liisa L. North. “Ecuador: Adjustment Policy Impacts on Truncated 
Development and Democratisation.” Third World Quarterly, 1997, 913–34. 
Latorre, Sara, Katharine N. Farrell, and Joan Martínez-Alier. “The Commodification of Nature 
and Socio-Environmental Resistance in Ecuador: An Inventory of Accumulation by 
Dispossession Cases, 1980–2013.” Ecological Economics 116 (2015): 58–69. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.016. 
Le Calvez, Marc. “El Rediseño de Los Sistemas de Gobernanza Petrolera En El Ecuador Y 
Venezuela.” In La Guerra Del Fuego Políticas Petroleras Y Crisis Energética En 
América Latina, edited by Guillaume Fontaine and Alicia Puyana. Quito: FLACSO, 
Ministerio de Cultura, 2008. 
Lee, Emma. “Fracking into the Future of Petro-Market Civilization.” In Energy, Capitalism and 
World Order, edited by Tim Di Muzio and Jesse Salah Ovadia. Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016. 
Levy, David, and Aseem Prakash. “Bargains Old and New: Multinational Corporations in Global 
Governance.” Business and Politics 5, no. 2 (2003). 
Lieuwen, Edwin. Petroleum in Venezuela: A History. Vol. 47. Univ of California Press, 1954. 
Llanes, Henry. Contratos Petroleros: Inequidad En El Reparto de La Producción. 2a. Edición. 
Quito-Ecuador: El Manantial, 2008. 
———. “La Reforma Petrolera Del Gobierno de Rafael Correa.” La Tendencia: Revista de 
Análisis Político 11 (March 2011): 104–8. 
López, Manuel. “El Paro Petrolero Convocado El 4 de Abril de 2002 Desencadenó Los Hechos 
Del 11-A.” El Correo Del Orinoco. April 11, 2012. 
López Maya, Margarita. “Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement and His Presidency.” Venezuelan 
Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2003. 
———. “The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003): 117–37. 
———. “Una Aproximación Al Golpe de Estado Del 11 de Abril Y Sus Causas.” Journal of 
Iberian and Latin American Research 8, no. 1 (2002): 117–28. 
doi:10.1080/13260219.2002.10431765. 
———. “Venezuela after the Caracazo  : Forms of Protest in a Deinstitutionalized Context.” 




Long, Tom. “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and 
Collective Power.” International Studies Review, 2016, viw040. 
López Maya, Margarita, and Luis E. Lander. “Venezuela, Golpe Y Petróleo.” OSAL: 
Observatorio Social de América Latina, no. 2 (June 2002): 15–18. 
Luong, Pauline Jones, and Jazmín Sierra. “The Domestic Political Conditions for International 
Economic Expansion” 48, no. 14 (2015): 2010–43. doi:10.1177/0010414015592647. 
Luong, Pauline Jones, and Erika Weinthal. “Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership 
Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints*.” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9 
(2006): 241–63. 
Mainwaring, Scott. “From Representative Democracy to Participatory Competitive 
Authoritarianism: Hugo Chávez and Venezuelan Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 10, 
no. 04 (2012): 955–67. 
Manzano, Osmel, and Francisco Monaldi. “12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract 
Renegotiation in Venezuela.” The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment without 
Public Commitment, 2010, 409. 
Mariátegui, José Carlos. 7 Ensayos de Interpretación de La Realidad Peruana, vol. 4  
(Caracas: Fundacion Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1979). 
 
Marini, Ruy Mauro. “Dialéctica de La Dependencia” (Era, 1977), http://lahaine.org/amauta/b2-
 img/mauro_dia.pdf. 
 
Martínez, Esperanza. “Las Políticas Minero/petroleras de La Revolución Ciudadana: 
Incumplimiento, Desvío, Avocamiento Y Coacción.” In El Correísmo Al Desnudo, 2a 
Edición. Montecristi Vive. Quito: Arcoiris Producción, 2013. 
Martín Frechilla, JJ, and Y. Texera Arnal. “Petróleo Nuestro Y Ajeno. La Ilusión de 
Modernidad.” Caracas: CDCH-UCV, 2005. 
Martín Frechilla, Juan José. “Ni Bendito Ni Maldito. Visión de Conjunto Del Impacto Del 
Petróleo En La Sociedad Venezolana.” In Petróleo Nuestro Y Ajeno: La Ilusión de 
Modernidad, edited by Juan José Martín Frechilla and Yolanda Texera Arnal. Caracas: 
Universidad Central de Venezuela, CDCH, 2005. 
Martz, John D. Politics and Petroleum in Ecuador. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 
Inc., 1987. 
McBeth, Brian Stuart. Juan Vicente Gómez and the Oil Companies in Venezuela, 1908-1935. 
Vol. 43. Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Mendoza Potellá, Carlos. Nacionalismo Petrolero Venezolano En Cuatro Décadas. Maracaibo: 
BCV, LUZ, 2010. 
Mikesell, Raymond F. Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case 




Ministerio de Energía y Minas. “Venezuela:: Exploración Y Producción En Areas Nuevas, 1995. 
Marco de Condiciones. Aprobadas Por El Congreso de La República de Venezuela Para 
La Celebración de Los Convenios de Asociación.” MEM/PDVSA, 1995. 
Mommer, Bernard. Global Oil and the Nation State. Oxford University Press, USA, 2002. 
———. La Cuestión Petrolera. 3rd edition. Plena Soberanía Petrolera. Caracas: Fondo Editorial 
Darío Ramírez PDVSA, 2010. 
———. “Subversive Oil.” In Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and 
Conflict, edited by Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, 2003. 
———. “Venezuela, Política Y Petróleos.” Cuadernos Del CENDES, no. 42 (1999): 63–107. 
———. “Venezuela: Un Nuevo Marco Legal E Institucional Petrolero.” Revista Venezolana de 
Economía Y Ciencias Sociales 8, no. 2 (2002): 201–7. 
Moore, Jennifer, and Teresa Velázquez. “Water for Gold: Onfronting State and Corporte Mining 
Discourses in Azuay, Ecuador.” In Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, 
Oil and Gas in Latin America. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013. 
Mora Contreras, Jesús. “Derechos de Propiedad, Compañías Petroleras, Estado Y Renta En 
Venezuela.” América Latina Hoy 53 (2009). 
http://revistas.usal.es/~revistas_trabajo/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/5939. 
Moran, Theodore H. Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in 
Chile. Princeton, N.J, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 
Muhr, Thomas. “(Re)constructing Popular Power in Our America: Venezuela and the 
Regionalisation of ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ in the ALBA-TCP Space.” Third World 
Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2012): 225. 
———. “Tina Go Home! Alba and Re-Theorizing Resistance to Global capitalism.(America-
Peoples’ Trade Agreement).” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social 
Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2010): 27. 
Munck, Gerardo L. “Tools for Qualitative Research.” In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse 
Tools, Shared Standards, edited by Henry E. Brady and David Collier. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 
Narváez, Iván. “Huaorani: Mundos Paralelos, Mundos Superpuestos Y Submundos.” In La 
Guerra Del Fuego Políticas Petroleras Y Crisis Energética En América Latina, edited by 
Guillaume Fontaine and Alicia Puyana. Quito: FLACSO, Ministerio de Cultura, 2008. 
———. Petróleo Y Poder: El Colapso de Un Lugar Singular Yasuní. 1a Edición. Quito-Ecuador: 
FLACSO-GTZ, 2009. 
———. “Yasuní Y Derechos Colectivos Indígenas En El Estado Constitutional de Derechos, 
Intercultural Y Plurinacional, Ecuatoriano.” In Retos Y Amenazas En Yasuní, edited by 
Anita Krainer and María Fernanda Mora. FLACSO, WCS, 2011. 
Nem Singh, Jewellord Tolentino. “Towards Post-Neoliberal Resource Politics? The International 
Political Economy (IPE) of Oil and Copper in Brazil and Chile.” New Political Economy 
19, no. 3 (2014): 329–58. 
250 
 
“Normativa Hidrocarburífera.” Government report. Quito-Ecuador: Secretaría de Hidrocarburos, 
2012. 
Olivares, Francisco. “Arco Minero Y Ambiente.” El Universal, April 3, 2016. 
http://www.eluniversal.com/noticias/economia/arco-minero-ambiente_247568. 
Palma, Pedro A. “La Economía Venezolana En El Quinquenio de 1994-1998: De Una Crisis a 
Otra.” Nueva Economía Año VIII, no. No. 12 (April 1999): 97–158. 
———. “Riesgos Y Consecuencias de Las Economías Rentistas El Caso de Venezuela.” 
Problemas Del Desarrollo 42, no. 165 (2011): 35–59. 
———. “Tsunamis Cambiarios.” In Las Circunstancias Mundiales Y Venezuela: Cambios 
Imaginarios Y Reales, edited by Luis Mata Mollejas. Caracas: Academia Nacional de 
Ciencias Económicas Coloquio “Alberto Adriani,” 2013. 
Pareja Yannuzzelli, Carlos. Caso Occidental: Soberanía O Sometimiento. Quito: Ediciones 
Abya-Yala, 2006. 
Parra Jácome, Ronny. “Estado Actual de La Política Del Sector Petrolero Ecuatoriano: Basado 
En El Análisis de Cambio de Política En El Período 1992-2012.” Tesis para obtener el 
título de Maestría en Ciencias Sociales con mención en Gobernanza Energética, Facultad 
Latinoaericana de Ciencias Sociales, Ecuador, 2013. 
Pellegrini, Lorenzo. “Resource Nationalism in the Plurinational State of Bolivia.” In The 
Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to 
Resource Nationalism, edited by Paul Haslam and Pablo Heidrich. Routledge, 2016. 
Pellegrini, Lorenzo, Murat Arsel, Fander Falconí, and Roldan Muradian. “The Demise of a New 
Conservation and Development Policy? Exploring the Tensions of the Yasuní ITT 
Initiative.” The Extractive Industries and Society 1, no. 2 (November 2014): 284–91. 
doi:10.1016/j.exis.2014.05.001. 
Penfold-Becerra, Michael. “Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A New 
Emerging Reality.” Working paper. Oxford, United Kingdom, July 2014. 
http://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/LAC%20Working%20Paper%20in%2
0Political%20Economy%20No%203,%20Michael%20Penfold,%20July%202014.pdf. 
Pérez Alfonzo, Juan Pablo. Hundiéndonos En El Excremento Del Diablo. Caracas: Banco 
Central de Venezuela, 2011. 
———. “Voto Salvado Del Doctor Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo.” In El Petróleo de Venezuela, 
edited by Rómulo Betancourt, 3rd Edition. Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Seix Barral, 1978. 
Pérez, Orlando, and Nelson Silva. Caso Chevron: La Verdad No Contaminada. Quito-Ecuador: 
El telégrafo, 2014. 
Perez S., Juan Jose. “El modelo de reparto ejecutivo de la renta en Venezuela (2003-
2009).(Report).” Revista Geografica Venezolana 52, no. 1 (2011): 125. 
Perreault, Tom. “Nature and Nation: Hydrocarbons, Governance, and the Territorial Logics of 
‘Resource Nationalism’ in Bolivia.” In Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of 
Mining, Oil and Gas in Latin America, edited by Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury. 
Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013. 
251 
 
Perreault, Tom, and Gabriela Valdivia. “Hydrocarbons, Popular Protest and National 
Imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in Comparative Context.” Geoforum 41, no. 5 (2010): 
689–99. 
Petróleos de Venezuela. “Informe Anual de Gestión 2012.” Business report. Caracas: PDVSA, 
2013. 
———. “Informe Anual de Gestión 2013.” Business report. Caracas: PDVSA, 2014. 
———. “Informe Anual de Gestión 2014.” Business report. Caracas: PDVSA, 2015. 
Philip, George. Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies. 
Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
———. “The Limitations of Bargaining Theory: A Case Study of the International Petroleum 
Company in Peru.” World Development 4, no. 3 (1976): 231–39. 
———. “When Oil Prices Were Low: Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) and Economic Policy-
Making in Venezuela since 1989.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 18, no. 3 (1999): 
361–76. 
Philip, George, and Francisco Panizza. The Triumph of Politics. John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
Phillips, Nicola, and Catherine Weaver. International Political Economy: Debating the Past, 
Present, and Future. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. 
Pickel, Andreas. “Explaining, and Explaining With, Economic Nationalism.” Nations and 
Nationalism 9, no. 1 (January 2003): 105–27. doi:10.1111/1469-8219.00077. 
Plaza, Salvador de la. Estructuras de Integración Nacional. Caracas: Editora San José, 1973. 
Pozo Crespo, Mauricio. “Reflexiones Sobre La Deuda Pública En El Ecuador.” In Deuda 
Externa Y Economía Ecológica: Dos Visiones Críticas, 1a Edición. Quito-Ecuador: 
FLACSO, 2009. 
Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. The New Press, 
2008. 
Prebisch, Raúl. “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems.” 
Comisión Económica Para América Latina Y El Caribe, 1950. 
http://archivo.cepal.org/pdfs/cdPrebisch/002.pdf. 
Prodavinci. “#Venezuela // ¿Qué Está Pasando Con El Sistema Eléctrico? ¿Por Qué Hay Una 
Crisis Eléctrica?” Prodavinci, February 25, 2016. 
http://prodavinci.com/2016/02/25/actualidad/venezuela-que-esta-pasando-con-el-sistema-
electrico-por-que-hay-una-crisis-electrica/. 
Purcell, Thomas F., Nora Fernandez, and Estefania Martinez. “Rents, Knowledge and Neo-
Structuralism: Transforming the Productive Matrix in Ecuador.” Third World Quarterly, 
April 26, 2016, 1–21. doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1166942. 
Quintero, Rodolfo. Antropología Del Petróleo. 2da Edición. Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 
1976. 
Radcliffe, Sarah A. “Development for a Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the 
Limits to Decolonisation in Ecuador.” Geoforum 43, no. 2 (2012): 240–49. 
252 
 
Ramamurti R. “The Obsolescing `Bargaining Model’? MNC-Host Developing Country Relations 
Revisited.” Journal of International Business Studies 32, no. 1 (2001): 23–39. 
Ramírez, Rafael. “Palabras Del Ministro de Energía Y Petróleo Y Presidente de PDVSA, Rafael 
Ramírez, Ante La Plenaria de La Asamblea Nacional Sobre El Modelo de Empesas 
Mixtas.” Caracas: Ministerio de Energía y Petróleo / PDVSA, March 23, 2006. 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela. “Decreto Con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos.” 
Law. Caracas, November 13, 2001. 
———. “Ley Aprobatoria Del Acuerdo Entre El Gobierno de Venezuela Y de China Sobre 
Cooperación Para Financiamiento a Largo Plazo.” Law. Caracas, 2010. 
———. “Ley Aprobatoria Del Segundo Protocolo de Enmienda Al Acuerdo Entre El Gobierno 
de La República Bolivariana de Venezuela Y El Gobierno de La República Popular 
China Sobre El Fondo de Financiamiento Conjunto Chino-Venezolano.” Law. Caracas, 
2012. 
———. “Ley de Regionalización Integral Para El Desarrollo de La Patria.” Law. Caracas, 2014. 
———. “Proyecto de Modelo de Contrato Para Las Empresas Mixtas Entre La Coporación 
Venezolana de Petróleo S.A. Y Las Entidades Privadas.” Law. Caracas, March 31, 2006. 
———. “Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar.” Government report. Caracas, 2007. 
———. “Reforma Parcial de La Ley Del Banco Central de Venezuela (LRPBCV).” Law. 
Caracas, 2005. 
Riggirozzi, Pía. “Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New 
Synthesis.” New Political Economy 17, no. 4 (September 2012): 421–43. 
doi:10.1080/13563467.2011.603827. 
Rival, Laura. “Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative: The Old and New Values of Petroleum.” 
Ecological Economics, Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70, no. 2 
(December 15, 2010): 358–65. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.09.007. 
Rochlin, James. “Development, the Environment and Ecuador’s Oil Patch: The Context and 
Nuances of the Case against Texaco.” Journal of Third World Studies 28, no. 2 (Fall 
2011): 11–39. 
Rodríguez Araque, Alí. Antes de Que Se Me Olvide: Conversación Con Rosa Miriam Elizalde. 
La Habana: Editora Política, 2012. 
———. El Proceso de Privatización Petrolera En Venezuela. Los Teques: Fondo editorial 
ALEM, 1997. 
Rodríguez, Francisco, and Adam J. Gomolin. “Anarchy, State, and Dystopia: Venezuelan 
Economic Institutions before the Advent of Oil.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 28, 
no. 1 (2009): 102–21. 
Rodríguez Sosa, Pedro Luis, and Luis R. Rodríguez Pardo. El Petróleo Como Instrumento de 
Progreso. Una Nueva Relación Ciudadano-Estado-Petróleo. Ediciones IESA, 2012. 
Rondón de Sansó, Hildegard. El Régimen Jurídico de Los Hidrocarburos: El Impacto Del 
Petróleo En Venezuela. 3rd Edition. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 2012. 
253 
 
Rosales, Antulio. “Going Underground: The Political Economy of the ‘left Turn’ in South 
America.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 1, 2013): 1443–57. 
doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.831538. 
Ruggie, John Gerard. Constructing the World Polity Essays on International Institutionalization. 
  New International Relations. London  ; New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Ross, Michael L., and Erik Voeten. “Oil and International Cooperation.” International Studies 
Quarterly 60, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 85–97. doi:10.1093/isq/sqv003. 
Sader Pérez, Rubén. Hacia La Nacionalización Petrolera. 2nd edition. Colección Venezuela Y 
Su Petóleo. Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 2013. 
Salazar-Carrillo, Jorge, and Bernadette West. Oil and Development in Venezuela During the 20th 
Century. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004. 
Salmerón, Víctor. Petróleo Y Desmadre: De La Gran Venezuela a La Revolución Bolivariana. 
Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2013. 
Sanderson, Henry, and Michael Forsythe. China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence-How 
China Development Bank Is Rewriting the Rules of Finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2012. 
Santos, Eduardo, and Luis Vallenilla Lanz. “Debate Sobre El Cesarismo Democrático.” Revista 
de Economía Institucional 16, no. 31 (Segundo Semestre 2014): 313–30. 
Sassen, Saskia. Sociology of Globalization. 1st ed. Contemporary Societies. New York: 
WWNorton, 2007. 
Sawyer, Suzana. Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in 
Ecuador. Duke University Press, 2004. 
Sebastián Paz, Gonzalo. “China and Venezuela: Oil, Technology, and Socialism.” IN: China 
Engages Latin America. Tracing the Trajectory. Adrian H. Hearn E José Luis León-
Marnríquez: Ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011, 221–34. 
Secretaría de Hidrocarburos. “Contrato Prestación de Servicios Tarapoa - 2010.” Service 
contract. Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons Secretariat, November 2010. 
http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_tarapoa_2010.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Bloque 14.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons 
Secretariat, November 2010. http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_bloque_14_2010.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Bloque 16.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons 
Secretariat, November 2010. http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_mdc_2010.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Bloque ENO - RON.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador: 
Hydrocarbons Secretariat, May 2012. http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_bloque_eno_ron_2012.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Gustavo G.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons 




———. “Prestacion de Servicios M. D. C.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons 
Secretariat, November 2010. http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_mdc_2010.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Tecpecuador.” Service contract. Quito-Ecuador, January 2011. 
http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_tecpecuador_2011.pdf. 
———. “Prestación de Servicios Tiguino.” Quito-Ecuador: Hydrocarbons Secretariat, January 
2011. http://www.she.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/prestacion_de_servicios_tiguino_2011.pdf. 
Shaffer, Brenda, and Taleh Ziyadov. Beyond the Resource Curse. University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011. 
Shaofeng, Chen. “Has China’s Foreign Energy Quest Enhanced Its Energy Security?” The China 
Quarterly 207 (2011): 600–625. 
Sikkink, Kathryn. “Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea of International 
Human Rights.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations 20, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 389–404. doi:10.5555/1075-2846-20.3.389. 
Silva Calderón, Álvaro. Reversión Y Nacionalización En El Sistema Legal de Los Hidrocarburos 
En Venezuela: Acopio de Escritos Y Textos Legales. Colección Sendero de Luz. 
Maracaibo: BCV, LUZ, n.d. 
Singh, Kelvin. “Oil Politics in Venezuela during the López Contreras Administration (1936–
1941).” Journal of Latin American Studies 21, no. 1–2 (June 1989): 89–104. 
doi:10.1017/S0022216X00014437. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order / Anne-Marie Slaughter. Princeton, NJ; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004.  
Stevens, Paul. “National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies in the Middle East: 
Under the Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle.” The Journal of 
World Energy Law & Business 1, no. 1 (2008): 5–30. 
Strange, Susan. States and Markets. London: Pinter, 1988. 
Svampa, Maristella. “Commodities Consensus: Neoextractivism and Enclosure of the Commons  
in Latin America.” South Atlantic Quarterly 114, no. 1 (2015): 65. 
Telesur. “Propuesta de Acuerdos a Ser Suscritos Durante La XIII Comisión Mixta de Alto Nivel 
(CMAN) Entre La República Bolivariana de Venezuela Y La República Popular China.” 
Caracas, n.d. http://exwebserv.telesurtv.net/secciones/archivos/ARCH515_799.pdf. 
Terán, Mantovani. El Fantasma de La Gran Venezuela: Un Estudio Del Mito Del Desarrollo Y 
Los Dilemas Del Petro-Estado En La Revolución Bolivariana. Caracas: Centro de 
Estudios Latinoamericanos CELARG, 2014. 
Tinker Salas, Miguel. “The Enduring Legacy: Oil.” Culture, and Society in Venezuela (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2009), 2009, 1900–1938. 
Tugwell, Franklin. The Politics of Oil in Venezuela. Stanford University Press, 1975. 
255 
 
Tussie, Diana, and Pia Riggirozzi. “A Global Conversation: Rethinking IPE in Post-Hegemonic 
Scenarios.” Contexto Internacional 37, no. 3 (2015): 1041–68. 
Uzcátegui, Rafael. “Movilizaciones estudiantiles en Venezuela: Del carisma de Chávez al 
conflicto en redes.” Nueva Sociedad, no. 251 (2014): 153–65. 
Valdivia, Gabriela. “Governing Relations between People and Things: Citizenship, Territory, 
and the Political Economy of Petroleum in Ecuador.” Political Geography 27, no. 4 
(2008): 456–77. 
———. “Oil Frictions and the Subterranean Geopolitics of Energy Regionalisms.” Environment 
and Planning A 47, no. 7 (2015): 1422–39. 
Vallenilla, Luis. La Apertura Petrolera: Un Peligroso Retorno Al Pasado. Caracas: Ediciones 
Porvenir, 1995. 
Vargas, René. “Petróleo: Desarrollo Y Seguridad.” In Política Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 1972-
1976. Quito: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 
1976. 
Vásquez Pacheco, Sergio. “Lo Lógico Y Digno Es Adquirir Por Lo Menos El 51% de Las 
Acciones Del Consorcio.” In Política Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 1972-1976, 99–132. Quito-
Ecuador: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 
1976. 
Veltmeyer, Henry. “The Natural Resource Dynamics of Postneoliberalism in Latin America: 
New Developmentalism or Extractivist Imperialism?” Studies in Political Economy 90 
(2013). http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/19269. 
Vernon, Raymond. “Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises.” Basic 
Book Inc., New York, 1971. 
———. Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues. Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Villavicencio, Arturo. Innovación, Matriz Productiva Y Universidad: Por Qué Yachay Es Una 
Estrategia Equivocada. Debate Universitario 8. Quito-Ecuador: Corporación Editora 
Nacional, 2014. 
———. “Un Cambio Neodesarrollista de La Matriz Energética. Lecturas Críticas.” In La 
Restauración Conservadora Del Correísmo, 1a Edición. Quito: Arcoiris Producción, 
2014. 
Villavicencio, Fernando. “El ‘Milagro Ecuatoriano’ En La Renegociación de Contratos 
Petroleros.” Plan V, June 10, 2014. 
http://www.planv.com.ec/investigacion/investigacion/el-milagro-ecuatoriano-la-
renegociacion-contratos-petroleros. 
———. Sarayaku: La Derrota Del Jabalí. Quito: Artes Gráficas SILVA, 2014. 
Vivoda, Vlado. “Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: Challenges 
and Change in the New Millennium.” New Political Economy 14, no. 4 (December 1, 
2009): 517–34. doi:10.1080/13563460903287322. 
256 
 
———. “Rise of State-Firm Bargaining in the 2000s.” In The Political Economy of Natural 
Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism, 53–69. New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2016. 
———. The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big Oil: A Study of 
Bargaining in the Contemporary Oil Industry. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008. 
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:330900. 
Watts, Michael. “Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.” 
Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 50–80. 
Weinthal, Erika, and Pauline Jones Luong. “Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative 
Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 01 (2006): 35–53. 
Weyland, Kurt. “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory.” 
Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (2009): 145–64. 
Wilson, Jeffrey D. “Understanding Resource Nationalism: Economic Dynamics and Political 
Institutions.” Contemporary Politics, no. ahead-of-print (2015): 1–18. 
Wolff, Jonas. “Business Power and the Politics of Postneoliberalism: Relations Between 
Governments and Economic Elites in Bolivia and Ecuador.” Latin American Politics and 
Society 58, no. 2 (2016): 124–47. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00313.x. 
 
